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ABSTRACT 
RELIGION AND REGIONALISM: CONGREGANTS, CULTURE, AND CITY-
COUNTY CONSOLIDATION IN LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 
 
Joshua D. Ambrosius 
May 8, 2010 
Literature on religious involvement in public affairs typically examines the 
national scene, particularly public opinion and political behavior in presidential elections.  
Few scholars examine religious actors in urban politics and policymaking.  Those who do 
study local politics emphasize morality policy and ignore issues of metropolitan 
governance and institutional design, central concerns of the urban politics field.  This 
dissertation fills that gap by studying Louisville, Kentucky, site of the first large-scale 
city-county consolidation since 1969.  I ask: does religion affect how people vote in a 
consolidation referendum and shape their opinions about merged government?   
I employ a survey instrument (N=807), collected randomly across Louisville 
Metro in 2006, and use multiple linear and binary logistic regression to predict religiosity, 
“culture war” stances, and consolidation referendum participation and support.  I control 
for socio-economic status, demographics, residence, and political ideology.  I 
operationalize religion as a variable in two ways: as a factor score index measuring level 
of religiosity, combining behavior, belief, and salience items; and as religious affiliation, 
predominately Roman Catholic and Southern Baptist in Louisville.  I also employ the  
ix 
 
2006 General Social Survey for comparison with the nation and several additional 
religion databases to better understand Louisville’s religious ecology.   
I find that religiosity did not significantly affect one’s turnout or vote but is 
positively related to opinions of the merged government.  Religious affiliation did not 
significantly affect turnout but significantly affected one’s vote and opinions.  Regression 
results show that Catholics were 37 percent more likely to support consolidation than 
Southern Baptists.  I downplay theories that differences over redistribution to central 
cities and political trust may be driving differences over consolidation.   
I posit a theory labeled “polity replication” based in the institutional and 
organizational theory and sociology of religion literatures.  I argue that participation in a 
religious denomination’s organizational structure conditions members to prefer similar 
structures in other societal institutions.  Two forms of metropolitan governance, 
monocentrism and polycentrism, parallel the poles of church polity (i.e., denominational 
governance): episcopal/centralized (Catholic) and congregational/decentralized (Baptist).   
In conclusion, I present recommendations and implications for research, religious 
practice, and politics/policymaking.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Introduction: Religion, Social Science, and Urban Studies   
Religious institutions and organizations have always been important components 
of human settlement and civilization.  Kotkin’s (2005) treatise on ancient urban history 
goes so far as to list the city’s sacred role on par with its more-emphasized political and 
economic functions.  The social sciences’ founders, including early economists, 
psychologists, historians, and sociologists, understood the importance of religion and 
integrated its study into their most-celebrated works (Smith, 1776; James, 1902; Maslow, 
1964; Tawney, 1926; Durkheim, 1897; Weber, 1930).  By the mid-to-late twentieth 
century, however, work on the social scientific study of religion faded into obscurity as 
the secularization thesis won acceptance.  With roots in Marx, Freud, Weber, and 
Durkheim, the secularization thesis—in its most basic form—holds that societal 
modernization, including urbanization, correlates with declining levels of religiosity.  The 
theory predicted that the power and influence of religious organizations would fade, 
ultimately undermining the church as a major institution of human society.   
This rejection of religion’s importance was engrained in urban studies, perhaps 
most of all, as the field embraced structural Marxism and Kotkin’s other urban 
functions—known collectively as political economy (Swanstrom, 1993; Sapotichne, 
Jones, and Wolfe, 2007).  Even theologians began to speak of the “secular city” (Cox, 
1965).  As cities grew, religion waned—or so it was thought.  Religion was simply  
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incompatible with modern, industrial, urbanized society.  Sociology’s founding fathers—
who spoke a great deal about religion—inspired later generations to discontinue further 
scientific investigation into religion’s role in society.   
At the advent of the twenty-first century we now recognize the secularization 
thesis largely as an ideologically-tinged byproduct of Enlightenment-era rationality.  If 
true at all, secularization is largely a European phenomenon; but even this “fact” has been 
challenged (Stark and Iannaccone, 1994).  Worldwide, including the United States (U.S.), 
just the opposite may be true.  A recent United Nations Population Fund (2007, 26) report 
on global urbanization states it well: 
The revival of religious adherence in its varied forms is one of the more 
noticeable cultural transformations accompanying urbanization.  Rapid 
urbanization was expected to mean the triumph of rationality, secular 
values and the demystification of the world, as well as the relegation of 
religion to a secondary role.  Instead, there has been a renewal in religious 
interest in many countries.   
 
Religion is being rediscovered in all branches of the social sciences—from 
sociology to political science, and even economics and New Institutional/organizational 
theory (Ebaugh, 2002; Wald and Wilcox, 2006; Iannaccone, 1998; Demerath, et al., 
1998; McMullen, 1994; Scheitle and Dougherty, 2008).  Urban studies—particularly the 
urban politics subfield of political science—appears to be an exception (Sharp, 2007).  
Urbanists rank the lowest in religious interest when compared with political science’s 
other Americanist and Comparativist branches (Ambrosius, 2008a; 2009a).  While 
sociologists of religion, for example, employ urban theory to explain the distribution of 
religion across neighborhoods and the metropolitan region—a concept known as religious 
ecology—urbanists largely tend to ignore other bodies of work outside the limited urban 
field (Form and Dubrow, 2005, 2008; Eiesland, 2000; McRoberts, 2003; Sapotichne, et 
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al., 2007).  This includes work on religion and politics by scholars of American national 
politics (Sharp, 2007).   
Many studies find that religion affects partisan identification, electoral 
participation/decisions, and personal opinions on social and political issues in the U.S. 
(Campbell, 2007; Denton, 2005; Gilderbloom and Markham, 1995; Green, Rozell, and 
Wilcox, 2003; Guth, et al., 2006; Kohut, et al., 2000; Langer and Cohen, 2005; Layman, 
2001; Leege and Kellstedt, 1993; Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth, 2009a; Wilcox, 1996).  
Much of this work relies on large samples of the mass public—drawing on publically 
available datasets (particularly the General Social Survey and American National 
Election Study) or survey data collected specifically to gauge the relationship between 
religion and politics (e.g., the National Survey of Religion and Politics; see Guth, et al., 
2006).   
Recent media accounts confirm that religious institutions and organizations are 
playing central roles in the fundamental issues and concerns of our time—including 
exurban growth, the housing boom and economic collapse, globalization, climate change, 
healthcare reform, urban planning and revitalization, and community economic 
development (Mahler, 2005; Rosin, 2009; Wright, 2009; Winter, 2009; Wisdom, 2009; 
Reep, 2009; Henriques and Lehren, 2007).  In the cases of globalization and the housing 
crisis, some are even attributing a causal link to religious forces (Wright, 2009; Rosin, 
2009).   
Despite this apparent “revival” of religion, little research has examined religion’s 
effect on local political allegiance, behavior, or beliefs.  Those limited studies that have 
explored local “culture war” divisions tend to rely on qualitative case studies rather than 
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quantitative analysis of random-sample survey data (e.g., Sharp, 1999).  Only one study 
thoroughly examines the relationship between religion and politics in a U.S. city 
(Demerath and Williams, 1992).  Two recent multi-author volumes engage moral and 
religious influences on local politics using multi-city samples (Djupe and Olson, 2007; 
Sharp, 2005).  Sharp (2005) and her colleagues concentrate on morality policy while 
Djupe and Olson (2007) extend their analyses, conducted by contributors, to issues 
“beyond the culture wars” like social justice and race relations.   
No contemporary authors emphasize potential religious influences on several key 
theoretical and empirical issues central to the urban politics field—including metropolitan 
governance, governmental fragmentation, and city-county consolidation.  At the heart of 
these issues is the question of institutional design: what set of institutions and 
organizational structures is best-suited for governance of the metropolitan region in the 
contemporary U.S.?  Given that governance structures “are the work of civil society and 
therefore…based on a rule of willing consent,” religion likely plays a role in shaping 
individual preferences for institutional design (Oakerson, 2004, 20).  Religious 
institutions dominate American civil society and are influential in shaping personal moral 
and political commitments (Putnam, 2000; see above citations).  Nonetheless, the direct 
effect of religion on preferences for differing forms of metropolitan structure has not 
been explored previously in the urban politics literature or elsewhere.   
 
Religion and Consolidation in Louisville, Kentucky 
Louisville, Kentucky is an interesting locale for exploration of religious ecology 
and its implications for local institutional design due to both its rich religious history and 
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recent political innovation.  Louisville is a mid-sized, middle American city bordering the 
southern and Midwestern regions, long labeled the “gateway from the North to the 
South” (McMeekin, 1946, 256).  The city is historically Democratic and Roman Catholic 
but located in a politically “red state” within the contemporary “Bible belt.”  Louisville 
has sizable populations of Roman Catholics, black Protestants, and white evangelical 
Protestants, particularly Southern Baptists, as well as several large megachurches, two 
prominent seminaries, and a denominational headquarters (Jones, et al., 2002; Hartford 
Institute, 2009; Barlow, 2004; Gaustad and Schmidt, 2004).  Louisville is home to over 
500 individual religious congregations (Jones, et al., 2002).  Southeast Christian Church, 
located in Louisville’s suburban east-end, is frequented each weekend by over 18,000 
worshippers (Hartford Institute, 2009).  The city itself boasts another six churches over 
2,000 average weekly attendees—the accepted cutoff for “megachurch” status (Hartford 
Institute, 2009; Thumma and Travis, 2007).  Louisville’s largest predominately black 
church, St. Stephen Church, has an average attendance of approximately 8,000 (Hartford 
Institute, 2009).   
Louisville’s medium size and relative geographic isolation make it a more 
manageable case study than oft-studied “megacities” and other mid-sized cities located 
within megalopolis regions (Ambrosius, Gilderbloom, and Hanka, 2010).  Barlow (2004) 
argues that the Midwest region is the most-representative of the U.S. as a whole of any of 
the country’s regions, demographically and in terms of religious affiliation.  Louisville 
lies on the Midwestern frontier, an area referred to as “Kentuckiana” due to its border 
with Indiana (Barlow, 2004, 31).  Louisville shares many characteristics, including ethnic 
and cultural diversity, with nearby Midwestern cities like its “Ohio River sister city,” 
6 
 
Cincinnati, Ohio (Williams, 2004, 217).  On the other hand, the U.S. Census Bureau 
places Louisville in the southern region, which has long been said to possess a distinct 
regional subculture (Salisbury, 1962; Ellison and Musick, 1993).  Thus, Louisville could 
be termed the Upper South or the Lower Midwest (Ownby, 2005).  While research 
findings from Louisville are not representative of the nation as a whole, or even all other 
cities (see Stein, 1960), a case study conducted in Louisville likely will uncover 
conditions more reflective of “typical” American communities than studies of cultural 
and social outliers like New York City or Los Angeles (also see Feagin, Orum, and 
Sjoberg, 1991).  A previous study with similar goals used a southern community (Atlanta, 
Georgia) to test general hypotheses without reference to the study’s regional context 
(McMullen, 1994).   
While interesting for religious and geographic reasons, Louisville has also drawn 
attention for its recent political reforms.  Residents of the City of Louisville and 
surrounding Jefferson County voted to consolidate their governments in a 2000 
referendum, with the merger of city and county completed by 2003 (Savitch and Vogel, 
2004).  This was the first large-scale consolidation in a U.S. city since Indianapolis and 
Marion County, Indiana, merged in 1969 (Morgan, England, and Pelissero, 2007).  Since 
consolidation, Louisville has become a magnet for scholars of urban studies, regional 
planning, and public administration.  The local elite, national experts on urban policy, 
and adherents of the “New Regionalism” hail Louisville’s successes in overcoming 
regional competition and planning for a better future (Brookings Institution, 2002; 
Greater Louisville Project, 2005, 2007, 2008; Rusk, 2003; Dreier, Mollenkopf, and 
Swanstrom, 2004).  Critical local academics, on the other hand, lament its downsides, 
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focusing on consolidation’s power dimension, dilution of minority influence, and 
inability to live up to its lofty goals—enhancement of economic development and fair 
share housing in particular (Ambrosius, 2009b; Imbroscio, 2006; Savitch and Vogel, 
2000, 2004; Savitch, Vogel, and Ye, 2009).   
Like most communities, Louisville faces a host of local political issues where 
religion is certain to play a role.  These include arguments over homosexuality and gay 
rights, pornography and adult entertainment, and sex education in public schools.  While 
these issues may or may not have developed to full-fledged local culture “wars” in 
Louisville, divisions in public opinion exist in any urban environment where forms of 
conventional and unconventional culture butt heads.   
 
Research Questions 
Savitch and colleagues’ (2008) account of Louisville’s political culture 
demonstrates that religious congregations and believers, particularly evangelicals, are 
inclined to take political action on important local moral matters.  While personal moral 
issues may make up the bulk of the bickering at the national level, religious differences 
are thought to extend beyond sexuality and abortion to economics, diplomacy, and other 
policy arenas (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2003; Guth, et al., 1996; Wilson, 2009).  In 
Peterson’s (1981) famous terms, local governments are “limited” by the federalist 
structure and thus cannot make war or peace, close their borders to outsiders, or take 
action in a host of other policy fields.  Nonetheless, the realm of local politics certainly 
encompasses the distribution of local power and decision-making and concerns over 
“who gets what”—the natural stuff of politics.  Do religious differences influence 
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personal political stances on these more-lofty issues of urban political economy and 
institutional design?  Some evidence indicates that local churches may have played a role 
in influencing public opinion about consolidation in Louisville (Savitch and Vogel, 
2004).   
Sharp (2007, 59) admits that, “To many analysts, the notion that cultural 
cleavages would shape urban electoral outcomes may at first blush appear absurd.”  She 
then acknowledges that in fact “it may not be the case that differences in religiosity…are 
directly implicated in voter mobilization and vote choice in local elections, except 
perhaps in referenda involving morality issues” such as Brown, Knopp, and Morrill’s 
(2005) study of gay rights in Tacoma, Washington (Sharp, 2007, 59).  Sharp believes that 
the possibility is still open that religion and other cultural factors may be “linked to 
differences in participation levels, thus shaping the effective electorate and hence 
electoral outcomes.  And…culture might serve as an important contextual or mediating 
variable” (Sharp, 2007, 59).   
Sharp’s willingness to ask questions of religion’s value and her lingering doubts 
about religious differences on substantial, non-morality issues beg for future exploration 
of religion’s effect on local government and politics.  Does religion influence urban 
government and politics beyond the typical culture war issues?  What is the mechanism, 
or theoretical connection, spurring any demonstrated religious effect?  Why might 
churches or religious believers approach a seemingly non-moral issue like city-county 
consolidation with unusual passion?  The central question of this study, operationalized, 
is: does religion (religiosity and/or religious affiliation) influence individuals’ preferences 
for institutional design, manifested by participation in a city-county consolidation 
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referendum, vote choice in favor of consolidation, and approval of a merged city-county 
government?   
Since I must test this question in a given locale, it becomes pertinent first to ask: 
to what extent does the county under study reflect the religion, politics, and culture of the 
general population?  Empirical, contextual questions take the following forms: What is 
the geographic distribution of Christian edifices, religious identification, and individual 
religiosity across the urban continuum of Louisville-Jefferson County Metro?  What 
variables contribute to the formation of Louisville’s religious ecology?  What variables 
predict individual religious identification and religiosity in Louisville?  How do these 
findings compare with the nation?  How does Louisville compare with the nation on 
religious differences on political ideology, partisan identification (support for President 
George W. Bush), and attitudes on the divisive culture war issues of homosexuality and 
sex education in public schools?  By religious differences, I mean differences in both 
religious affiliation and religiosity.   
Furthermore, to test whether preferences for city-county consolidation are 
possibly masking preferences for something else, I ask: do religiosity and/or religious 
affiliation influence, in the same or similar way, individuals’ (a) attitudes on 
redistribution to central cities, (b) penchants for political trust, and (c) approval of the 
primary consolidation entrepreneur (Louisville’s mayor)?   
I theorize two connections between religion and urban institutional design, 
represented by two key independent variables: religiosity and religious identification/ 
preference (a proxy for religious affiliation).  Because religions are divided on some 
issues of social justice and redistribution, and consolidation is supported by a diverse 
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coalition of interests, the direction of effect (positive or negative) on religiosity is 
somewhat ambiguous.  On one hand, consolidation and other regional initiatives are 
thought to harness suburban resources for the betterment of the typically-decaying urban 
core (Rusk, 2003; Dreier, et al., 2004).  Many churches take part in similar urban-
suburban partnerships that could reinforce pro-regionalism attitudes and behaviors (Sider, 
et al., 2008; Owens, 2006).  However, this understanding is complicated by the recent 
rise of politically conservative religion which views any form of government-imposed 
redistribution as suspect.  In this sense, religiosity may be a proxy for conservatism and 
NIMBY (“not in my back yard”) attitudes.  On the other hand, consolidation can be seen 
as furthering the interests of the powerful—economic growth and development (Savitch 
and Vogel, 2004).  In this context, conservative religionists may favor consolidation 
while liberal, urban parishioners—particularly black Protestants, who fear dissolution of 
influence—may view consolidation and its supporters with suspicion.   
I propose an original theory as to why different religious denominations may have 
differing views on city-county consolidation and, more broadly, questions of institutional 
design in society at large.  It is known that religious denominations possess divergent 
organizational structures (Allen, 1995; Zech, 2003).  For example, the Southern Baptist 
Convention is a loose alliance of Baptist churches that prides itself on maintaining 
relative congregational autonomy (Mao and Zech, 2002).  On the other hand, the Roman 
Catholic Church is an international conglomerate with many levels of administration 
(Mao and Zech, 2002).  Local Catholic Church officials and their congregations are 
beholden to the leadership at the regional (diocese), national, or Vatican levels.  These 
two church structures—inspired by their distinctive theologies—correspond fairly well 
11 
 
with two models of urban structure: polycentrism and monocentrism (Oakerson, 2004).  
Past research has found that culture does influence societies’ institutional structures and 
policy preferences (Greif, 1994; Koven, 1999).  Differences in local culture are thought 
to influence the pursuit (or lack thereof) of regionalism—with certain areas preferring 
individualized, localized control and others more collective, regional government (Burns, 
1994; Dreier, et al., 2004; Miller, 2002; Rusk, 2003).   
Catholics and Southern Baptists are the two largest religious denominations in 
Louisville and, in many ways, represent the two poles of Christian polity (see McMullen, 
1994 for similar examples).  It seems likely that Southern Baptists will view 
consolidation with more skepticism, while Catholics will view it more favorably.  Black 
Protestants will likely view both consolidation and the regime with skepticism.  It is 
documented that much of consolidation’s opposition came from within the black 
community (Porter, 2008; Savitch and Vogel, 2004).  The religiously unaffiliated often 
align with the liberal end of the political spectrum and the Democratic Party in U.S. 
politics (Leege and Kellstedt, 1993).  Their views of consolidation could go either way—
in support of far-left critics or in alliance with the local Democratic establishment.  Other 
Protestants and Christians’ opinions are likely largely divided, perhaps reflective of, or 
cutting across, other political divisions.  Non-Christian religions compose such a small 
proportion of Louisville’s population that an attempt to understand particular traditions’ 
positions is particularly difficult; and any collective effect is nonsensical because of the 
inclusion of vastly different traditions (Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, etc.).   
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Data Sources 
This study analyzes data on local public opinion in Louisville, Kentucky from the 
2006 Louisville Metropolitan Survey (LMS; Department of Sociology, 2006).  The 2006 
LMS asks a host of questions on religion and religiosity, morality, and local politics 
including participation and vote in the consolidation referendum and opinions of the 
consolidated Louisville Metro government.  This study also employs the General Social 
Survey for comparison with the nation as a whole and as a means to test locally-derived 
theory (GSS; Davis and Smith, 2006).  In addition, I explore several other data sources on 
Louisville’s religious ecology and history to provide context as needed.   
 
Overview 
Following a literature review and methodology description, findings are divided 
into three chapters (IV) “Louisville’s Religious Landscape”; (V) “Culture War in 
Louisville and the Nation”; and (VI) “Religion and City-County Consolidation in 
Louisville.”  Each of the three includes review of historical or contextual information, 
analysis of descriptive statistics and inferential methods, and discussion of the findings.  
The final chapter (VII) titled “Discussion and Implications” summarizes the findings and 
discusses implications for research and practice.   
 
Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to the social scientific literature in several ways.  At 
a basic level, it reconnects urban politics with political science through analysis of 
religion, political behavior, and institutional design (Feiock, 2004b).  Ramsay (1998), 
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Swanstrom (1993), and Sharp (2007) have all argued that the urban politics field has 
ignored cultural factors (including religion) in favor of an unhealthy reliance on what 
Swanstrom calls “economism.”  When religion appears in the urban literature, it is often 
in the form of a religious metaphor with little substantive reference to religious 
phenomena (see Judd, 2005 for numerous examples).  Henig (2008), writing in a special 
issue of Urban News devoted to the status of the Urban Politics Field (UPF), argues that 
UPF scholars should test hypotheses from the national level at the urban level to 
stimulate the subfield and dialogue across American political science.  Liu (2008, 2) 
summarizes Henig’s argument: 
Henig offer[s] suggestions regarding how the UPF can reinvigorate itself 
to be more influential in [mainstream political science].  His main 
suggestion is “to self-consciously use city settings as sites to test 
hypotheses generated at the national level under differing economic, 
political, and cultural contexts.”  For Henig, using the city as the unit of 
analysis paid research dividends in the past, and it could do so once again 
in the future. 
 
This sentiment is the foundation for this present study.  This dissertation seeks to 
fill the “God-shaped hole” in urban politics, to borrow King’s (2005, 531, n1) apt phrase; 
to move beyond the racial and economic divisions dominating the urban literature to the 
cultural and religious cleavages that have so polarized the U.S. electorate in recent 
presidential elections.  This research connects the scientific study of religion—by 
sociologists, economists, and political scientists—with theory on urban ecology, urban 
political economy, regionalism, institutional design, and political behavior.  The 
identification of religious influences on urban public opinion and electoral outcomes will 
hopefully open the eyes (and hearts) of urbanists to a new vein of urban research.   
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This study introduces a unique causal mechanism, termed “polity replication.”  
This theory opens up a new strain of research in public administration, organizational and 
institutional theory, urban politics, and other subfields of contemporary political 
science—including national, comparative, and international politics.  For example, 
Roman Catholics may be more likely than Baptists (to use the two key traditions of this 
study) and other Protestants to view international organization and nation-state 
cooperation with favor (see Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser, 2001).  Furthermore, if participants 
in religious denominations are in fact structured to prefer particular institutional forms 
outside the church, perhaps other private associations—from hierarchical corporations to 
community-based nonprofit organizations—similarly encourage institutional preferences.   
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
This review summarizes several bodies of literature which relate to the present 
research questions.  I first discuss explorations of religious ecology and past findings on 
the distribution of religion across metropolitan regions.  Secondly, I explore the literature 
on individual religiosity, grouped by findings on several key demographic characteristics.   
Thirdly, I summarize theories on religion and politics at the national level and beyond, 
including evidence for a “culture war” and studies of the “faith factor” in national 
elections and public opinion.  Fourthly, I discuss religion’s place in the study of urban 
politics and the limited work done in this area.  Finally, over three sections, I turn to 
institutional theory and institutional design in church and state, including literature on 
city-county consolidation and religious influences.  Hypotheses are suggested throughout, 
culminating in the primary hypotheses in the final section and accompanying table.  
 
Religious and Urban Ecology   
A hot topic in the sociological study of religion has been the study of “religious 
ecology,” either of an entire city or metropolitan region (Form and Dubrow, 2008; 
Livezey, 2000), a single subsection of the metropolis (Ebaugh, O’Brien, and Chafetz, 
2000; Form and Dubrow, 2005; Eiesland, 2000; McRoberts, 2003), or communities 
across several cities or regions (Ammerman, 1997; Blanchard, 2007; Blanchard, et al., 
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2008).  This sometimes involves a census of religious congregations and a geographic 
analysis of their locations or an analysis of where religious followers/members reside 
within a community (Sinha, et al., 2007; Ebaugh, O’Brien, and Chafetz, 2000).  The term 
“religious ecology” is rarely defined explicitly in these works; and if it is anything like its 
cousins urban or human ecology, it could mean many things—particularly with the 
newfound emphasis on environmental (or “ecological”) research.   
“Ecology” (or “ecological”) typically implies two distinct connotations in the 
social scientific literature that are often intertwined.  First, it can simply refer to the use of 
aggregate (or community-level) data.  In this sense, ecological study can represent either 
(a) the sum of individual characteristics or preferences (and is thus subject to the 
ecological fallacy, which limits the application of aggregate conclusions to individual 
actors; Robinson, 1950) or (b) structural conditions.  Second, ecology can simply refer to 
environment—surroundings or context—and the environmental conditions (Eiesland and 
Warner, 1998).  This is also a structural conceptualization (Blanchard, et al., 2008).   
McRoberts (2003, 9) attempts to define religious ecology by simply stating that 
“urban forms give rise to religious forms.”  McRoberts (2003, 9) traces the study of 
religious ecology back to the Chicago School of Sociology’s urban ecology, which 
“treats the city as a system analogous to a natural ecology.”  According to McRoberts, 
religious ecology is rooted in the Chicago Schools’ understanding of neighborhood 
transition (“invasion” and “succession”) applied to religious organizations’ patterns of 
land use.  Eiesland (2000, xi) employs a slightly more-specific understanding of religious 
ecology, which she defines as “the patterns of relations, status, and interaction among 
religious organizations within a locality.”  This builds on her understanding of the 
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“ecological frame” or perspective—which is the “theoretical and practical response to 
increased religious pluralism and the restructuring of religious life” (Eiesland and 
Warner, 1998, 41).  Eiesland and Warner (1998) also use the metaphor of the natural 
world to describe communities.   
Livezey (2000) further discusses the Chicago School roots of religious ecology.  
Citing Sennett (1969), Livezey (2000, 15) argues that Robert Park (1968) and his 
Chicago School colleagues (Park and Burgess, 1925) diverged from their German 
teachers by seeking to “discern the urban culture…in the ways in which it was internally 
divided” (i.e., the city’s own “ecology”).  Simmel, Weber, and Spendler, on the other 
hand, contrasted city life with rural life, that of “farm and village,” assuming that cities 
exhibit a singular form of urban culture (Livezey, 2000, 15).  This may have been truer of 
European cities which at the time housed a single ethnicity and largely a sole religious 
tradition.  U.S. cities like Chicago instead embodied the “melting pot” metaphor of 
America composed of immigrants from various world regions and, increasingly, various 
world religions who immigrated to its neighborhoods—which took the form of ethnic 
enclaves.  Religious scholars in the U.S. thus applied Chicago School methods to study 
the diversity of religious congregations within cities—particularly Chicago (e.g., 
Kincheloe, 1989; Drake, 1940).  In one such example, Douglas (1926) surveyed over one 
thousand churches located in large cities across the U.S. and compared various phases of 
“adaptation” to changing urban environments.   
Implicit in Chicago-style religious ecology is the notion that individuals attend 
churches near their residence; and the inverse, that churches locate nearby the homes of 
their target population.  Related to religious ecology is what McRoberts (2003, 11-12) 
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calls the “religious voluntarism” literature, which is rooted in Rational Choice-inspired 
conceptions of religious consumers, church competition, and religious market share.  
Following Warner (1993), McRoberts criticizes the ecological perspective for ignoring 
the fact that individuals decide which churches to attend; and many people decide to 
attend churches in neighborhoods where they do not live.  McRoberts (2003, 12) also 
derides the voluntarism perspective for ignoring the “ways localities present opportunities 
for and place constraints on the flowering of religious markets.”  There is an apparent 
tension between the application of urban ecology and organizational ecology to the study 
of religious ecology.  McRoberts (2003, 12) concludes that the two perspectives should 
share insights:  
It seems that the ecological and voluntarism perspectives can benefit from 
cross-pollination.  Sensitivity to the voluntary aspects of participation can 
extend the explanatory power of religious ecology.  Meanwhile, the place-
oriented insights of religious ecology can make voluntarism theory more 
applicable to local contexts.   
 
Sociologists identify two types of congregations—parish and niche—that, to an 
extent, parallel the divisions between urban and organizational ecology (Ebaugh and 
Chafetz, 2000; McKinney, 1998; Ammerman, 1997; McRoberts, 2003).   Ammerman 
(1997, 36) nicely summarizes the two types in the following passage: 
Congregations, then, are related to their immediate contexts in a variety of 
ways.  Some are strongly identified with the people who inhabit a given 
locale and are therefore tied into the dense network of affiliation that is the 
local community.  They approximate the parish image.  Others occupy a 
specialized niche, serving a culturally or theologically defined 
constituency.  Urban congregations probably always lie somewhere 
between the two poles of parish and niche… 
 
Guest and Lee (1987) document the parish model, arguing that more-established 
churches with members most like their surrounding neighborhoods are the most-involved 
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in community affairs.  Roman Catholic congregations are thought to typify the parish 
model because they still delineate congregational territories, although this changes as 
young members move from the neighborhood but still return for Sunday mass (Ebaugh, 
O’Brien, and Chafetz, 2000).  On the other hand, Ebaugh, O’Brien, and Chafetz (2000) 
describe immigrant churches that carve out a niche by catering to a specific ethnicity and 
drawing members from throughout the metropolitan area.  Another example of niche 
churches are the numerous predominately gay congregations forming in cities around the 
country, such as those affiliated with the Metropolitan Community Church, groups of 
gays within traditional denominations, or even independent gatherings in gay bars 
(Warner, 1995; Davidson, 1987; Thumma, 2006).  Ebaugh, O’Brien, and Chafetz (2000) 
confirm Ammerman’s (1997) suggestion that many churches lie along a spectrum 
between the two types.   
Ammerman cautions that “niche” is used differently in this sense than in 
organizational theory/analysis (also see McRoberts, 2003, 12).  Organizational theorists, 
like Baum and Singh (1994), see every organization as possessing a niche, in that it must 
carve out its own position within a particular market for a product or service.  In 
Ammerman’s (1997, 384, n58) sense, niche congregations are ones that “successfully 
garner enough resources from a large institutional environment to be able to offer a 
distinctive array of services with little competitive overlap.”  Wuthnow (1994a) sees 
niche congregations as small churches with few ties to their immediate contexts while 
categorizing megachurches, which serve a larger region, as a distinct type of relationship 
between congregation and community.  Form and Dubrow (2005) similarly define the 
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downtown “first church” because it largely serves the entire metropolitan area rather than 
only the few residents of the downtown business district.   
Cities have changed quite a bit since Park and Burgess (1925) first attempted to 
simplify the urban form as several concentric zones emanating from the city center.  
Almost immediately, other scholars attacked the Chicago School’s model and proposed 
their own revisions (Hoyt, 1939; Harris and Ullman, 1945).  Hoyt (1939) saw various 
sectors, or wedges, radiating from the center and demarcated by major transportation 
routes, often of the “spoke and wheel” design that would later become highways and 
expressways.  Harris and Ullman (1945) proposed that the city is instead made up of 
“multiple nuclei”—including suburban areas functioning as smaller business districts.  
This theory foreshadowed later literature documenting polycentric urban regions and 
“edge cities” (Garreau, 1991).  Consequently, the simple Chicago School model has 
fallen out of favor in urban studies and, for some, has been replaced by a “postmodern” 
Los Angeles School (Dear and Flusty, 1998; Dear, 2002).  Dear (2002, 5) believes that 
American cities are patterning after the post-industrial Los Angeles (LA) area of southern 
California (rather than old, industrial Chicago); that LA is the “prototype of our urban 
future.”  Dear (2002, 20) distinguishes the LA School from its Chicago precursor by the 
ideas that the “urban peripheries are [now] organizing what remains of the center” and 
urban development has become a chaotic, non-linear process.   
While the urban studies field has, to an extent, left Chicago behind, scholars of 
religious ecology continue to employ a Chicago-style conception of the urban form.  
While early religious ecologists did link their theories to Chicago School methods, 
today’s religious ecologists do so implicitly without citations of Park and Burgess’ work.  
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Only one religious scholar has attempted to apply the new vision of the LA School to 
urban religion (Miller, 2001).  In a volume edited by Dear, Miller (2001) recounts the 
continued importance of religion in the U.S., even in LA despite California’s high rates 
of secularism.  Los Angeles appears to pattern after the nation—or maybe the nation after 
LA, in the LA School’s eyes—with the rise of Latino Catholicism, Black Protestantism, 
and evangelicalism and the decline of mainline Protestantism.  Miller also documents the 
growth and presence of numerous megachurches.  He does little, however, to connect the 
religious ecology to urban theory.   
 
Religiosity and its Determinants 
National research on the U.S. population has often found that certain individuals 
are more religiously-inclined than others.  Since the mid-twentieth century, social 
scientists—especially sociologists of religion—have sought to explain variations in 
religious observance across demographic lines (age, race, gender, etc.), socioeconomic 
statuses, regional differences, and daily, competing time constraints.  These broad 
categories compose much of the explanatory literature on religiosity.  This literature 
mostly confirms common perceptions of the independent variables’ impacts on church 
attendance/participation and overall religiosity.  This section briefly summarizes the 
existing body of work on determinants of religiosity.   
Race.  Many studies have found that blacks in the U.S. participate in religious 
activities more than whites when controlling for other individual socio-demographic and 
economic factors (Johnson, Matre, and Armbrecht, 1991; Nelson, Yokley, and Nelson, 
1971; Sasaki, 1979; Taylor, et al., 1996; Taylor, Mattis, and Chatters, 1999).  Some argue 
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that much of the difference is due instead to regional and urban-rural differences (Hunt 
and Hunt, 2001).  Taylor, Mattis, and Chatters (1999) find that religious involvement for 
blacks varies systematically by age, sex, marital status, and region.  Claims of a religious 
resurgence among Hispanics warrants further investigation and a thorough comparison 
with blacks, whites and others (Stevens-Arroyo, 1998).   
Sex.  It has been shown repeatedly that women in the modern West are generally 
more religious than men in terms of belief in God and participation in religious services 
and activities (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle, 1996; 
Brierley, 1991; Schobie, 1975; Yinger, 1970).  For example, Jacobs and Worcester 
(1990) found that 84 percent of British females believe in God compared with only 67 
percent of males.  This consistent difference has been attributed to gender differences in 
“structural location” in society, including such items as labor force participation and 
child-rearing (de Vaus and McAllister, 1987; Gee, 1991; Luckmann, 1967; Nelsen and 
Potvin, 1981); levels of guilt (Gray, 1971; Suziedelis and Potvin, 1981); overall 
socialization (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; D’Andrade, 1967; Suziedelis and Potvin, 
1981; Mol, 1985); and even risk preferences, a theory based on an inventive discussion of 
Pascal’s wager argument (Miller and Hoffmann, 1995).   
Age and Marital Status.  Older individuals tend to be more religious and attend 
church more regularly than younger people, although scholars debate how much of this is 
simply due to progression through “life courses” and if period effects exist (Argue, 
Johnson, and White, 1999).  As men and women age, marriage and family formation—
the addition of children—tend to increase the desire for religious community (Carroll and 
Roozen, 1975; Mueller and Cooper, 1986; Roozen, McKinney, and Thompson, 1990; 
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Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, and Waite 1995).  While religiosity and family formation are 
certainly correlated, the effect may be reversed, considering that most religious traditions 
place an emphasis on marriage as the sole expression of sexuality and encourage forming 
families to “replenish the earth” (Aldous, 1983; D’Antonio, 1983, 1985; Thornton, 1985).   
Socio-economic Status.  Individuals with higher education, income, and overall 
socio-economic status tend to be less religious than others.  Nationally, the most educated 
Americans are the least religious (Albrecht and Heaton, 1984; Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 
1975; Caplovitz and Sherrow, 1977), although education’s effect may not hold if one 
examines particular religious denominations (Albrecht and Heaton, 1984).  Also, more-
educated persons may exhibit less religious devotion but accumulate more religious 
knowledge (King and Hunt, 1975).  The relationship with wealth is often found to be 
weaker, with some researchers finding a positive or “backward bending” relationship, 
meaning that participation is highest for middle-income groups (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 
1975).  The wealthiest individuals, who also tend to be very educated, may not feel the 
need for religion—or perhaps manipulate it to their advantage, as in Marx’s famous 
account.  One study on the effect of religion on wealth accumulation finds that 
conservative Protestants accumulate very little wealth compared with the general 
population and followers of other religious traditions, especially Judaism (Keister, 2003).   
Geography: Regionalism and Urbanism.  Geography, including region of 
residency, influences religiosity.  For example, it has been demonstrated repeatedly that 
Southerners possess a distinct culture that places a strong emphasis on religious 
observance, particularly of the “fundamentalist” type (Ellison and Sherkat, 1995; Fichter 
and Maddox, 1965; George, 1988; Hunt and Hunt, 2001; Levin, Taylor, and Chatters, 
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1995; Taylor, 1988; Taylor, Thornton, and Chatters, 1987; Wuthnow and Christano, 
1979).  Fundamentalism may lead to intolerance and thus limit the building of “bridging” 
social capital across religious and racial lines, although more research is needed to 
differentiate the effects of region and religion (Ellison and Musick, 1993). 
In addition, rural inhabitants tend to be more religious than city-dwellers and even 
suburbanites (Hunt and Hunt, 2001; Miller, 2001).  Church attendance increases when 
one moves out to the periphery from the central city (Carlos, 1970).  This may be due to 
urbanism’s association with nontraditional behavior and values (Fischer, 1975a, 1975b).  
Urbanization has been thought to lead to a reduction in church attendance in the West.  
Landis (1959, 342) wrote that the National Council of Churches found that in the U.S. 
“the per cent of urbanization of a county was the most important statistic to analyze in 
connection with the churches located in that county and their membership.”  Furthermore, 
rural dwellers have fewer options for participating in local community.  At least one 
study found that regional differences matter more than rural versus urban residence in 
predicting religiosity (Chalfant and Heller, 1991).   
Time Constraints: Employment and Commuting.  Economists have begun to 
analyze household religious participation as they do other nonmarket activities—using a 
“household-allocation-of-time framework” (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975).  Azzi and 
Ehrenberg (1975, 43) find evidence for “the existence of income and substitution effects 
on religious participation.”  Drawing on Putnam (1995, 2000), many scholars have 
identified an overall decline in Americans’ community engagement.  Time constraints 
such as long hours spent working, commuting, and viewing television tend to exert a 
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downward influence on religious participation and other types of social capital-building 
activities (Putnam, 2000).   
Type of Residence.  While a thorough comparison of religiosity by residential 
structure—single-family home versus apartment/condominium—has not been conducted, 
some research is suggestive of a link between housing type and religiosity.  While 
employment status may capture competing time constraints, housing type may capture 
competing social constraints.  Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000, 17) find that apartment 
dwellers socialize more with their immediate neighbors and that these “increases in 
sociability appear to drive out other forms of social interaction such as churchgoing…”  
Indeed, they find that apartment dwellers attend church and frequent other social outlets 
less than home dwellers (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2000).  Home dwellers are also more 
likely to own their place of residence.  This leads to greater stability within the 
community and more active participation in community life, including church and 
politics (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Gilderbloom and Markham, 1995).   
 
Religion and Politics in the Nation   
According to Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth (2009b), there are two dominant theories 
on the role of religion in the American public square.  They call these the ethnoreligious 
and theological restructuring perspectives.  The ethnoreligious perspective believes that 
differences in political culture exist across religious traditions, which are confounded by 
racial, ethnic, and regional differences.  From this perspective, Roman Catholics—
particularly Latino Catholics—are expected to differ from white Protestants in their 
political views.  This theory held well when immigration from various parts of Europe 
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was at its height; and was very descriptive of local politics in the U.S. (Freeman, 1958).  
This perspective still largely describes Black Protestant and Latino Catholic/Protestant 
politics (Smidt, et al., 2009b).   
The more-contemporary restructuring perspective makes use of Hunter’s (1991, 
1994) “culture war” language.  As Wuthnow (1988) famously argued, religious traditions 
themselves are becoming polarized between traditional/orthodox/conservative and 
modern/progressive/liberal factions.  Thus, at least for the three large white American 
traditions—Roman Catholicism, Mainline Protestantism, and Evangelical 
Protestantism—greater differences exist within rather than across traditions.  According 
to this perspective, for example, conservative Roman Catholics may have more politics in 
common with conservative Mainline and Evangelical Protestants than they do with 
liberal Catholics.   
Roman Catholics have approached public life in three manners.  O’Brien (2008) 
labels these the republican, interest group, and evangelical approaches.  The republican 
approach emphasizes “shared responsibility as American citizens” in a pluralistic society, 
while the interest group model is “grounded in the immigrant working class experience, 
also serv[ing] as a form of identity politics, allowing civic action which was clearly 
Catholic” (O’Brien, 2008, 22-23).  The third, more-recent approach—termed evangelical 
by O’Brien—is the “Catholic version of the social Gospel.”  Rather than denoting 
conservative social positions like those held by contemporary evangelical Protestants, 
O’Brien’s (23) use of evangelical indicates “style,” which is a commitment placing 
Christian discipleship “beyond the claims of citizenship and group self-interest” which 
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often results in progressive positions favoring social justice.  In sum, this evangelical 
position: 
…involves a direct move from religious judgment to political prescription; 
it is the sharp end of identity politics, demanding discipleship, devaluing 
citizenship, and practicing, at least in language, what Max Weber called a 
“politics of ultimate ends.”  It challenges the domination of republican 
categories and calls into question the acceptability of interest group 
negotiations (O’Brien, 2008, 23).   
 
O’Brien’s categories reflect similar reasoning as the ethnoreligious and 
restructuring perspectives.  His interest group model is clearly an example of 
ethnoreligious theory, while the evangelical style is a component of religious 
restructuring.  Catholics following this evangelical approach transcend religious divisions 
and take public action to achieve the common goals of other, socially-minded Christians.  
The republican model is an alternative group that places citizenship ahead of ethnicity 
and religious culture; and is thus not represented by ethnoreligious nor restructuring 
theories.  All three are potentially relevant to the experiences of urban Catholics.   
Recent presidential and congressional elections have brought cultural 
restructuring to the fore and spawned allegations of an extremely polarized public, 
particularly the 2000 and 2004 elections (Jacobson, 2005).  These recent elections not 
only pitted Republican versus Democrat and conservative vs. liberal, but also religious 
vs. secular and red state vs. blue state—perhaps even suburban/rural vs. urban 
(Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005, 2008; Gimpel and Karnes, 2006; Sperling, et al., 
2004).  Some scholars debate this perspective arguing that the culture war is a myth and 
most Americans reside somewhere in the tolerant middle (Fiorina, 2005; Ansolabehere, 
Rodden, and Snyder, 2006; Wolfe, 1999).  Others find that views on morality issues are 
more complex and less “bipolar” than commonly perceived (Craig, et al., 2005).  Despite 
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claims that the “God gap” had subsided by the 2008 presidential contest that witnessed 
the election of the first African American President, Barack Obama, evidence suggests 
that similar religious voting patterns have persisted (Smidt, et al., 2010).   
Whether or not the public is as polarized as media accounts suggest, clear 
differences do exist between traditionalists and modernists on culture war issues 
(Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005, 2008; Hunter, 1991, 1994).  These include the 
morality/legality of abortion, the morality of homosexual activity and legality of same-
sex marriage, the appropriateness of premarital sex and sex education in public schools, 
and the availability of pornography and other forms of adult entertainment.  Even Wolfe 
(1999), who purports to debunk the culture war, cites the nature and morality of 
homosexuality as the sole, major moral issue dividing American political culture.   
Religion is a powerful predictor of individuals’ stances on these issues 
(Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005, 2008).  Members of traditionalist religious 
denominations and those in most denominations who attend church regularly tend to 
align themselves with conservative positions against abortion, homosexual activity and 
same-sex marriage, sex education, and pornography (Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009; 
Hardinge, 2004; Jelen, 1986; McIntosh, Alston, and Alston, 1979).  Furthermore, those in 
the U.S. who participate in religious services more often have found a comfortable home 
on the conservative end of the political spectrum and within the Republican Party 
(Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005, 2008).   
In addition to culture war issues, religious affiliation and religiosity influence 
opinions on a variety of public policies.  For example, it has long been theorized that 
religion affects economic structures and individuals’ attitudes about economics (Tawney, 
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1926; Weber, 1930; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2003; Barker and Carman, 2000; 
Wilson, 2009).  Classically, Tawney (1926) and Weber (1930) both attribute the rise of 
capitalism to Protestant beliefs and ethics.  In today’s global economy, Guiso, et al. 
(2003) find that following a Christian religion is correlated positively with attitudes 
favoring economic growth, even more so than for adherents of other non-Christian faiths.  
In other words, Christian theology and culture seem to endorse “good” economic 
development policies—those “conducive to higher per capita income and growth” 
(Guiso, et al., 2003, 225).  Attitudes on social welfare policy are discussed in the later 
section on redistribution. 
 
Religion and Urban Politics   
While religion is increasingly seen as playing a role in American politics, scholars 
have largely ignored its effects on local or urban politics.  Pratt (2004, 170) asks, “Is the 
urban politics literature…correct in implying that churches are no longer significantly 
involved in the governance of the nation’s largest cities?”  This question implies that 
religious organizations were once greatly involved in urban governance and that 
something recently changed indicating that this may no longer be the case.  To test Pratt’s 
implications, I examined the founding fathers and dominant voices of the urban politics 
literature.  Does religion “show up” in the key debates and theories in urban politics, 
community power, and, more recently, urban political economy?   
The “community power” debates of the 1950s and 60s launched urban politics “as 
a focus for study in its own right” (Harding, 2009, 27).  This debate pitted elite theorists 
(Hunter, 1953) against pluralists (Dahl, 1961/2005), both sides arguing that they 
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understood who held power in cities.  Hunter (1953), in his landmark “reputational” 
study of “Regional City” (revealed to be Atlanta, Georgia), found that all place-shaping 
policy was made by a small group of “unelected” economic elites and the elected mayor.  
Dahl (1961/2005) countered with findings from his analysis of New Haven, Connecticut, 
arguing that no single group held sway over all policy.  Rather, a plurality of groups with 
distinct but overlapping memberships—each headed by “mini-elites”—was responsible 
for crafting education and developmental policies, to use his two examples.   
This debate contributed little to understanding religion’s role in the city.  Hunter 
(1953, 83) does mention religious leaders, but dismisses any notion that religion matters: 
It may be noted here that none of the ministers of churches in Regional 
City were chosen as top leaders by the persons interviewed in the study.  
The idea was expressed several times by interviewees that some minister 
ought to be on the listing, but under the terms of power definitions used in 
the study they did not make “top billing.”  It is understood, however, that 
in order to get a project well under way it would be important to bring the 
churches in, but they are not, as institutions, considered crucial in the 
decision-making process.  Their influence is crucial in restating settled 
policies from time to time and in interpreting new policies which have 
been formed or are in the process of formulation.  Church leaders, 
however, whether they be prominent laymen or professional ministers, 
have relatively little influence with the larger economic interests.   
 
In other words, ministers may play a role in implementing or supporting policy 
but not in the actual policymaking process.  Hunter (1953, 82) concludes that, “Within 
the policy-forming groups the economic interests are dominant.”  He does state that the 
Jewish “sub-community” includes representation in the top group of policy leaders, due 
to their economic power; and that several ministers are considered powerful within the 
black “sub-community,” although black leaders are much more isolated.   
Dahl’s (1961/2005) analysis responds with a passage on the Catholic Church’s 
influence over education policy.  While ministers may have little impact on urban 
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redevelopment, they are reported by several informants to influence public education.  
Dahl, however, finds little evidence of any direct influence.  Instead, any Church 
influence is indirect and divided—some Catholic elements within the community favor 
parochial schools and siphon the best students from the wealthiest families; meanwhile, 
because the city is two-thirds Catholic, many moderate-income Catholics rely on the 
public school system for their livelihood and the education of their children.  Thus, 
Dahl’s study essentially confirms Hunter’s finding that church leaders do not influence 
local policy—except for powerful individuals who incidentally belong to a particular 
faith.   
Later books on urban political economy confirm these early findings.  Logan and 
Molotch’s (1987) “growth machine” thesis—the idea that a coalition of powerful local 
interests, dominated by “place-based” capital, works to intensify urban development—
“returned to Hunter’s main theme” by establishing a neo-elitism with elements borrowed 
from Marxism (Harding, 2009, 35; see also Molotch, 1976, 1993).  Logan and Molotch’s 
(1987) book includes no religious terms in the index and no substantive discussion of 
religion’s role in the city.  They do, however, mention the church in passing while 
commenting on the social organization of the ghetto: 
Even the black churches, an important part of black neighborhood life, 
cannot make up for the absence of an indigenous exchange value engine.  
No church organization is ever of crucial importance in metropolitan 
dynamics (except occasionally as a tourist site).  And the black church, 
unlike the Catholic or Protestant churches of the immigrants, is not itself 
closely tied to the religious organizations of the dominant white groups.  
Not only are black ministers not considered important to growth goals, 
they are also irrelevant to the personal salvation of white leaders (Logan 
and Molotch, 1987, 131-132). 
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Logan and Molotch make clear that the church, particularly the black church, is 
unconnected to economic interests and is thus extraneous to policymaking.  If Logan and 
Molotch represent a neo-elitist view, what of neo-pluralism?  Urban regime theory, the 
dominant contemporary urban analysis originally formulated by Stone (1989) and Elkin 
(1987), has its roots in pluralist thinking (Harding, 2009).  Regime theory describes 
“formal and informal modes of collaboration between public and private sectors, arguing 
that the fragmentation of power between a market economy and popularly elected 
political institutions makes such cooperation necessary in order to realize important local 
policy goals” (Mossberger, 2009, 40).  Does Stone’s (1989) influential study of Atlanta 
address the impact of religion on local policymaking?   
Stone (1987) does cite an example of a white minister allying with larger business 
interests to combat the construction of new public housing.  However, the minister does 
so largely because of other ties—he once edited the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce news 
magazine and chairs the commission of the hospital located next to the planned public 
housing.  The minister “feared that the hospital”—not his church, apparently—“was 
being encircled by a spreading ghetto” (Stone, 1987, 42).   
In another passage, Stone speaks of a community group known as U-Rescue 
founded by black ministers (one is also a state legislator) to oppose “urban renewal,” the 
displacement of residents and churches by new development.  “City officials concluded 
that U-Rescue was indeed a formidable grass-roots organization, capable of wielding 
significant electoral power and of bringing an effective legal challenge” (Stone, 1987, 
68).  The election of a black minister—“a particularly savvy negotiator”—as a state 
legislator from the neighborhood displays the power of the church in the black 
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community (Stone, 1987, 68).  The organization did not last, however, partially due to the 
minister’s transfer to another area by the hierarchy of his religious denomination.  Stone 
also discusses the election of Andrew Young, “a minister by training,” as Atlanta’s 
mayor—although his election was primarily due, one assumes, to his secular 
accomplishments as a member of Congress and as the United Nations ambassador under 
President Carter (Stone, 1987, 109).   
In later work, Stone (2005) connects the church to his idea of “selective 
incentives”—side payments necessary to gain acquiescence from particular publics 
(Stone, 1987, 175).  He writes that “to head off potential opposition, especially from 
someone like a pastor with established connections and a ready-made audience,” some 
form of “extragenerous compensation” is due (Stone, 2005, 317).  This suggests that the 
power of churches, if any, lies in the large body of weekly attendees that can be churned, 
perhaps by religious fervor, into political action.  In his discussion of megachurches, 
Chaves (2006, 337) states that “the pastor of one 2,000-person church probably gets an 
appointment with the mayor more easily than the pastors of ten 200-person churches.”  
McCann’s (2002) account of Louisville’s neighbor, Lexington, Kentucky, found that one 
megachurch joined a coalition of developers in their effort to develop a parcel of land at 
the city’s fringe.  The pastor spoke at a city council meeting with support from two 
hundred parishioners, all wearing buttons in favor of growth and development (McCann, 
2002, 385). 
Few scholars have seriously applied any of these theories of urban politics and 
political economy to studies with religion as the centerpiece.  A lone scholar, Newman 
(1991; 1994), has directly applied both growth machine and regime theory to urban 
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religious institutions.  While admitting that the growth machine’s architects ignore 
religious institutions, Newman (1991) borrows Logan and Molotch’s dichotomy of 
exchange vs. use value in his study of televangelist Charles Stanley’s First [Southern] 
Baptist megachurch in Atlanta, Georgia.  According to Newman, some churches do prize 
their real estate holdings—in this case, prime downtown real estate—for the exchange 
value (to the tune of $62 million) rather than simply its use value.  As Pastor Stanley 
expressed to his congregation, “God is for growth and anyone opposed is under Satan’s 
influence” (Newman, 1991, 241).  This article views Logan and Molotch’s work as a new 
theory of land use, in the tradition of Burgess and Hoyt, rather than its implications for 
community power.  Essentially, Newman wishes to explain the existence of downtown 
“superchurches,” “misfits” which defy past classifications based in Chicago School 
theories of the urban form.  When Newman (1991, 240) does address power, churches are 
seen as subservient to growth machine interests: 
An increase in the local population may help sustain these institutions 
[churches] by increasing the number of clients and support groups.  More 
important, perhaps, is that such institutions often need the favor of those 
who are at the heart of the local growth machines—the entrepreneurs, 
media owners, and politicians—who can make or break their institutional 
goals. 
 
However, Newman does ask whether the pastor of such a large church participates in the 
elite machinery of growth.  He states that many church members are middle-to-upper 
income and employed in industries that benefit directly from growth (Newman, 1991).   
Newman’s (1994, 23) other study, which jumps ship to Stone’s regime theory, 
argues that the members of the Concerned Black Clergy (CBC) organization in Atlanta 
have recently “become active regime participants helping to influence policy decisions on 
behalf of the city’s poorer citizens.”  According to Newman, this has not always been the 
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case.  Newman cites Stone’s (1989, 167) critical view that, “Black ministers, who are key 
links between black officeholders and the black public, have indicated that any 
impairment to an incumbent mayor is perceived as a weakening of black solidarity and a 
threat to black political power.”  This “black solidarity” led the clergy to support urban 
development and regressive tax schemes that favored the rich and, to some extent, hurt 
the poor, simply because the mayoral office-holder was African American.  More 
recently, with the creation of the CBC in 1983, the group has lobbied on behalf of poor, 
black neighborhoods on issues like rapid transit development.  Newman concludes that 
black ministers serve as gatekeepers in times of regime instability; but once African 
Americans irreversibly dominate the regime, they are free to mobilize against regime 
policies.  According to Google Scholar, both of these papers together account for a mere 
four citations in others’ work (August, 2009).  To say that their contributions have been 
ignored is an understatement.   
In a similar vein, Pratt’s (2004) analysis of religion and urban government in 
Detroit and New York City makes use of regime theory as well as its intellectual 
ancestor, Dahl’s pluralism, to interpret metropolitan religious organizations’ involvement 
in urban governance.  This book only receives one citation on Google Scholar (August, 
2009).  This compares to nearly 800 for Stone (1989), nearly 1,500 for Logan and 
Molotch (1987), and over 1,000 for Peterson (1981).  Granted, these classics have 
circulated for over two decades—but they each average well over 40 citations per year.   
What of Peterson’s (1981) City Limits, a book inspired by Tiebout’s (1956) public 
choice model that strikes fear in the hearts of urbanists (Sapotichne, et al., 2007)?  
Peterson mentions little about religion, except to highlight historical, ethno-religious 
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conflicts between established Protestants and new-comer Catholics.  Peterson does, 
however, contribute to this discussion in another way—by discounting local politics.  He 
writes that “local politics is groupless politics”—in that “formally organized groups play 
a much less prominent role in [local] policy formation” (Peterson, 1981, 116-117).  In 
other words, community associations such as churches are unlikely to affect local 
policymaking because it is shaped, to a large extent, by the federalist and economic 
structures.   
Pratt (2004, 170) inquires: 
…is it the case, as some would contend, that churches have irreversibly 
declined as a political force in urban America?  Is the urban politics 
literature—as summarized in leading textbooks on the topic—correct in 
implying that churches are no longer significantly involved in the 
governance of the nation’s largest cities? 
 
Pratt cites Djupe’s (1996) conference paper on the decline in importance of 
religious leaders in local politics as evidence.  Pratt earlier lists the “textbooks” to which 
he refers, including: Jones (1983), Judd (1979), Peterson (1981), and Stone (1986).  My 
review of the key works in urban politics has shown that, at least since the mid-twentieth 
century, urban politics scholars have not held a high view of religious actors in cities.  
But, according to Pratt, one does not have to dip into the historical record of medieval 
Europe or pre-industrial America to find examples of religious influence in Western 
cities.  Pratt cites several texts from the 1930s to the 60s that treat religion as a more 
important component of urban governance and politics.  However, his case is 
unconvincing because he cites works that only devote a few pages to discussion of 
religion—including Dahl’s three-page account of “the church” cited above.   
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Following the fields’ dominant voices, urban politics scholars as a whole have 
expressed minimal interest in religion as a political variable.  Based upon empirical 
evidence on American Political Science Association (APSA) organized section cross-
memberships and journal citations of religious search terms, contemporary urbanists rank 
the lowest in religious interest when compared with Americanists and comparativists 
(Ambrosius, 2008a; 2009).  Table 2.1, reprinted from Ambrosius (2009a) shows that only 
4.3 percent of the membership of the APSA Urban Politics section are also members of 
the Religion and Politics section.  This is the second lowest of the nine subfields 
examined—only Political Economy has a lower percent of cross-membership with 
Religion and Politics.  Table 2.2, also from Ambrosius (2009a), shows that the urbanist 
journals—Urban Affairs Review (UAR) and Journal of Urban Affairs (JUA)—rank at or 
near the bottom in terms of citations of religious search terms in their titles and abstracts 
when compared with other subfields’ top-ranking journals (rankings from Garand and 
Giles, 2003).  UAR, the official journal of the Urban Politics section, ranks dead last in 
religious references with only 0.02 annual cites in article titles and 0.19 annual cites in 
article abstracts over its 43-year existence.   
Pratt (2004) takes the lack of religious references in the major texts of urban 
politics as a possible sign that religious influence has waned in American cities (citing 
Djupe, 1996), a conclusion he himself finds surprising given the increasing evidence of 
religious influence at the national level.  Other scholars have attributed, directly or 
indirectly, the lack of religious and other cultural research among urbanists to 
peculiarities of the field: the influence of structural Marxism, an overreliance on political 
economy, or even a pronounced academic prejudice in the subfield (Ambrosius, 2008a, 
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2009; Sapotichne, et al., 2007; Sharp, 2007; Swanstrom, 1993).  Another possibility is 
that urbanists’ neglect of the social scientific study of religion is due to urban politics’ 
isolation from mainstream political science (MPS); and both MPS and sociology of 
religion’s reliance on a rival theoretical framework, Rational Choice, which is labeled 
“pathological” by urbanists (Ambrosius, 2008a; Imbroscio, 2007; McKinnon, 2005; 
Sapotichne, et al., 2007).   
 
Section
Political Parties
Presidency
Foreign Policy
Legislative Studies
Public Policy
Comparative Politics
Public Administration
Urban Politics
Political Economy
Source: APSA website (2004).
Table 2.1: APSA Section Members also in Religion & Politics Section
Total Members Percent in R&P
624 8.17%
636 5.66%
894 5.59%
447 7.16%
643 7.00%
417 4.32%
688 3.49%
1622 5.36%
568 4.93%
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Annual Annual
Rank Journal Title Rate Journal Abstract Rate
1 PSQ 0.89 PP 1.54
2 PP 0.77 JPAM 1.41
3 CP 0.29 PSQ 1.22
4 APSR 0.26 PAR 1.05
5 JPAM 0.19 APSR 0.38
6 PAR 0.16 WP 0.31
7 JPE 0.13 JUA 0.25
8 JUA 0.08 LSQ 0.23
9 WP 0.07 CP 0.21
10 LSQ 0.04 UAR 0.19
11 UAR 0.02 - -
Table 2.2: Ranking of Subfield Journals by Annual Rates of Religious Terms
NOTE: Eleven total journals were searched, including the top ranked journal from each 
subfield in Table 1 along with APSR and two journals representing UP.  JPE does not 
have abstracts.  JPAM abstract searches include full-text results.  Searches are 
current through 2007 unless recent issues are excluded from a database.  
Search terms: Catholic; charitable choice; Christ; Christian; church; congregation; 
evangelical; faith-based; God; Protestant; religion; religious; spiritual.
 
Ramsay (1998, 597) argues that the reliance on scientific positivism is waning 
and giving way to a “growing appreciation for the importance of culture,” including 
religion, among urbanists.  Pratt (2004, 173), too, ultimately concludes that the under-
emphasis is unwarranted: 
In the case of New York and Detroit, at least, the evidence presented 
indicates that throughout the century-long period surveyed [1895-1994] 
the churches significantly impacted government and vice versa.  It is 
40 
 
reasonable to expect that subsequent research, focused on these or other 
large American cities, would provide additional support for the view that 
religious bodies remain a significant, ongoing aspect of present-day urban 
governance. 
 
Much of the contemporary work at the national level examines the impact of 
religion on elections and public opinion.  What about the importance of religion to urban 
electoral outcomes?  Pratt (2004, 8) writes that several early writings on city politics treat 
“the importance of religious voting in city elections” (Reed, 1934; Gosnell, 1937; Kneier, 
1947).  Stone (1987) seems to suggest that religious affiliation may affect electoral 
decisions at the local level.  This could occur through several mechanisms.  For example, 
a church leader may encourage parishioners to support or oppose a particular policy 
initiative or agenda given his/her church’s receipt or lack of receipt of incentives from 
policy leaders/entrepreneurs (Stone, 2005).  Churches may also need a “favor” from the 
local leadership that pushes congregants into political advocacy (McCann, 2002).  Or, 
from an ethno-religious perspective, religious affiliates may support or oppose a policy 
because its proponents are of the same or different religious persuasion, respectively.  
While past scholars certainly studied conflicts between Protestants and Catholics, as 
Peterson (1987) alludes to, it is unlikely that modern voters in urban elections continue to 
oppose rival faiths en masse.   
This leaves the first explanation—that of church support or opposition.  While 
suggestions of this nature conjure images of a fiery pastor at the pulpit, this may also 
occur through indirect means, as Dahl (1961/2005) suggests.  For example, church 
culture may condition members to favor certain institutional forms over others.   
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Little scholarship of urban electoral politics has centered on religion, or even 
included it as a potential variable.  Sharp (2007, 58-59), alluding to the religious 
restructuring hypothesis, writes that, 
…urban scholarship has very little to offer about the extent to which 
culture war divisions do or do not shape election outcomes within 
cities…Matters of religiosity and the broader cultural divisions outlined 
earlier are largely ignored.  It is as though cities are somehow immune to 
the postindustrial cultural division that some analysts claim is central to 
understanding elections in America…Is there a parallel body of 
contemporary urban scholarship addressing these important matters of the 
role of religion [and] cultural polarization…but in the urban electoral 
sphere?  The answer is by and large no. 
 
The largest body of work on religion and urban politics focuses on the black 
church and its political/community activities (Day, 2001; Owens, 2007; Sawyer, 2001; 
Smith, 2003; Smith and Harris, 2005; Wallace, 2003).  Some scholarship has examined 
clergy activism in urban settings (Crawford and Olson, 2001).  A few studies have 
examined local culture war divisions over issues like sex education, evolution, abortion, 
and homosexuality, hot issues in both the church and public at large (Brown, Knopp, and 
Morrill, 2005; Deckman, 2004; Sharp, 1999).  Few, if any, of these studies rely on 
polling random samples of the urban public.   
One reason why few scholars have examined public opinion in cities is the lack of 
polling data collected and available at the local level (Peterson, 1981).  As Peterson 
(1981, 127) states,  
Polling public opinion is almost as expensive among a relatively small 
population confined within one city as it is for the United States as a 
whole.   But whereas the cost of a national poll can be borne by national 
polling organizations with a national audience or by national candidates 
with national constituencies, the cost of local polling is often prohibitive. 
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This may be one reason why scholars of religion and politics typically rely on 
polls of the mass public—the costs are comparable and the payoff looms larger.  Urban 
politics scholars do not poll local populations about religion because of these scholars’ 
lack of interest in the topic.  If they do conduct a poll—many simply rely on secondary 
data, if public opinion is even a matter of interest—question space is limited and must be 
devoted to more pressing matters of politics and economics.   
There is a single study that examines a topic similar to this dissertation within a 
single city using similar methods—Demerath and Williams’ (1992) study of Springfield, 
Massachusetts.  Demerath and Williams recount a religious and political history of 
Springfield with emphasis on the city’s recent conversion from Protestant 
Congregationalist domination to Roman Catholic majority.  They conduct a thorough 
case study of three issues of “community controversy” which together range from social 
policy to public morality: (1) publicly-provided homeless care; (2) economic 
development of a black neighborhood (Winchester Square); and (3) sexuality, including 
abortion and sex education.  They survey, via a mail questionnaire, 256 members of the 
public and small “elite” samples of political-economic, religious, and educational 
insiders.  While they collect this quantitative data, they rely more on qualitative and 
historical analysis to answer questions of religious change, community power, and 
church-state interaction.   
Given Springfield’s Catholic majority, questions of religious hegemony that may 
defy church-state divisions naturally arise.  Demerath and Williams find less “bridging” 
of church and state than they predicted.  Nonetheless they find that, “Religionists of 
varying stripes…have exerted considerable political influence on selected issues, indeed 
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more influence than many social scientists might have expected” (Demerath and 
Williams, 1992, 255).  The authors nicely summarize the state of religion (and religious 
research) in America’s communities: 
Religion in Springfield may be in decline, but is hardly in demise.  Any 
attempt to understand civic power and politics without it is sadly myopic.  
Issues of homelessness, black-neighborhood development, and sexuality 
have all evoked major religious responses.  Religious protagonists have 
had their say, if not always their way.  In the process, they reveal a 
dimension of urban power that is frequently neglected (Demerath and 
Williams, 1992, 140). 
 
Urban politics scholars also have a hearty interest in urban policy, particularly the 
extent to which the U.S. national government intervenes in urban affairs.  Studies of 
urban policy emphasize several stages of development beginning with the Progressive 
Era’s calls for reform and culminating in the post-Great Society decline in federal 
involvement in cities’ problems (see Mohl, 1993).  While religious actors—clergy and 
other religiously-motivated reformers—are identified as key players in the early twentieth 
century progressive age, they are notably absent from later stages (Ibid).  Advocacy for 
assistance to central cities—whether genuine or for the purposes of “renewal”—shifted to 
the new urban lobby (e.g., U.S. Conference of Mayors) and the downtown business 
community (e.g., Urban Land Institute) during the depression/New Deal and post-war 
periods, respectively (Ibid).  Private involvement in urban communities largely shifted to 
leftist radicals until the late twentieth century when the church reemerged as a key player 
identified by urbanist academics (Ramsay, 1998).  This is partially a response to the 
worldwide rebuff of socialism but also a result of the “new federalism,” which forced 
communities to fend for themselves with less support from above.  Privatization 
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advocates now call for increased involvement of faith-based institutions in social service 
delivery at the neighborhood level (Savas, 2005).   
 
Institutional Theory and Design 
Since the mid-twentieth century, political science—and much of social science in 
general—has left behind the (typically “naïve”) study of institutions for the study of 
individual actors, encouraged by the dominant approaches of behavioralism and Rational 
Choice (Peters, 1999).  This shift is even reflected in the discipline’s change of name 
from Government to Political “Science” (Goodin, 1996).  Beginning in the 1980s, a 
“counter-reformation” under the banner of New Institutionalism has returned to 
examining the importance of formal and informal institutions in constraining individual 
action (Peters, 1999).  Goodin (1996) notes that institutionalism has recently reemerged 
in nearly every branch of the social sciences in distinct yet comparable forms—in history, 
sociology, economics, political science, and social/political theory.    
Of all the social sciences, sociology has been the most consistent in emphasizing 
the importance of institutional effects on individual agency.  Goodin (1996, 7) writes of 
sociological institutional theory: 
The old institutionalism within sociology focused upon ways in which 
collective entities—the family, the profession, the church, the school, the 
state—create and constitute institutions which shape individuals, in turn.  
The new institutionalism focuses, more modestly perhaps, upon ways in 
which being embedded in such collectivities alters individuals’ 
preferences and possibilities.  But it is the hallmark of sociological 
institutionalism, whether old or new, to emphasize how individual 
behavior is shaped by (as well, perhaps, as shaping) the larger group 
setting (emphasis added). 
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It appears that sociological institutional theory is more helpful for the purposes of 
this present investigation because I examine the role of the church(es) in shaping 
individual preferences for political institutions; rather than political institutions 
constraining individual actions, as emphasized by political science-based institutionalists.  
While often turning first to political institutions and organizations, the general approach 
of institutional theory in political science is nonetheless applicable: 
…there are important respects in which institutions matter to behavior, 
and it is those to which the “new institutionalist” resurrection of that older 
institutionalist tradition within public administration points.  The 
behavioralist focus usefully serves to fix attention upon agency, upon 
individuals and groupings of individuals whose behavior it is.  But those 
individuals are shaped by, and in their collective enterprises act through, 
structures and organizations and institutions (Goodin, 1996, 13; emphasis 
added). 
 
Even political scientists within the aforementioned behavioral and Rational Choice camps 
are rediscovering institutions: “Behavioralists find they need to bring the state back in, 
game theorists find it emerging from within their models.  Either way, institutions 
(political and otherwise) have once again come to the fore in political studies” (Ibid, 15). 
Scholars are divided over the definition of “institution.”  Nobel laureate Elinor 
Ostrom (1999, 37) writes that some refer to institutions simply as organizational entities, 
such as legislatures, corporations, or family units; others, including herself, define 
institutions as “rules, norms, and strategies adopted by individuals operating within or 
across organizations.”  In simple terms, institutions are ideas about how something 
should be done, structured, or otherwise constituted.  Ostrom’s view is representative of 
the most-widely accepted definition in institutional theory, including her own subfield of 
institutional rational choice or, more specifically, “institutional analysis and 
development” (IAD).  Institutional design, then, is “the process of crafting a 
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configuration of rules…aimed at reducing the severity of the trade-offs among multiple 
values by shaping incentives in ways that encourage desirable behaviors” (Oakerson, 
2004).   
Meyer, Boli, and Thomas (1987, 36-37) hold a similar conception but go into 
greater detail of the process of “institutionalization”: 
By institution, we mean a set of cultural rules that give generalized 
meaning to social activity and regulate it in a patterned way.  
Institutionalization, then, involves processes that make such sets of rules 
seem natural and taken for granted while eliminating alternative 
interpretations and regulations.  In the Western tradition, rules become 
institutionalized as they are linked more closely to moral authority and 
lawful order in nature. 
 
In an earlier echo of this same claim, Zucker (1983, 2) writes that institutions 
represent a “phenomenological process by which certain social relationships and actions 
come to be taken for granted.”  In this light, McMullen (1994) links neoinstitutionalism 
to Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) influential ideas about the “social construction of 
reality”—meaning that individuals and organizations interact to form socially-approved 
representations of each other's actions which, through habitualization, become 
institutionalized and thus understood as objective reality.  New Institutionalists 
emphasize how individuals “learn…taken-for-granted scripts, habits, routines, rules, and 
conventional menus and categories of action” (McMullen, 1994, 710).  In other words, 
“The views, interests, and beliefs of individuals themselves are constituted by 
institutions” (Ibid, 710-711).   
While institutions extend beyond organizational entities, organizations and their 
structures, as Ostrom (1999) suggests, are typically important components of institutional 
arrangements.  Organizations, concisely defined, are “social unit[s] with some particular 
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purposes” (Shafritz and Ott, 1996, 1).  In considering the differences between 
organizations and institutions, Powelson (2003) writes that, “An organization is an 
administrative and functional structure, clearly bounded, while an institution is a 
significant practice within a culture, such as the institution of marriage.”  In this sense, 
American religion and metropolitan governance are both institutions; individual 
denominations and congregations are organizations with administrative and functional 
structures.  Metropolitan governments are organizations which reflect preferences for 
how an institution should be structured or organized.  Institutional environments shape 
organizational structures and culture.  According to Rainey (1997, 15-18), organizational 
structures “are the relatively stable, observable assignments and divisions of 
responsibility within [an] organization, achieved through such means as hierarchies of 
authority, rules and regulations, and specialization of individuals, groups, and subunits.”   
Ostrom (1999) states that in the absence of empirical research based on an 
appropriate framework, “recommendations of [institutional] reform may be based on 
naïve ideas about which kinds of institutions are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and not on an analysis of 
performance.”  This may affect non-experts choices or preferences for institutional 
design.  Ostrom challenges the Homo economicus view of man dominate in neoclassical 
economics and substitutes an understanding of “bounded rationality.”  From this view, 
information gathering is costly, processing capabilities are limited, and decisions are thus 
made based on “incomplete knowledge of all possible alternatives and their likely 
outcomes” (Ostrom, 1999, 46).  People can make mistakes (see V. Ostrom, 1986)—for 
example, they can errantly vote in favor of city-county consolidation and later recognize 
(perhaps) that such a vote was not indeed in their individual interests (or vice versa).   
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Culture—political, religious, organizational, or in general—affects institutional 
and organizational structures.  Ostrom (1999, 57) defines culture as “attributes of a 
community” including “the level of common understanding that potential participants 
share about the structure of particular types of action arenas.”  Processes of institutional 
change are key to the practice of institutional design because institutions build on 
preexisting institutional and cultural frameworks and rarely construct institutions “from 
scratch.”  Goodin (1996) identifies three major models of institutional change by means 
of accident, evolution, or intention.  While institutions do arise at times by accident and 
do adapt to their environments, most efforts at institutional design and change are 
intentional—that is, based on the efforts of entrepreneurs and their followers.   
A similar debate paralleling differences between individualist and institutionalist 
camps is waged between the competing positions on the “agent-structure problem” 
(Wendt, 1987; Imbroscio, 1999).  This debate pits structuralist accounts of social and 
political action versus those who believe individual, human agency plays a role in 
determining outcomes.  In response to structuralist works, such as Peterson’s (1981) 
aforementioned study, some scholars rejected both extreme perspectives in favor of a 
“dual” notion of structure.  Scholars like Giddens (1979) and Abrams (1982) spoke of 
“structuring” and “structuration”—arguing that structure does shape human action, but 
individuals can in turn reshape societal structures.  Thus, individuals are not completely 
handicapped by social forces.  Imbroscio (1999) posits that social science is coalescing 
around this dual view of structure.  Some prominent urbanists, most notably Stone 
(1989), explicitly embrace the views of Giddens and Abrams.  While the structuralist 
view may be akin to the old institutionalism, the duality perspective reflects the 
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contemporary emphasis on “new” institutionalism—a sort of synthesis between 
institutional and behavioral poles.  Imbroscio (1999) argues that this debate is important 
because it dictates our views of democracy and political responsiveness—thus if elected 
leaders are beholden to existing institutions, then they cannot be held responsible for 
neglecting social justice in favor of economic development, for example.    
 
Institutional Design in Church and State 
One possible connection between urban government and politics and religion is 
the study of institutional design.  No work has directly linked internal denominational 
structures to preferences for similar structures in society, such as monocentric or 
polycentric urban governance.   
All Christian denominations accept some form of religious authority.  Typically, 
authority can take the forms of Pope, Bishop, Priest/Minister, Pastor, or Deacon/Elder.  
These offices are situated at various levels and roughly correspond with equivalent levels 
of secular, political authority at the international, national, regional, and local ranks.  One 
could term this “religious federalism.”  This term is used differently in this sense than its 
use by other scholars.  Some speak of religious federalism as “institutionalizing 
majoritarian tyranny in a religious federal state” (El-Gaili, 2004).  Instead, the term can 
refer to a federal, or multi-tiered, structure within a single church, denomination, or other 
religious body (see Takayama, 1974).   
While most religious bodies have varying levels of authority, one often 
predominates.  It is often clear to members and even outside observers which level is 
most-emphasized in church governance.  Determining which level of authority should 
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predominate is still a highly-controversial issue in the twenty-first century church.  This 
is made obvious by the ever-growing independent, non-denominational, and inter-
denominational churches forming in the U.S. and around the world—which essentially 
opt out of denominational hierarchy in favor of local, congregational control (Smidt, et 
al., 1996, 238, n9).   
Scholars of religious governance refer to denominations’ forms of polity 
(Harrison, 1959; Moberg, 1962; Takayama, 1974; Davidson, Schlangen, and D’Antonio, 
1969; McMullen, 1994).  Citing Harrison, Takayama defines polity as “formally (or 
theologically) defined aspects of church government and administration, including the 
relation between individual and groups within a denomination” (Takayama, 1974, 10-11).  
McMullen (1994) understands religious polity as a form of institutionalized myth and 
ritual.  He writes, “Polities are the rules of ecclesiastical authority and dictate the rituals 
by which church government operates” (Ibid, 712).   
Takayama (1974) goes on to describe three main types of church polity: episcopal 
(or hierarchical); presbyterian (or collegial); and congregational (or autonomous).  In the 
episcopal type, “formal hierarchy is most explicit…the church itself being sometimes 
finally defined by and restricted to the clerical bureaucracy” (Takayama, 1974, 11).  
Takayama lists the Roman Catholic Church as being “strictly hierarchical,” while other 
examples like the Protestant Episcopal Church and the United Methodist Church are 
somewhat more “balance[ed].”  On the other end of the spectrum, “Congregationalism 
places the maximum power in the local group both with respect to the choice of the 
minister and the control of organizational affairs” (Takayama, 1974, 11).  Prime 
examples are the variety of Baptist groups—Takayama (1974, 29) writes that, 
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Baptists believe that local congregations bear the marks of the true Church 
and theologically they do not accept any higher human authority and 
organization.  They believe that their national conventions are merely 
functional associations of local churches formed for their mutual support 
and a channel for their cooperative efforts, but have no binding authority 
over local churches.   
 
While Takayama notes that Protestant denominations in the contemporary U.S. 
have tended to resemble one another—many taking the congregational form—the Roman 
Catholic Church is distinct as the only major body to retain a truly hierarchical/ 
centralized polity.  Thus, a comparison of governance structures (polity) in the Catholic 
Church and, for example, a prominent Baptist tradition like the Southern Baptist 
Convention should be striking—theoretically, theologically, and in practice.  I do not 
emphasize the presbyterian-type denominations for several reasons: (a) there exists a 
varying degree of reliance on regional institutions in these churches, thus preventing 
broad generalizations; (b) Takayama (1974) suggests that a move to congregational polity 
is at work in many presbyterian denominations, thus making regional institutions largely 
into “fifth wheels”; and (c) these types are not highly represented in Louisville, the 
location currently under study.  Past studies comparing church polities have also sought 
to compare examples representing the poles of church polity (McMullen, 1994).   
Past research finds that congregants generally perceive the correct structure 
implied by the polity typology, both of their own denomination and others’ 
denominations (Davidson, et al., 1969; McMullen, 1994).  For example, Catholics 
recognize a hierarchical structure in their own churches—although Protestants do tend to 
see the Catholic Church as slightly more hierarchical than its own members (Davidson, et 
al., 1969).  Davidson, et al. (Ibid, 322) do theorize that their results may not be 
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attributable to actual church practices but rather “ideological commitments to traditional 
Protestant norms.” 
Baptist Pastor George W. Truett (2001) classically portrayed Catholics as the 
“exact opposite” of Baptists in his 1920 address from the U.S. Capital highlighting the 
differences between Baptists and Roman Catholics and the disparaging views Baptists 
hold of the Catholic Church.  He said:  
The Baptist message and the Roman Catholic message are the very 
antipodes of each other.  The Roman Catholic message is sacerdotal, 
sacramentarian, and ecclesiastical.  In its scheme of salvation it magnifies 
the church, the priest, and the sacraments.  The Baptist message is non-
sacerdotal, non-sacramentarian, and non-ecclesiastical…the Catholic 
conception of the church, thrusting all its complex and cumbrous 
machinery between the soul and God, prescribing beliefs, claiming to 
exercise the power of the keys, and to control the channels of grace—all 
such lording it over the consciences of men is to the Baptist mind a ghastly 
tyranny in the realm of the soul and tends to frustrate the grace of God, to 
destroy freedom of conscience, and to hinder terrible the coming of [the] 
Kingdom of God.   
 
Cairns (1981, 79, emphasis in original) argues that the church is simultaneously 
an “eternal, invisible, biblical organism” and a “temporal, historical, visible, human, 
institutional organization.”  He identifies these as the respective end and means of the 
church.  In essence, the end shapes the means (polity) chosen by a particular church.  
Luther and other reformers often made reference to “the idea of the invisible church: the 
enduring existence of true Christians—proto-Protestants—guided by Providence, yet 
often invisible amid the deep anti-Christian corruption of the [Catholic] church” (Barnett, 
1999).  Cairns (Ibid, 79) writes that, “Any large corporate body must of necessity have 
leadership; and, as it grows, the division of functions and consequent specializations of 
leadership must come if it is to function effectively.”   
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Sommerfeld (1968) similarly attributes denominations’ social structures to their 
theology of the Divine Person or Godhead, which he labels “the Ultimate.”  While not 
exactly corresponding with the three historical polities, Sommerfeld’s typology does 
exhibit striking similarities—confirming Cairns’ (1981) idea that the end (the Ultimate) 
shapes the means (polity).  He defines three ways of conceiving the Ultimate: Familial, 
Democratic, and Dominical.  Familial and Democratic correspond roughly to the 
hierarchical and congregational polities, respectively.   The Familial-type “views the 
Ultimate primarily in terms of divine family relationships” among the members of the 
Trinity—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.  This Familial-type places authority in the Church 
as the “cumulative possessor of knowledge.”  Sommerfeld (1968, 182) writes, “To know 
God is to know what the church has come to know of the Ultimate through the years.”  
Religious authority is thus “recorded in corporate decisions arrived at in and through the 
apostolic continuity of the divine family” (Sommerfeld, 1968, 184).  This conception 
characterizes the Roman Catholic Church (Ibid).   
The Democratic-type, on the other hand, “emphasizes that there is a divine 
Ultimate…whom each and all can individually know and experience” (Sommerfeld, 
1968, 182).  For the Democratic-type, religious authority is “centered in the spiritual 
experience of the individual” (Sommerfeld, 1968, 184).  This conception characterizes 
“mainstream” American Protestantism, including Baptists, minus what some may call the 
“high” or intellectual church with their emphases on documents.  Lutherans, 
Episcopalians, and Calvinist Presbyterians are characterized by Sommerfeld as a third 
type, Dominical, and are more difficult to corporately fit into a traditional polity.  
Dominical roughly corresponds with a blend of hierarchical and presbyterian governance.  
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In sum, the Familial-type emphasizes the body corporate, the Church and its hierarchy; 
the Democratic-type emphasizes the individual and individual congregations.   
In many ways, the whole of the Reformation and later Protestant schisms were 
due primarily to disputes over church governance systems (Cairns, 1981; Barnett, 1999; 
Sullins, 2004).  Cairns (1981) writes that the origins of church polity lie with Christ who 
chose the twelve apostles to be the leaders of the fledgling church and these same 
apostles developed the other offices of the church, presumably under the influence of the 
Holy Spirit, the third member of the Godhead bestowed upon Christ’s followers at 
Pentecost.  Cairns cautions that this “does not by any means imply a pyramidal hierarchy, 
such as the Roman Catholic church has developed, because the new officials were to be 
chosen [democratically] by the people, ordained by the apostles” (Ibid, 79).  This 
statement reflects Cairns’ own bias.  Protestant reformers like the Puritans opposed the 
“un-Christian episcopal hierarchy” of Catholicism and “considered their presbyterianism 
outlook [on polity] the same as that of the church polity practiced by the apostles” 
(Barnett, 1999).  Despite Vatican II’s liberal reforms and lower-level clergy and laity 
demanding greater roles in church decisions, the Catholic Church remains committed to 
its episcopal form of polity and has offered minimal concessions to Catholic 
“congregationalists” (White, 1972; D’Antonio, et al., 1989; Kohmescher, 1980).   
No scholarship has examined whether churches intentionally (or implicitly) 
encourage their followers to prefer or even replicate these organizational structures 
outside the walls of the church.  Some scholars speak of “cue perceptions,” the explicit or 
implicit instruction provided by religious leaders on “matters politic” (Leege, 1992; 
Welch, Leege, Wald, and Kellstedt, 1993).  If according to Sommerfeld and Cairns, 
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conceptions of the Ultimate influence denominations’ own organizational and social 
forms, then might not cues involve replicating a denomination’s own organizational 
form?  Phrased alternatively, if political issues concern the organization of government, it 
makes sense that religious believers would prefer their own theologically-derived 
organizational preferences based in their idea of the Ultimate.  To use Schattschneider’s 
(1960) famous terminology, organizations are defined by the “mobilization of bias.”  In 
this sense, religious organizations may be some of the most “biased” of all.  Clergy, and 
laity acting on cues, spread the message of the Gospel, distilled through their particular 
religious tradition—of which one’s own conception of what constitutes the “true Church” 
and how this body should be governed compose a key component of such a Gospel.    
Political institutions at the national level in the U.S. are set by constitutional 
prerogative: the roles of Congress (legislature), Presidency (executive), and Court 
(judiciary) remain relatively unchanged, despite relative shifts in importance one 
direction or the other.  At the state and local level, there exists quite a deal of variation in 
institutional design (Miller, 2002).  Just as arguments persist over the proper 
organizational structure of religious denominations, so do arguments continue over the 
“best” form of local governance.  At a basic level, these debates pit monocentrists against 
polycentrists (Oakerson, 2004).   
Monocentrists, or consolidationists, prefer a single, centralized government with 
authority over the whole of a metropolitan area with power to regulate behavior and 
development.  Polycentrists favor many localized governments covering the metropolitan 
region—“a pattern of governance that emerges from the interactions of multiple 
independent centers of authority” (Oakerson, 2004, 21).  While typically emphasizing the 
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benefits of interjurisdictional competition, based in Tiebout (1956), polycentrists also 
embrace institutions meant to encourage collective action but without centralizing 
authority (see Feiock, 2004a).  Monocentrists and polycentrists derive their commitments 
from both empirical observation (such as the effect of one form of governance on 
economic development outcomes, over the other) and normative values (such as beliefs 
about government or the market’s abilities to direct society).  Visser (2002) terms the two 
camps’ models “reform-consolidation” and “market-public choice,” respectively.  These 
two terms are also used to describe historical stages of evolution of urban governance in 
the U.S., with reform-minded monocentrism dominating the early twentieth century and 
polycentrism achieving relevance in the mid-century wake of Tiebout’s thesis (Wallis, 
1994; Schechter, 1996).  Visser (2002) describes a later wave of reform encouraging 
greater consolidation in the 1960s-70s, and again in the 1990s, together culminating in 
several large scale city-county consolidations: Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee 
(1962); Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida (1967); Indianapolis-Marion County, Indiana 
(1969); and Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky (2003; Morgan, England, and 
Pelissero, 2007).   
These two terms, monocentric and polycentric, are also used in urban economics 
and geography to describe theories or observations of the urban spatial form.  The 
monocentric city model posits a single central business district surrounded by declining 
values of land rent and thus differing land uses from office to factory to housing and 
eventually agriculture (see Anas, Arnott, and Small, 1998).  This economic model, which 
has much in common with the earlier sociological theories of urban form, is based in the 
influential works of Alonso (1964), Muth (1969), and Mills (1972).  Later scholars have 
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documented a trend toward multi-centered urban regions with multiple business districts 
and thus more-sporadic patterns of development (Garreau, 1991; Dear, 2002).  This view 
is associated with the LA School of urban geography (Dear and Flusty, 1998).  The 
political and economic versions of monocentrism and polycentrism are not 
interchangeable.  In this study, the terms are used in the political sense.   
Is religious fervor, gained through religious participation, responsible, at least in 
part, for passionate views on the structure of urban institutions?  The prominent political 
scientist, polycentrist, and Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom (2000) alleges that academic 
monocentrists’ rely on “self-evident truths.”  Ostrom makes the case that scholars and 
policy practitioners often act as if their diagnosis and ensuing policy prescriptions are 
dictated by “common sense” and thus obvious to all.  The demonization of metropolitan 
fragmentation is one of her two chief examples.  Ostrom (2000, 33) admits that the “sheer 
complexity of… [local] government service delivery arrangements” bewilders most 
analysts and laypeople alike.  Many perfunctorily presume that having “large numbers of 
small governmental units” servicing a single metropolitan area obviously leads to 
“inadequate, inefficient, and inequitable services” (Ibid).  The inverse—that large, 
centralized, consolidated governments are more professional, efficient, and equitable—
became conventional wisdom.   
Often without recourse to scientific evidence, advocates of monocentrism push to 
consolidate metropolitan regions under a single governmental entity.  Ostrom cites 
monocentric theorists claiming things like, “A diagnosis of the metropolitan malady is 
comparatively easy and its logic is too compelling to admit disagreement….Nothing, it 
would seem, could be more obvious or more rational [than consolidation]…” (from 
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Hawley and Zimmer, 1970, 3).  Modern-day advocates make similar claims, ignoring 
evidence like Ostrom’s own comparative study of police agencies in 80 metropolitan 
areas across the U.S.  She and her colleagues conclude that small and medium-sized 
departments are more effective at producing direct services and that police performance 
is enhanced in metropolitan areas with larger numbers of departments.  Both findings 
contradict monocentrists’ claims.   
Religionists often make reference to their Truth’s self-evidence; and are often 
encouraged by philosophers and theologians to instead base their policy 
recommendations on rational argument and commonly-held values/norms in pluralistic 
societies (see Stout, 2004; Ambrosius, 2005).  Perhaps it is only natural that those 
favoring hierarchical church governance or localized, congregational governance would 
see these structural forms as best for all organizations in society.   
Catholics and evangelicals (of which Southern Baptists constitute the largest 
component in Louisville and the nation) have the greatest penchant for receiving 
ministerial cues (Leege, 1992).  Thus, one would expect that these denominations are 
prime candidates for the exhibition of the effect discussed here—which I label “polity 
replication” for shorthand.  One can imagine a Southern Baptist arguing with a Roman 
Catholic friend over the proper role of authority in the church.  What if the same 
Southern Baptist and Catholic parishioners instead discussed an upcoming city-county 
consolidation referendum?  It is conceivable that the Southern Baptist may make the 
claim, “I’ve always believed in local control, whether we’re talking about church or 
matters of state.”  The Catholic may respond something like, “There is nothing wrong 
with large, central government—our church is large and lead by His Holiness the Pope.  
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This is better for the church, and our city would be better off consolidated with a strong 
mayor able to do as he/she sees fit.”  These hypothetical statements are not meant to 
stereotype but rather reflect past research findings and this present studies’ theoretical 
orientation.  This sentiment is certainly suggested by past research on elite and public 
Catholic support for urban political machines in the U.S. and European Union integration 
in Europe, where Catholic support was significantly higher than among Protestants 
(Merton, 1972; Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser, 2001).   
What of the direction of causality?  Leege (1992, 200) writes that “religion is both 
a shaper and mirror of culture and social life.”  Are religious denominations shaping 
attitudes about the proper design of political institutions; or are they themselves simply 
mirroring the societal debate and pre-existing preferences of outsiders?  While mirroring 
no doubt occurs, shaping is much more important, and likely, in the contemporary U.S. 
and elsewhere.  Cross-national studies indicate, or at least theorize, that countries with 
Catholic majorities exhibit centrist/corporatist forms of government, while Protestant 
nations are more democratic and participatory.  For example, Gill (2004, 2) writes that in 
Latin America: 
Catholic leaders and their devout followers often had strong preferences 
for centrist and corporatist forms of government.  During the nineteenth 
century, the Church fervently resisted the advance of European liberalism 
and fuelled the preference of practicing Catholics for more corporatist 
forms of social organization.   
 
While the Latin American case has colonial baggage, it does seem that the introduction of 
Protestantism and increases in individual religiosity may advance democratic ideals—or 
at least civic participation.  Comparison of European countries, past and present, reveals 
similar patterns.  It is clear that a nation’s religious identity (in most if not all cases) 
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predates the contemporary governance structure and even the existence of the modern 
state.  Christendom was inspired by Christianity’s universalism; and later Catholic 
support for EU integration continues to draw its inspiration from the Church’s social 
teachings (Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser, 2001).  As Weber suggested, it is religion that 
affects “other forms of social and political behavior” first—and then the culture itself 
may begin to reshape religion (Gill, 2004, 2).   
The roots of the Baptist movement lie in separatist Congregationalism, which 
argued against the state church and were active in England during the late 1500s (Cairns, 
1981).  Early Congregationalist Robert Browne “argued that believers were to be united 
to Christ and to one another by a voluntary covenant, that officers were to be chosen by 
the [church] members, and that no congregation was to have authority over another” 
(Ibid, 337).  Followers were among the first settlers of North America who “applied [this] 
covenant idea to political life by entering into the Mayflower Compact before landing at 
Plymouth” (Ibid, 338).  This is a past example of congregants’ vision of church polity 
shaping other societal institutions.  The first English Baptist church emerged from this 
movement in the late 1500s and the first in the new world came in the 1600s (Ibid).   
Other scholars like White (1972) argue that churches’ organizational structures 
can be a reflection of their environments.  For example, many American churches’ 
congregational polities are the result of America’s national emphases on democracy and 
self-governance/reliance.  White (Ibid, 100) writes, “we find churches in the free-church 
tradition modeling their ecclesiastical organizations after the political structures of 
society.”  Combining the insights, it seems that polity affected the very foundations of 
61 
 
American society, which then tend to reinforce and reproduce a certain democratic, 
congregational polity in some indigenous religious movements.   
 
City-County Consolidation: Attitudes and Religious Influences 
City-county consolidation is one form of contemporary metropolitan reform with 
profound influence on the life and governance of a city.  Consolidation involves the 
dissolution of City and County and the creation of a new government encompassing the 
territory of both.  The effect is akin to the annexation of all unincorporated land within a 
county into the central city limits.  Questions remain as to whether the new government is 
a “city without suburbs” or, in cases of powerful suburban interests, “suburbs without a 
city” (Rusk, 2003; Savitch and Vogel, 2004).  Consolidation is “a radical form of 
organizational change because it is so complete and often difficult to reverse” and is thus, 
perhaps, the most drastic form of institutional (re)design available to local governments 
in the U.S. (Savitch and Vogel, 2004, 760).  Consolidation is almost universally 
supported by Chambers of Commerce, who recognize this form of government as more 
corporate-like in its structure.   
Morgan, England, and Pelissero (2007, 52) summarize the consensus view of who 
typically supports efforts at city-county consolidation and who does not: 
The central-city business elite, civic organizations, big-city newspapers, 
and reform groups often support reorganization, while suburban 
newspapers, mayors and employees of small towns, fringe-area business 
people, and central-city blacks often lead the opposition.   
 
This seems to suggest that a regression analysis of individual beliefs about consolidation 
would find positive effects on socio-economic indicators like income and education, 
although mitigated by distance from the city center, and negative effects on 
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suburbanization and African American status (Erie, Kirlin, and Rabinovitz, 1972; 
Harrigan, 1993; Lyons, 1972; Temple, 1972).  Temple (1972) and Horan and Taylor 
(1977) find that socio-demographic variables are important predictors of attitudes on 
consolidation.  On the other hand, Edwards and Bohland (1991) find that socio-
demographic factors are weak or insignificant predictors of consolidation support, except 
for residence.  Urban residents are more likely than suburban residents to support 
consolidation, while suburban residents are more likely than rural residents.  This 
supports a hypothesized decline in support as one moves from the city center to the urban 
fringe.   
Edwards and Bohland (1991) conclude that one’s vote in a consolidation 
referendum reflects two “attitudinal dimensions” of reform-mindedness and attitudes 
toward economic development strategies.  According to my reading of the issues, debates 
over city-county consolidation often center on preferences for institutional design, 
redistribution from suburb to city, political power/trust, and views of consolidation 
elites—which may be reflected in individuals’ opinions.  In other words, one’s opinion of 
consolidation or a consolidated government may be a proxy for their ideas about 
institutional design (under general terms such as the role of government in society), 
redistribution, political power, or prominent personalities.   
Research on religious actors and city-county consolidation is slim.  Carr and 
Feiock (2002) do find that religious organizations exert a modest impact on both “stages” 
of the consolidation process: agenda-setting and referendum.  Their comparative study is 
based on data collected through a national survey of county officials in communities that 
held referenda on city-county consolidation over a ten-year period.  Carr and Feiock 
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(2002, 84) write that, “Religious groups apparently had a very minimal role in the issue; 
in fact, most respondents (62 percent) felt these groups had no effect whatsoever.”  Their 
data show that only nine percent of the responding county officials believed religious 
actors had a significant involvement in agenda-setting or the referendum stages of 
consolidation, respectively.   
Savitch and Vogel (2004) suggest that churches may have played a role in 
influencing public opinion about consolidation in the Louisville case.  However, they 
merely mention in passing that the coalition opposing consolidation, Citizens Organized 
in Search of the Truth (CO$T), held meetings or rallies in local churches.  It is unknown, 
from their research, to what extent religious organizations themselves took stances on the 
issue.   
Much research on consolidation emphasizes elites or entrepreneurs’ attitudes 
about consolidation and/or roles in placing the issue on the agenda and bankrolling 
electoral support (e.g., Durning and Edwards, 1992).  While consolidation may be put on 
the agenda by elites, it is decided by the voting public.  Peterson’s City Limits (1981) 
approach and Logan and Molotch’s (1987) “growth machine” thesis surprisingly share 
much in common but differ on who benefits from growth.  Likewise, voters must decide 
if consolidation is in the interest of “the city” as a whole or a subsection of the city’s 
elite.  Religious commitments’ influences on voters’ perceptions of consolidation and 
decisions in consolidation referenda have not been investigated.   
Current research on private actors’ involvement in the consolidation issue is 
rather pluralist in orientation and based on power’s first face (decision making) or, at 
best, its second face, manipulating agendas (Dahl, 1961/2005; Bachrach and Baratz, 
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1962).  It ignores more recent developments like Lukes’ (2005) third face of power—
manipulating people’s preferences.  Religious organizations no doubt exercise power’s 
third face.  Church members make their own individual decisions that they believe are 
based in their own conclusions, but are indeed shaped by the church and its leadership.  
This use of power is not necessarily nefarious or even conscious.  While it is assumed 
that business, labor, and political groups shape preferences, religious organizations are 
often ignored.  While Carr and Feiock’s (2002) respondents may not have witnessed the 
hand of the church in action, it still remains that religious organizations affected 
consolidation referendum outcomes, in the least, through their encouragement (or 
discouragement) of civic involvement and impartation of civic skills (Sharp, 2007; 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995).  The building of civic skills in churches is known 
to vary based on type of church polity—hierarchical church structures like those 
exhibited by Catholic churches are less conducive to learning civic skills than more-
participatory Protestant congregations (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995).   
Religious organizations may also shape attitudes about morality and institutional 
design and, in this way, affect the outcome of a consolidation referendum.  Scholars have 
ignored the application of power’s third face to the study of religion and institutional 
design.  While churches certainly play minimal, if any, roles in setting metropolitan 
agendas and bullying the public (at least successfully), they certainly shape members’ 
values and, to borrow a popular term, “worldviews”—the loose English translation of the 
German, weltanschauung.  Christian author James Sire (2004) defines a worldview as: 
...a commitment, a fundamental orientation of the heart, that can be 
expressed as a story or in a set of presuppositions (assumptions which may 
be true, partially true or entirely false) which we hold (consciously or 
subconsciously, consistently or inconsistently) about the basic constitution 
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of reality, and that provides the foundation on which we live and move 
and have our being. 
 
Contemporary Christians, particularly evangelical Protestants, have attempted to 
recast their faith as a worldview in opposition to the perceived secularism of other 
modern and postmodern schools of philosophy (Naugle, 2002).  The more 
“subconscious” elements of a contemporary Christian worldview are ripe for sociological 
and psychological analysis—including preferences for institutional design manifested 
through consolidation referenda and subsequent perceptions of a merged city-county 
government.   
 
Toward a Theory of “Polity Replication” 
A theory of polity replication should emphasize two mechanisms—ideological 
and participatory polity replication.  Figure 2.1 illustrates these two forms of polity 
replication as a path diagram—in similar fashion to a logic model, a scheme used by 
program evaluators to understand the theoretical connections between inputs and 
outcomes (McLaughlin and Jordan, 1999).  The arrows represent directions of causality 
or feedback loops.  On one hand, attendance at church worship and religious education 
shapes a congregants ideology about God and spirituality (theology), state (political 
ideology), society (social ideology), and structures/organizations.  Presumably, those “in 
the pews” more often will receive more “cues” and thus be more likely to vote on 
political issues, like consolidation and morality-based referendums, reflecting their 
church’s official or unofficial positions.   
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On the other hand, those who participate in church programs and governance may 
learn civic skills, according to Verba and colleagues (1995), and develop intense 
preferences for similar governance structures.  While participants in corporate or 
government bureaucracies may come to loathe such structures, monetary constraints may 
prohibit organizational members from leaving.  The religious sector, however, is entirely 
voluntary and thus participants can generally “self-select” the church that best fits their 
preferences (McMullen, 1994).  Since many religious adults were raised as religious 
children, their preferences for a religious tradition are shaped early on through 
socialization and their preferences for organizational structure will develop later, based 
on positive or negative experiences.  Some Catholics, who become disillusioned with 
church ritual or hierarchy, may join a mainline or evangelical Protestant congregation 
following a conversion experience.  This should not, however, be seen as the norm (e.g., 
Hadaway and Marler, 1993).  Most congregants are likely to believe their church 
structure is the best or ideal form.   
While this present study does not explicitly test which form of polity replication is 
at work in consolidation referenda, I posit that both are present.  However, the effects of 
each cannot be parsed out due to limitations in the present data.  This section and the 
corresponding figure are included to better illustrate the theorized connections and inspire 
further exploration of polity replication.   
 
Religion, Redistribution, and Public Trust 
 Consolidation support, as a variable, may instead serve as a proxy for 
redistribution support, because consolidation is often seen as marshalling suburban 
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resources to aid a central city; or public trust, because consolidation support requires 
taking elites’ claims at face value and the belief that elites consider citizens’ interests in 
addition to their own.   
Researchers have examined the effect of religious affiliation and religiosity on 
penchants for redistributive policy.  Wilson (2009) cites literature arguing that 
evangelical Protestants tend to take conservative economic positions that place emphasis 
on individual responsibility rather than government intervention (also see Johnstone, 
1988; Hargrove, 1989; and Barker and Carman, 2000).  This does not mean that 
evangelicals take their faith’s requirement to love and serve the poor lightly (Wuthnow, 
1994b).  Instead, evangelicals tend to support “relational” approaches to alleviating 
proverty—i.e., the charitable works of congregations and individual believers (Smith, 
1998).  Black Protestants tend to take very liberal positions on social welfare policy—and 
are the only major U.S. religious tradition for which increased religiosity correlates with 
increased liberalism (Wilson, 2009).  Roman Catholics and mainline Protestants tend to 
lie somewhere in the middle and are more likely to support government social programs 
than evangelicals (Ibid).   
Wilensky (1981) finds a strong relationship between Catholic party power and 
social welfare spending in the liberal democracies of Europe and America.  He also posits 
a connection between Catholicism and corporatism.  Wilensky (1981, 362) writes:  
Catholic power (where it appears) is not only a more important source of 
welfare state development than left party power, but as one might expect, 
Catholicism is one historical root of corporatist democracy and has similar 
effects… statistically speaking, they are substitutes for one another… 
Catholic parties, once formed, can and do build upon the ancillary 
institutions of the Catholic Church, which are much older than the 
centralized state.  Catholic party dominance thus taps an older social-
political complex.   
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Wilensky (Ibid) further argues that “while highly centralized governments may precede 
the creation of Catholic parties, the fully developed corporatist-technocratic linkages 
caught by our measures are a quite recent development.”  His “simple” causal model thus 
begins with Catholic political power and proceeds through the intermediate development 
of corporatism and ends with significant welfare efforts by the state.   
Benabou and Tirole (2006) employ Weber’s “Protestant Ethic” to argue that more 
religious individuals oppose social welfare because they work hard and believe in justice 
for those who do not.  They write that, “At the individual level, studies universally find 
that more religious individuals, particularly Protestants, have less favorable attitudes 
toward redistribution than others and are more tolerant of inequality” (Benabou and 
Tirole, 2006, 733; emphasis added).  They cite several studies as evidence, including 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) and Scheve and Stasavage (2006).   
An interesting strain of research suggests that the rise of the welfare state in 
Western liberal democracies may lead to declines in religiosity, a suggestion that may 
support religiously-inspired skepticism of public welfare (Gill and Lundsgaarde, 2004).  
In this sense, government social services replace the church’s role as social support 
mechanism (see also Scheve and Stasavage, 2006).  The Bush Administration’s Faith-
Based and Community Initiative—which sought to incorporate small and religious 
organizations, including congregations, into the federal social service regime—recently 
sparked public debate over the separation of church and state.  It would seem that 
conservative evangelicals may have found a happy medium between government largesse 
and Christian charity—so long as the “government shekels” come without “government 
shackles” (Kennedy and Bielefeld, 2002).   
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 The identification of a “religious effect” in a consolidation referendum could 
represent polity replication in action or religious preferences for redistribution—because 
Catholics tend to support social welfare while Southern Baptists tend to identify with 
conservative parties and movements that do not (Wilson, 209; Wilensky, 1981; 
Ammerman, 1991).  Perhaps both are at work.  Controls for political ideology may not 
accurately represent Catholics’ positions, for example, since they tend to endorse liberal 
economics and conservative social values (O’Brien, 2008).  To test whether this is the 
case, one may wish to examine religious attitudes on redistribution to central cities in the 
mass public.  If the same patterns emerge—i.e., the same religious traditions favor 
redistribution as those favoring consolidation—then it may seem that the public 
understands consolidation as a form of redistribution.  However, if the same religious 
patterns are absent, then one may conclude that another force is at work—such as polity 
replication.   
When it comes to political trust, Roman Catholics may be more trusting of 
government than Southern Baptists.  This relationship seems intuitive given the churches 
corresponding polity structures and attitudes on income redistribution.  However, one 
scholarly investigation concluded that while trusting people is positively correlated with 
confidence in public officials and religious institutions, no significant differences on trust 
exist between religious traditions in the U.S. (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002).  Their 
findings do suggest a positive relationship between religiosity and public trust if the same 
individuals trust people, governments, and churches (Ibid).   
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Hypotheses 
Table 2.3 features the expected signs of the various independent variables’ effects 
on the chief dependent variables (or groupings of dependent variables) included in this 
study.  I discuss these hypotheses under the three headings of religious, culture war, and 
consolidation hypotheses.  While Table 2.3 focuses solely on individual-level variables 
and relationships, I also discuss neighborhood-level hypotheses under the religious 
hypotheses heading.  While literature is cited in several respects, I do not cite evidence if 
it has already been cited previously in this literature review.   
Religious hypotheses.  Church attendance and overall religiosity are likely 
distributed fairly randomly throughout the city region because urban-dwelling African 
Americans and suburban-dwelling whites, particularly evangelicals, are often very 
religious (e.g., Taylor, et al., 1996; Wilcox, 1990; Wuthnow, 1988).   However, central 
cities themselves are often seen as irreligious places exhibiting unconventional, and often 
secular, cultural elements (Cox, 1965; Fischer, 1975a).  Louisville is largely composed of 
three religious groupings—Southern Baptists (and other evangelical Protestants), Roman 
Catholics, and Black Protestants.  Given their demographic compositions, I expect to see 
Black Protestants concentrating in the central city, Roman Catholics spreading across the 
city region, and Southern Baptists congregating in the suburban rings.  Past research has 
found that religious salience increases moving outward from urban to suburban to rural 
contexts (Miller, 2001).  This suggests a negative linear relationship between religiosity 
and distance from the city center, although this relationship may be mitigated in 
Louisville by a common social structure across the metropolis.  In other words, many 
scholars of public opinion typically compare urban or metropolitan areas’ social 
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City-County City-County 
Culture War Consolidation Consolidation
Independent Variables (IV) Religiosity Issues Turnout Vote/Opinion
Female + ? - ?
Black + ? - -
Age + + + ?
Education - - + +
Income - - + +
Fulltime - ? - +
Married + + + ?
House + + + +
Conservatism + + + -
Distance to CBD + + + -
Religiosity NA + + ?
So. Baptist + NA - -
Catholic - NA + +
NOTE: + means a positive effect; - means a negative effect; ? means the direction is unclear; NA means 
"not applicable" (i.e., that the IV does not or cannot appear in such a model). ? is inserted if there is no 
precedent for such a relationship, or the literature indicates the relationship could be positive or negative.  
Higher values on the dependent variables are, respectively: more religious, more conservative stances on 
the culture war issues, more likely to vote in the consolidation referendum, and more likely to support city-
county consolidation in the referendum and in one's opinions. The expected effects of the religious affiliation 
dummy variables compare the two traditions, So. Baptist and Catholic, with one another. 
Table 2.3: Expected Signs of Independent Variables' Effects on Dependent Variables/Groupings
 
structures with rural areas and do not believe it necessary to subdivide between urban and 
suburban (see Arcury and Christianson, 1993, for a Kentucky example of this practice in 
environmental studies).  However, in urban studies, urban-suburban differences are often 
emphasized and found to be quite pronounced (e.g., Swanstrom, et al., 2004).   
Churches should be more centralized than the population because original 
structures were built in or near the downtown and these “first churches” are, in many 
cases, still located in the central city (Form and Dubrow, 2005).  These historical 
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buildings are valuable for religious, artistic, and emotional reasons (“use value”; Logan 
and Molotch, 1987), not to mention that their restoration is more environmentally-
friendly and, in some cases (but not all), more cost-effective than new construction.  
However, Chicago school urban ecology predicts that churches will follow members to 
the suburbs as they gain affluence and move outward to the suburbs (McRoberts, 2003).  
Churches that moved at the height of urban decline likely relocated to original or inner-
ring suburbs.  Rural churches at the fringe of the county are few, as less dense 
populations cannot support many membership organizations.  These exurban areas do 
tend to house at least one megachurch (Eiesland, 2000).  This suggests a linear decline in 
church presence across the urban continuum from the city to the urban edge.  Churches at 
the fringe likely have the largest lot sizes due to the ready availability of undeveloped 
land parcels.   
I predict that Louisville will compare favorably with past research and with the 
nation in terms of what socio-demographic variables predict religiosity.  Because 
Louisville borders two regions and is a mix of native Kentuckians and those from other 
regions, its population is more representative of the nation as a whole than the more rural 
parts of Kentucky—which more resemble typical southern areas and have many 
characteristics in common with Tennessee or West Virginia.  Table 2.3 indicates that I 
expect, holding other variables constant, conservatism, distance to the central business 
district (CBD), and the female, black, age, married, house, and Southern Baptist dummy 
variables to all have positive effects on religiosity.  Southern Baptists are likely to be 
more “religious” than Catholics because of their emphasis on individual accountability 
and participation; and the presence of an “evangelical bias” in survey items (see 
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Mockabee, Monson, and Grant, 2001).  I expect a negative relationship between the 
indicators of socio-economic status (SES) and religiosity.  These include education, 
income, and fulltime employment.  Fulltime status also represents a time constraint on 
religious participation.   
Culture war hypotheses.  I believe Louisville exhibits similar political and moral 
positions/attitudes to the nation as a whole on political ideology, partisan identification, 
and the divisive issues of our time.  When culture war issues are viewed as a group, I 
expect positive (more-traditional) signs on age, marital status, house residence, 
conservatism, distance from the CBD, and religiosity (see Table 2.3).  I expect negative 
signs on education, income, and in some cases, female and black.  Females are often 
supportive of abortion, gay rights, and sex-education, but in opposition to pornography 
and other forms of adult entertainment.  They are also less conservative and less 
supportive of the Republican Party and former President Bush.  Blacks are also less 
conservative and less supportive of Republicans, but often opposed to abortion and 
homosexual activity.  However, blacks may be more supportive of sex education and 
adult entertainment than whites.  For brevity’s sake, I do not emphasize culture war 
differences among religious traditions in this dissertation.   
Consolidation hypotheses.  Table 2.3 divides the hypothesized effects of the 
independent variables between city-county consolidation referendum turnout and 
vote/opinion towards consolidation and consolidated government.  The expected signs on 
turnout are based on both conventional views of turnout in general elections and literature 
on consolidation specifically.  Females, blacks, full-time workers, and Southern Baptists 
are expected to exhibit lower likelihoods of voting; whereas, the older, more-educated, 
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higher-income, more-suburban, more-religious, home-dwellers and Catholics are likely to 
exhibit higher likelihoods of voting.   
When it comes to vote choice in the consolidation referendum, I expect higher 
SES to translate into electoral support for consolidation (education, income, fulltime, and 
house).  I expect black, conservative, and suburban voters to oppose consolidation.  There 
is little literature to draw from in predicting the consolidation views of women and 
older/married persons—thus, these relationships are unclear or not statistically significant 
(coded with a “?”).  One might theorize, though, that all are more trusting and thus more 
likely to support consolidation.   
I suspect that religious differences do indeed extend beyond local culture war 
issues to other political issues such as city-county consolidation and approval of the local 
regime.  In terms of religiosity, the direction is unclear.  Because religious individuals 
have largely identified with conservatism and the Republican Party in recent national 
elections (e.g., Langer and Cohen, 2005), one may hypothesize that religiosity and 
identification with conservative religious groups will negatively affect support for 
consolidation.  However, most religious faiths mandate or strongly encourage support for 
the poor (see Pacione, 1990) and thus more religious people may endorse greater societal 
concern for impoverished urban populations.  In this case, more-religious individuals in 
Louisville may favor consolidation for its oft-hypothesized redistributive benefits.   
I expect differences over consolidation to exist between Southern Baptists and 
Catholics due to my theory of polity replication.  Southern Baptists will be less likely 
than Catholics to support consolidation; or the converse, Catholics will be more likely to 
support consolidation.  This effect should be exhibited in both referendum vote and 
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opinions of the consolidated entity.  I would also expect Catholics to have higher rates of 
turnout in the referendum.  It is possible that differences in vote may be mitigated in 
opinions by Southern Baptists adapting to the “popular” local view of supporting the 
regime in power.   
 
Conclusion 
 This literature review outlines the theory underpinning this dissertation’s research 
questions and the hypotheses under examination.  The remaining chapters summarize the 
methodology and test the hypotheses, ultimately lending credence to my theory of polity 
replication.   
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 This chapter details the methodology employed for this dissertation.  I first 
identify and discuss the data sources.  I then describe in detail the construction of all 
dependent and independent variables.  Next I calculate and present the descriptive 
statistics for all variables.  Finally, I describe the statistical methods used to test my 
hypotheses.   
 
Data 
This study utilizes multiple data sources at the individual and neighborhood 
levels.  The chief source of data is the Louisville Metropolitan Survey (LMS) collected in 
spring 2006 by the University of Louisville’s Urban Studies Institute in consultation with 
the Department of Sociology, whose faculty designed the questionnaire (Department of 
Sociology, 2006).  Previous versions of the LMS were collected in 2004, 2000, and 
earlier years.  The unit of analysis is the individual.  Survey respondents were chosen by 
random digit dialing across Jefferson County, Kentucky (Louisville Metro), a technique 
which ultimately resulted in a sample of 807 complete interviews with adult respondents 
aged 18 or over.  Participants were asked for responses on political, moral, and religious 
issues along with basic socio-demographic characteristics.   
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Scholars who have previously utilized the 2006 LMS data have noted that the 
respondents compare favorably with 2000 U.S. Census data and are thus likely fairly-
representative of Louisville’s population, although these analyses only examine a 
subsection of respondents asked environmental questions (Ambrosius, 2008b; 
Gilderbloom, Hanka, and Ambrosius, 2009; Walton, 2006).  In this present analysis, I 
find that the full sample is somewhat more female, older, and more educated than U.S. 
Census Bureau data for 2006.  The sample also drew slightly more white respondents 
than the rate in the population of Jefferson County.  Consequently, I weight the sample to 
reflect better the population using four criteria: sex, race, age, and education (Sapsford, 
1999).  Rather than using dated 2000 Census data, which possibly would eliminate 
important demographic shifts that have occurred over the six years from 2000 to 2006, I 
utilize three-year estimates from the American Community Survey (ACS), 2005-2007.  
The three-year estimates are more reliable than an ACS collected in a single year; and the 
LMS collection year forms the center of the ACS analysis period.  The weighting process 
successfully weighted up male, black, younger, and less-educated respondents to their 
approximate levels in the population.  See Table 3.1 for a comparison of the ACS with 
the unweighted and weighted versions of the LMS.  The exact wording of all relevant 
questions asked by the LMS is included in Appendix A.   
Figure 3.1 illustrates the distribution of LMS respondents across the territory of 
Louisville Metro.  Respondents are scattered randomly throughout their ZIP codes of 
residence using a dot density technique because a full street address was not provided (to 
protect confidentiality).  This map reveals that respondents’ locations are fairly 
distributed across the metropolitan area and do not exhibit a substantial regional bias.   
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Dataset ACS, 3-year estimates LMS, unweighted LMS, weighted
Year 2005-2007 2006 2006
N 704,648 807 805
Sex
Female 51.9 61.1 51.2
Male 48.1 38.9 48.8
Race
White 75.6 79.1 73.5
Black 19.7 17.2 20.7
Other 4.6 2.3 4.4
Age (20+)
20-34 25.6 15.9 24.9
 
35-44 19.8 14.1 18.4
45-59 29.9 34.6 29.5
60-84 22.0 31.4 22.3
85+ 2.7 2.5 3.0
Educ
No HS diploma 14.4 6.9 13.2
HS diploma 29.8 20.2 29.1
Some college 21.9 30.2 22.8
AA degree 6.5 8.3 7.5
BA degree 16.4 14.7 16.7
Graduate school 10.9 19.6 10.7
Table 3.1: Comparison of ACS, 2005-2007, with Unweighted and Weighted LMS, 2006
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To illustrate better the distribution of religion across Louisville, I compiled my 
own list of Louisville’s Christian congregations.  My initial source for this congregational 
census was Church Angel (www.churchangel.com).  This website presents an excellent 
starting point for an electronic database containing a particular community’s Christian 
churches.  While critics may allege that this source of data will miss many smaller, 
African American and non-denominational congregations, the list includes a significant 
number of churches from historically-black denominations (e.g., African Methodist 
Episcopal) and those without denominational ties.  Church Angel lists congregations by 
their city.  In addition to Louisville, I searched for the approximately 80 “lower-class” 
cities (as defined by Kentucky law) in Jefferson County that remain intact after 
consolidation (Savitch and Vogel, 2004).  This search yielded a total of 554 Christian 
congregations.  This compares favorably with Jones, et al.’s (2002) figure of 594 
religious congregations in Jefferson County, which includes non-Christian religious 
establishments.  Because Louisville is overwhelmingly Christian, I chose to disregard 
other relatively-small religious traditions (including Judaism and the eastern religions), 
with very few houses of worship in the city, in this analysis.   
I geocode each congregation by its street address and ZIP code using the 
Louisville/Jefferson County Information Consortium’s (LOJIC) interactive mapping 
system (http://www.lojic.org/mylouisville/viewer.htm).  This process returns the census 
tract in which the church is located, while a search of the Jefferson County Property 
Valuation Administrator’s (JCPVA) property database (http://www.pvalouky.org/ 
propertyinfo/search.php) yields the parcel identification number and the acreage of the 
site.  Eighty-six percent coded on the first run, which rises to over 93 percent following 
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address corrections.  A total of 38 correct addresses could not be located in LOJIC or 
PVA records for a final N of 516.   
To further gauge Louisville’s religious history and ecology, I integrate contextual 
data from: (1) Stark and Bainbridge’s (1996) dataset Religious Ecology of 378 American 
Cities, 1906-1936, which gathers data from the 1910, 1919, 1930 and 1941 U.S. 
Government publications titled Religious Bodies; (2) the 1952, 1971, 1980, 1990, and 
2000 Religious Congregations and Membership Studies (RCMS; Jones, et al., 2002); (3) 
the 2000 LMS, which asked several religious questions; and (4) the Hartford Institute for 
Religion Research’s Database of Megachurches in the U.S. (http://hirr.hartsem.edu/ 
megachurch/database.html).   
For comparison with the nation as a whole and further testing of my hypotheses, I 
employ the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS) collected in 2006, the same calendar year 
as the LMS (Davis and Smith, 2006).  The GSS is a respected project of the National 
Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago funded by the National 
Science Foundation (NSF).  It is a nationally-representative, personal-interview poll of 
non-institutionalized U.S. adults.  The 2006 iteration represents the 26th round of 
collection since the GSS began in 1972, which has proceeded biennially since 1994, and 
is the first to include Spanish-language interviews.  According to NORC, the GSS is the 
most frequently analyzed social science data source other than the decennial U.S. Census 
(National Opinion Research Center, 2009).  The 2006 GSS dataset contains 4,510 cases.  
Due to the 2004-2008 rounds of the GSS adopting a non-respondent, sub-sampling 
design, one must use a weight variable when performing data analysis.  I use the weight 
variable “wtss,” which considers both the sub-sampling of non-respondents and the 
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number of adults in each household.  This weight allows one to generalize about the 
population as a whole even though only one adult per household is eligible to participate 
in the survey.   
For comparison with the LMS, the GSS includes relatively-comparable questions 
on political and moral positions, religious affiliation and religiosity, and basic socio-
demographic characteristics.  While the question wording is often different, the GSS is 
the best available national dataset for direct comparison with the LMS.  The exact 
wording of all relevant questions asked by the GSS is included in Appendix B.   
 
Dependent Variables 
This study makes use of religious, moral, and political dependent variables.  Some 
of these variables are also employed as independent variables in other statistical models 
alongside socio-demographic controls.  The following subsections describe the various 
dependent variables.   
Neighborhood-level Church Variables.  Using my database of churches in 
Louisville, I construct several variables to represent the number of churches per 
community-grouping.  All are calculated by both census tract (N=170) and ZIP code 
(N=32) because the geocoding process captured both.  Census tracts are a better 
approximation of neighborhoods because they are smaller and more numerous.  
However, ZIP codes are also advantageous because LMS respondents were asked to 
identify their ZIP code.  This allows one to calculate neighborhood-level church 
attendance and religiosity averages for those ZIP codes represented by sufficient 
respondents (seven or greater) and compare with measures of neighborhood churches.   
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The first church variable is a per capita measure capturing churches per 1,000 
residents of the census tract or ZIP code.  The second is churches per unit of land area, 
measured by one square mile (i.e., church density).  I employ population density (persons 
per square mile) as a comparable measure calculated for census tracts using 2000 Census 
population and the tract area in square miles.  The third is the percentage of religious land 
use, calculated in acres given the total lot sizes of all churches in the tract or ZIP code.  
Census tract population and land area are provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.  ZIP code 
population and land area are obtained from CSG Network, a website existing “to provide 
assistance, direction, information and reference material for students” 
(http://www.csgnetwork.com/zcl.html).   
Religious Identification.  While serving as a key independent variable in 
regression analyses, I discuss religious identification in detail here because it does serve 
first as a dependent variable when I analyze the religious distribution.  The LMS asks the 
basic question, “What is your religious preference?”  The response choices are (1) 
Baptist; (2) Other Protestant Denomination; (3) Roman Catholic; (4) A Christian religion 
not yet mentioned; (5) A non-Christian religion; and (7) No religious preference.  The 
dominant white American religious traditions are Roman Catholic, Mainline Protestant, 
and Evangelical Protestant (Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth, 2009a).  This LMS question does 
not allow for a division of Protestants into mainline and evangelical branches.  However, 
for unknown reasons, the question does isolate the “Baptist” religious family.  The likely 
reason for breaking out Baptists is their prevalence in Louisville—largely divided into 
white Southern Baptists and various African American Baptist traditions.  An 
identification of evangelical Protestants is further hindered by their likely inclusion in 
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several response categories: Baptist, Other Protestant, a Christian religion, and even no 
religious preference.  Non-Baptist evangelical Protestants who are unfamiliar with the 
Protestant label likely answered “A Christian religion not yet mentioned” or, for those in 
non-denominational or independent churches, perhaps even, “No religious preference.”  
Many Christians, particularly evangelicals or “born again” Christians, deny that their 
faith is comparable to other traditions and thus should not be labeled a religion (see 
Ridenour, 1967 for one such example).  It is clear that the other Christian religion 
category includes respondents beyond Eastern Orthodox and conservative non-
traditionalists (e.g., Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses) not captured by the other 
categories because those choosing this category are greater than these traditions’ rates in 
the population.   
Given these constraints, the classification scheme that comes closest to that 
offered by Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth (2009b) divides the LMS sample into Southern 
Baptists, Black Protestants, Other Protestants, Roman Catholics, Other Christians, Other 
Non-Christians, and the unaffiliated, a diverse category including both religious, non-
religious, and anti-religious respondents.  Southern Baptists do serve as a decent proxy 
for evangelicals in Louisville because they account for about three-quarters of the 
evangelical population (Jones, et al., 2002).   
Southern Baptists are identified as those white respondents who selected 
“Baptist.”  This category likely includes a few mainline or other evangelical Baptists 
because the percentage in the LMS (18.5 percent) is slightly higher than that found by the 
2000 RCMS (15.6 percent), although the vast majority of white Baptists in Louisville are 
indeed Southern Baptists (as is the case across the South—see Shortridge, 1976).  The 
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RCMS finds 164 Southern Baptist congregations but only 28 other Baptist congregations, 
which together account for a mere 0.5 percent of religious adherents in Louisville.   
Black Protestants are identified as those black respondents who selected 
“Baptist,” “Other Protestant,” or “a Christian religion.”  This category accounts for 18.0 
percent of the LMS sample.  While some of these Black Protestants may be members of 
largely-white denominations, the bulk likely attend congregations associated with 
historically-black denominations.  As the cliché goes, Sunday morning is the “most 
segregated hour” in America (Hadaway, Hackett, and Miller, 1984).  Smidt, Kellstedt, 
and Guth (2009b) argue that Black Protestants exhibit similar social, political, and 
theological positions and thus deserve their own category without division into 
evangelical and mainline.   
The Roman Catholic category is fairly straight forward because it was selected by 
the respondents themselves.  23.6 percent of respondents identify with the Roman 
Catholic Church, making it the largest single religious body in Louisville.   
Other Non-Christians, including Jews, Muslims, and Hindus, are only represented 
by a few respondents (totaling 3.3 percent) and, as a composite category, are unfit for 
stringent analysis.  The other Christian categories—Other Protestants (13.0) and Other 
Christians (10.4)—are ambiguous categories that likely include a mix of mainline 
Protestants like Lutherans and Methodists, evangelical Protestants including both 
Pentecostals and self-defined fundamentalists, various Eastern Orthodox traditions, and 
other traditions taking the “Christian” label.  There is no means by which one can 
subdivide the two “other” categories into these individual traditions.  The remaining 
category, the religiously unaffiliated, accounts for 13.2 percent of the LMS sample.   
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While the GSS offers considerably more detail in its variables “RELIG” and 
“DENOM” (see Appendix B), I pare the responses down to those given by the LMS for 
direct comparison.  Southern Baptists are Protestants (RELIG) who selected Southern 
Baptist in the denomination (DENOM) follow-up question.  Black Protestants are those 
black respondents who selected Protestant, Christian, or Non-denominational on RELIG.  
Again, Roman Catholics are able to explicitly self-identify.  Other Protestants are given 
their own category.  Other Christians are grouped by non-blacks who selected Orthodox 
Christian, Christian, or Non-denominational.  The remaining religious groups are placed 
together in the Other Non-Christian category.  Those selecting “None” are labeled 
unaffiliated.   
All religious categories are included in statistical analysis but the Southern Baptist 
and Roman Catholic religious traditions are the dominant traditions in Louisville and the 
key affiliations under study.  Thus, they receive primary attention in discussion of this 
study’s findings.  Religious identification is measured at the individual-level but can also 
be aggregated by ZIP code for those ZIP codes with more than seven respondents, an 
arbitrary but necessary cutoff meant to ensure that a neighborhood score is not based on 
one or few respondents’ characteristics.   
Religiosity.  Both the LMS and GSS ask a host of questions on one’s religious 
salience, behaviors, and beliefs.  I construct an index of religiosity from both datasets 
using factor analysis.  The LMS religiosity index sums information from three religious 
salience questions, two religious behavior questions (one public, one private), and one 
belief question.  These LMS questions capture the following: importance of religion, 
desire to become more religious, closeness to God, worship/religious activity attendance, 
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frequency of scripture reading, and belief in an afterlife (see Appendix A for exact 
question wording).   
The GSS questions capture: strength of religious preference, the extent to which 
one considers oneself religious, the extent to which one considers oneself spiritual, 
worship attendance, religious activity attendance, frequency of prayer, and belief in an 
afterlife (see Appendix B for exact question wording).  The three religious salience 
measures in the GSS are notably different from those in the LMS, but they capture 
similar attitudes on one’s personal religiosity.  The worship attendance question in the 
LMS asks, “Over the past 12 months, how often did you attend a religious gathering such 
as a worship service, Sunday school, or Bible study?”  Because this item does not isolate 
worship service attendance but includes other religious activities, I incorporate two GSS 
questions into the index: “How often do you attend religious services?” and “How often 
do you take part in the activities and organizations of a church or place of worship other 
than attending services?”  While the LMS features scripture reading as a private religious 
behavior, the GSS only asks about frequency of prayer.  This is likely the largest 
difference in index construction because personal scripture reading is thought to reflect 
an “evangelical bias” (Mockabee, Monson, and Grant, 2001).  Finally, while the GSS 
asks numerous belief questions, I only include belief in the afterlife (measured with an 
ordinal “certainty” scale) because this is the only belief question asked by the LMS.   
I use factor analysis, or more specifically a variant of factor analysis called 
principal components analysis (PCA), to construct an index of religiosity from both 
datasets (Jolliffe, 2002).  The factor loadings, eigenvalue, and explained variance of both 
the LMS and GSS religiosity indices are included in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.  The factor 
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loadings are comparable across the two datasets, the eigenvalues each exceed 3.0, and the 
explained variance captured by the single factor each exceeds 50 percent.   Thus, both 
indices fulfill basic statistical requirements (Ibid).  Like religious identification, this 
variable is used at the individual-level but can also be aggregated by ZIP code for those 
ZIP codes with more than seven respondents.   
Factor loadings
Importance of religion .822
Closeness to God .770
Desire to be more religious .668
Worship/church attendance .728
Bible/holy book reading .725
Belief in life after death .530
Eigenvalue 3.051
Explained variance (%) 50.843
Table 3.2: Religiosity Index, LMS
 
Political Ideology.  Political ideology is captured by a five-point scale of 
conservatism.  The LMS asks the question, “Do you think of yourself as a Liberal, a 
Conservative, or as middle-of-the-road?”  It then follows-up with, “Do you consider 
yourself a strong or not very strong [liberal or conservative]?”  I combine these two 
questions to create the following scale: (1) strong liberal; (2) weak liberal; (3) moderate; 
(4) weak conservative; and (5) strong conservative.   
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Factor loadings
Strength of religious preference .730
Extent considered religious .817
Extent considered spiritual .713
Worship/church attendance .785
Religious activity participation .697
Frequency of prayer .748
Belief in life after death .468
Eigenvalue 3.589
Explained variance (%) 51.272
Table 3.3: Religiosity Index, GSS
 
The GSS asks a more-detailed, seven-point question: “I'm going to show you a 
seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from 
extremely liberal to extremely conservative.  Where would you place yourself on this 
scale?”  This scale is as follows: (1) extremely liberal; (2) liberal; (3) lean liberal; (4) 
moderate; (5) lean conservative; (6) conservative; and (7) extremely conservative.  The 
“lean” categories compare well with the “not very strong” (or “weak”) categories in the 
LMS.  To collapse this scale into the same five-point one captured by the LMS, I make 
these categories equivalent and instead combine “extremely [liberal or conservative]” and 
“liberal or conservative” into single categories.  While a slightly different approach for 
each dataset, the results of statistical analysis should be comparable.   
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Political Identification.  The GSS does ask a question labeled “PARTYID” which 
asks, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, 
Independent, or what?”  The LMS, however, does not ask such a question.  The LMS 
does ask whether one feels “very favorable, favorable, neutral, negative, or very negative 
[towards] George W. Bush?” of approximately half the sample (440 cases).  Using the 
very favorable and favorable categories, I create a dummy variable that represents those 
respondents (30 percent) likely to have voted for Bush in 2004.  Jefferson County does 
lean Democratic but the Bush-Cheney Republican ticket in 2004 claimed nearly half of 
the vote (almost 49 percent).  The LMS approximation is lower because: (a) the sample 
includes those who did not vote in 2004 but responded with a negative opinion of Bush; 
and (b) it reflects the fact that some 2004 Bush supporters likely jumped ship to “neutral” 
or “negative” given Bush’s falling approval ratings and unpopular war in Iraq.  
Interestingly though, using the estimated population from the 2004 ACS, Bush garnered 
2004 electoral support from 31.6 percent of the total 520,727 adults (18 and over) in 
Jefferson County.  Thus, this variable is a decent approximation of Bush’s electoral 
support.   
The GSS asks more straightforward questions: “Do you remember for sure 
whether or not you voted in [the 2004] election?”; “Did you vote for Kerry or Bush?”; 
and “Who would you have voted for, for President, if you had voted?”  Given the 
responses to these questions, I create a dummy variable that sums those who: (a) voted 
for Bush; and (b) would have voted for Bush if they had voted or had been eligible to 
vote.  Because the second component (b) allows for change of opinion between 2004 and 
2008, but the first (a) does not (unless one misreports), I would expect this dummy 
92 
 
variable to be higher in support of Bush than the LMS.  It is (43 percent).  Nationally, 
Bush garnered support from nearly 51 percent of 2004 voters or just shy of 30 percent of 
2004 (ACS) U.S. adults.  Despite the inherent differences, these two dummy variables are 
the best comparable measures of political identification across the two surveys.  I caution 
readers to compare these measures carefully with full awareness of their 
incompatibilities.   
Homosexuality.  Both the LMS and GSS ask a comparable question on the 
morality of homosexual relationships.  The LMS asks, “Homosexuality is wrong.  Do 
you…” (1) strongly agree; (2) agree; (3) not sure whether you agree or disagree; (4) 
disagree; or (5) strongly disagree?  I flip this scale so that higher scores represent greater 
disapproval of homosexuality.  The LMS question does not seem to make a distinction 
between homosexual orientation and homosexual behavior.   
I create a comparable five-point scale from the GSS variable “HOMOSEX” 
which asks, “What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex—do you 
think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at 
all?”  I code this scale: as (1) not at all wrong; (2) unsure if wrong; (3) sometimes wrong; 
(4) almost always wrong; and (5) always wrong.  I place the unsure category at level 2 
rather than in the center because the next category is “sometimes wrong” which does not 
fit on the same side as “not at all wrong.”  The GSS question does seem to emphasize 
behavior over orientation.   
Sex Education.  On the issues of sex education in public schools, the LMS asks, 
“How supportive are you of some form of sex education being taught in public schools?” 
following a short statement priming the respondent: “Now I'd like to ask you some 
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questions about sex education, a topic that is often debated among communities and in 
schools.  The Centers for Disease Control reports that in 2003, just over 52 percent of 
teens surveyed in Kentucky claimed to have had sexual intercourse at least once.”  A 
second statement and question was then read regarding “comprehensive” sex education 
(which includes, by the definition given in the survey, discussion of contraception but 
also abstinence), as well as several other follow-ups probing respondents attitudes 
toward, and knowledge of, the issue.   
In a rare instance of providing less detail, the GSS simply asks, “Would you be 
for or against sex education in the public schools?”  Because this is a two-point division, 
unless non-responses are placed in-between, I am forced to do the same with the LMS 
and create comparable dummy variables that express (1) opposition or (0) support for 
public sex education.  Because the GSS question does not include the term 
“comprehensive,” I simply use the first LMS question which refers to “some form of sex 
education.”  Nine percent of the LMS sample asked the sex-ed questions oppose sex 
education, while eleven percent of the GSS respondents are in opposition.  The LMS is 
likely slightly lower because it is an urban area with more liberal views than the nation as 
a whole, which includes rural populations holding more conservative views.   
Adult Entertainment.  Regulation of adult entertainment, or sexually-oriented 
businesses, is a moral issue faced by all local governments (Sharp, 2004).  The LMS asks 
three questions on adult entertainment establishments’ effects on local neighborhoods.  
They begin with: “Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statements about various community issues.”  The three statements are: “Adult 
bookstores and strip clubs tend to create an unsafe neighborhood;” “Communities that 
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have adult bookstores and strip clubs are more likely to have robberies;” and “Adult 
bookstores and strip clubs hurt other businesses in the area.”  I combine these three into 
an index capturing opposition to adult entertainment.  I first recoded all responses into the 
same five-point scale expressing increased levels of opposition (i.e., agreement with the 
statement): (1) very much disagree; (2) somewhat disagree; (3) no opinion; (4) somewhat 
agree; and (5) very much agree.  I then run PCA using these three items.  Factor loadings 
are all above 0.85, the eigenvalue is over two, and the explained variance exceeds 73 
percent.  See Table 3.4 for the PCA results.   
Factor loadings
Adult ent. unsafe .857
Adult ent. makes robberies more likely .867
Adult ent. hurts other businesses .850
Eigenvalue 2.210
Explained variance (%) 73.662
Table 3.4: Adult Entertainment Opposition Index, LMS
 
City-County Consolidation.  A large portion of the LMS is devoted to the recent 
2003 merger of Jefferson County and the City of Louisville.  The 2004 LMS contains the 
same questions on merger but lacks any questions on religion.  From the 2006 questions, 
I created two dummy variables and a factor score.   
First, I simply established whether one voted in the merger referendum using the 
basic question: “Did you vote for the merger, against the merger, or did you not vote at 
all?”  I summed those voting for or against the merger and code them as 1.  I then coded 
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those living in Jefferson County or Louisville in 2000 but who did not vote as 0.  Those 
who were ineligible to vote, meaning they reported living elsewhere in 2000, are coded as 
“system missing.”  This does miss those living in Jefferson County but otherwise 
ineligible or unregistered to vote.  According to these LMS questions, 59 percent of 
adults living within Jefferson County reported voting in the 2000 merger referendum.   
Second, from the same question, I establish whether a voter supported 
consolidation.  Of the 59 percent of eligible respondents reporting a vote, roughly 70 
percent supported and 30 percent opposed consolidation.  The actual referendum results 
show that 54 percent of voters approved consolidation.  As with most surveys, slightly 
more respondents report voting than the amount actually turning-out; and more report 
supporting the winning vote (in this case, consolidating the city and county).   
Finally, I use the follow-up questions asked of all respondents, “regardless of 
whether [one] voted,” to create a factor score of support for the merger and subsequent 
merged government.  The full question text of these six items is located in Appendix A.  
In short, they ask whether one: is (1) better off since merger; (2) trusting of the merged 
government; (3) convinced that merger benefits all residents; (4) convinced that the 
merged government does not waste taxes; (5) convinced that the merged government’s 
employees are honest; and (6) convinced that race relations have improved post-
consolidation.  All items load on a single factor.  The eigenvalue is greater than 2.5 and 
most factor loadings are high, although the questions on merger making one better off 
and improving race relations load lower.  The explained variance is slightly lower than 50 
percent, but the index is acceptable for use.  The results of the PCA are included in Table 
3.5.   
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Factor loadings
Merger made one better off .431
Trust merged government .768
Merger benefits all .786
Merged government does not waste taxes .683
Merged government's employees honest .744
Race relations better post-consolidation .414
Eigenvalue 2.584
Explained variance (%) 43.073
Table 3.5: Merger Index, LMS
 
One further measure of support for the merged government is support for 
Democratic Mayor Jerry Abramson, the former mayor of the City of Louisville, 
champion of consolidation, and present mayor of Louisville Metro.  Abramson, locally 
labeled “mayor for life,” is so connected with the issue of consolidation that his own 
approval rating should compare favorably with personal opinions of merger and the 
merged government.  However, this question was only asked of half of the sample (440 
cases) and thus, if included in the PCA, would delete half of the LMS cases listwise from 
the consolidation index.  I analyze this item on its own as an alternative explanation of 
consolidation position.  This variable is measured on the same five-point scale as the 
original Bush variable—asking whether one feels “very favorable, favorable, neutral, 
negative, or very negative” towards Mayor Abramson.  The scale is kept as a five-point 
variable but flipped so higher responses capture positive views. 
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 Redistribution and Political Trust.  The GSS asks several questions concerning 
one’s beliefs about national spending priorities, two of which deal directly with federal 
spending on redistribution to “big cities.”  The pair of 2006 GSS questions labeled 
“NATCITY” and “NATCITYY” has a subtle difference in question wording.  
Respondents are first read the following statement: “We are faced with many problems in 
this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively.  I’m going to name 
some of these problems, and for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think we’re 
spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.”  Then, 1467 
interviewees responded to “spending on solving the problems of the big cities.”  
Alternatively, 1530 responded to “spending on assistance to big cities.”  These two 
questions are part of a host of GSS items that are reworded slightly to examine the impact 
of question wording on the answers respondents gave.   
 Given the slight difference in wording, I make use of both of these items 
individually and then in a combined measure.  A Chow test comparing regression 
coefficients indicates whether the two samples belong together or are in fact too different 
(Chow, 1960).  It appears that respondents to the question worded “solving the problems” 
were more likely to call for increased spending—48 percent for additional spending 
versus 12 percent believing too much is spent; whereas respondents to the more general 
term “assistance” are more likely to oppose additional spending—22 percent for 
additional spending versus 36 percent believing too much is spent.  It is not surprising 
that the combined measure’s distribution lies somewhere in between.  The coding is as 
follows: (1) spending too much; (2) spending just right amount; and (3) spending too 
little.   
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 The GSS asks several questions concerning political trust.  I combine four 
questions into an index using PCA.  The results of the PCA are included in Table 3.6.  
The index meets accepted standards—the Eigenvalue exceeds two, the variance exceeds 
50 percent, and all four factor loadings exceed 0.5.  The four items are whether: (1) 
politicians treat people fairly; (2) treatment depends on who one knows; (3) politicians 
are corrupt; and (4) government administrators are corrupt.  An additional item, bribery 
frequency, was removed from the PCA due to an extremely low factor loading (0.199).  
The political trust questions were asked of a subsection of the GSS respondents.   
 
Factor loadings
Politicians treat people fairly .518
Treatment depends on who one knows .512
Politicians are corrupt .865
Government administrators are corrupt .865
Eigenvalue 2.027
Explained variance (%) 50.678
NOTE: Initial PCA included an additional item (bribery frequency) that 
was removed from index due to a low factor loading (.199). 
Table 3.6: Political Trust Index, GSS
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Independent Variables 
While also serving as dependent variables, religious identification and religiosity 
are the key independent variables predicting political and moral attitudes and political 
behavior.  The following subsections describe the independent variables—both test 
variables and controls.   
Neighborhood-level Characteristics.  I make use of a single neighborhood-level 
independent variable—location—that takes two forms: distance to/from the central 
business district (CBD) and concentric ring of residence.  Distance from the CBD is a 
standard explanatory variable in the urban subfields of economics, geography, and 
sociology.  This variable captures the distance from the downtown ZIP code (40202) or 
census tract (004900) in miles.  Distance to the CBD is calculated using MapQuest for 
ZIP codes and, for census tracts, using the geographic coordinates of tract centroids 
provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.  Because Louisville is still a very monocentric city 
with a single downtown and a relatively centralized housing market, this measure may be 
of interest in predicting church locations (Ambrosius, Gilderbloom, and Hanka, 2010).  I 
also use tract location to assign a three-point ordinal measure of urban ring.  My method 
is discussed in detail below under the heading “Individual Socio-Demographic Controls.”  
I include summary statistics for nonwhite percent, percentage of total residents 
identifying as something other than “white only” on the 2000 Census, in the coming table 
for reference even though race is not considered at the neighborhood level in further 
analysis. 
Religious Identification and Religiosity.  The construction and measurement of 
these variables are discussed above in the section on dependent variables.   
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Political Ideology.  This variable—level of conservatism—is also discussed 
above.   
Individual Socio-Demographic Controls.  These control variables include sex, 
race, age, educational attainment, annual income, employment status, marital status, and 
dwelling type.  All are available and are nearly identical in the LMS and GSS.  Several of 
these are measured as dummy variables with values of 1 for female, black, fulltime 
employment, married, and single-family home residency.  All other values are assigned 0.  
Age is an interval level variable measured in years.  Education (1-8) and income (1-9) are 
ordinal-level variables capturing SES.   
The LMS allows for further classification of respondents based on their place of 
residency.  While Jefferson County was once divided into city and county prior to 
consolidation, a new residential classification scheme is being advocated by the elites of 
Louisville Metro (Louisville-Jefferson County Metro, 2006).  The post-consolidation 
Comprehensive Housing Strategy attempts to divide the city-county into three concentric 
rings of neighborhoods.  These are demarcated by the area’s two beltways—the inner 
beltway (I-264) known as the Watterson Expressway and the outer beltway (I-265) 
named the Gene Snyder Expressway.  The three rings are thus the areas (1) inside the 
inner beltway; (2) between the two beltways; and (3) outside the outer beltway up to the 
county line.  The report states that these correspond to the “urban core and 1st suburban 
ring”; “2nd suburban ring”; and “3rd suburban ring,” respectively (Louisville-Jefferson 
County Metro, 2006, 7).  I simply refer to these areas as (1) urban and original suburban; 
(2) inner/older suburban; and (3) outer/newer suburban and rural.  The inner-ring suburbs 
contain 1950s suburbs, many with ranch houses, and numerous shopping complexes.  
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The outer-ring includes new high-end subdivisions as well as preexisting family farms.  
Outside the outer beltway could be described, to borrow Sharp and Clark’s (2008) 
language, as the “rural-urban fringe” or where the “country and the concrete” meet.   
I use the respondents ZIP codes to identify their ring of residence.  In cases where 
a ZIP code crosses a beltway, I assign it to the area containing the majority of the ZIP 
code.  Alternatively, LMS respondents may be coded with their distance from the CBD 
given their ZIP codes.  I use MapQuest to calculate the distance from each ZIP code to 
the downtown ZIP code (40202).   
The 2006 GSS lacks any indicator of urban, suburban, or rural residence except in 
the past tense—an item called “RES16,” which asks “Which of the categories on this 
card comes closest to the type of place you were living in when you were 16 years old?”  
The responses include rural, farm, suburb, and various city sizes.  In today’s economy, 
there is no reason to expect that people currently live in the same setting in which they 
were raised.   
 
Descriptive Statistics 
I include descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, and range) for all 
variables in Tables 3.7 through 3.12.  I divide them by type of variable (independent, 
dependent); level of analysis (neighborhood, individual); and dataset, for the individual-
level variables (LMS, GSS).  Table 3.7 contains the descriptive statistics for 
neighborhood-level dependent variables.  Table 3.8 includes the descriptive statistics for 
individual-level dependent variables from the LMS.  Table 3.9 consists of the descriptive 
statistics for individual-level dependent variables from the GSS.  Table 3.10 contains the 
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descriptive statistics for neighborhood-level independent variables.  Table 3.11 includes 
the descriptive statistics for individual-level independent variables from the LMS.  
Finally, Table 3.12 consists of the descriptive statistics for individual-level independent 
variables from the GSS.   
From a cursory analysis of the descriptive statistics, several initial findings are 
evident.  I separate these into descriptions of: (a) Louisville neighborhoods; and (b) a 
comparison of Louisville (LMS) and the nation (GSS). 
Neighborhoods.  From Table 3.7, the average neighborhood (proxied by census 
tract) contains approximately three churches while 23 neighborhoods have no churches 
and five neighborhoods, all urban or black inner suburbs, have more than ten.  The 
neighborhood with the most churches, Russell (tract 002400), has 23.  This together 
seems to suggest that the church database is not lacking in African American churches, as 
many scholars claim of the RCMS data (Finke and Scheitle, 2005).  At a minimum, my 
database certainly includes a multitude of churches in black neighborhoods.  The average 
neighborhood has one congregation per 1,000 inhabitants, although the top two 
neighborhoods, again both black urban neighborhoods, have four and five.  These 
findings are consistent with the literature on black “religious districts,” which finds that 
black neighborhoods are often “overchurched,” meaning they possess too many churches 
given the local population and its available resources (McRoberts, 2003).   
The average neighborhood contains nearly nine acres devoted to church use, 
which accounts for approximately one percent of total land area.  Three tracts contain 
over fifty acres of religious land use, two of these exceeding 100 acres.  One of these 
tracts (010706) contains Southeast Christian Church’s campus, which itself covers 102  
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Number of churches (tract) 170 3.03 2.97 0 23
Number of churches (zip) 32 17.09 10.96 3 50
Churches per 1,000 persons (tract) 170 .82 .79 0 5.07
Churches per 1,000 persons (zip) 32 1.04 1.14 .27 6.49
Churches per sq. mi. (tract) 170 3.49 5.08 0 35.38
Churches per sq. mi. (zip) 32 2.82 3.30 .18 16
Percent of religious land use (tract) 170 .84 1.24 0 12.37
Percent of religious land use (zip) 32 .72 .78 .03 4.55
Neighborhood religiosity (zip) 32 2.39 .34 1.59 3.17
Neighborhood church attendance (zip) 32 3.24 .46 2.03 4.07
Persons per square mile (tract) 170 3,856 2,498 115 11,231
Persons per square mile (zip) 32 2,867 1,773 50 6,946
Table 3.7: Descriptive Statistics for Neighborhood-level Dependent Variables
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Relgious Identification
Roman Catholic dummy 805 .24 - 0 1
Southern Baptist dummy 805 .19 - 0 1
Black Protestant dummy 805 .18 - 0 1
Other Protestant dummy 805 .13 - 0 1
Other Christian dummy 805 .10 - 0 1
Non-Christian dummy 805 .03 - 0 1
Unaffiliated dummy 805 .13 - 0 1
Religiosity Index 805 .00 1.00 -.2.94 1.36
Political Ideology
Conservatism 805 3.10 1.15 1 5
Political Identification
Support for Bush 440 2.63 1.32 1 5
Support for Bush dummy 440 .30 - 0 1
Homosexuality Opposition 805 3.19 1.41 1 5
Sex Education Opposition 382 .09 - 0 1
Adult Entertainment Opposition Index 805 .00 1.00 -2.17 1.22
City-County Consolidation
Vote? dummy 710 .59 - 0 1
Vote for? dummy 417 .71 - 0 1
Merger Support Index 709 .00 1.00 -2.14 2.09
Support for Abramson 440 3.56 1.06 1 5
Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics for Individual-level Dependent Variables, LMS
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Relgious Identification
Roman Catholic dummy 4512 .27 - 0 1
Southern Baptist dummy 4512 .07 - 0 1
Black Protestant dummy 4512 .09 - 0 1
Other Protestant dummy 4512 .35 - 0 1
Other Christian dummy 4512 .02 - 0 1
Non-Christian dummy 4512 .04 - 0 1
Unaffiliated dummy 4512 .16 - 0 1
Religiosity Index 2996 .00 1.0 -2.25 1.68
Political Ideology
Conservatism 4483 3.13 1.25 1 5
Political Identification
Support for Bush dummy 4512 .43 - 0 1
Homosexuality Opposition 1999 3.45 1.81 1 5
Sex Education Opposition 1960 .11 - 0 1
Redistribution Support
Solve problems of big cities 1343 2.35 .70 1 3
Assistance to big cities 1349 1.86 .75 1 3
Combined problems/assistance 2692 2.10 .76 1 3
Political Trust Index 1410 .00 1.0 -2.28 3.21
Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics for Individual-level Dependent Variables, GSS
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Distance to the CBD in miles (zip) 32 9.83 5.24 0 18.72
Distance to the CBD in miles (tract) 170 7.04 4.03 0 18.58
Percent of nonwhite persons (tract) 170 25.35 29.51 1.37 99.43
Table 3.10: Descriptive Statistics for Neighborhood-level Independent Variables
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Relgious Identification
Roman Catholic dummy 805 .24 - 0 1
Southern Baptist dummy 805 .19 - 0 1
Black Protestant dummy 805 .18 - 0 1
Other Protestant dummy 805 .13 - 0 1
Other Christian dummy 805 .10 - 0 1
Non-Christian dummy 805 .03 - 0 1
Unaffiliated dummy 805 .13 - 0 1
Religiosity Index 805 .00 1.00 -.2.94 1.36
Political Ideology
Conservatism 805 3.10 1.15 1 5
Sex
Female dummy 805 .51 - 0 1
Race
Black dummy 795 .21 - 0 1
Age in years 788 48.27 17.78 18 96
Education 805 4.22 1.80 1 8
Income 699 4.93 2.70 1 9
Employed fulltime dummy 805 .46 - 0 1
Married dummy 805 .46 - 0 1
House dummy 805 .75 - 0 1
Location
Distance to the CBD in miles 805 10.21 4.91 .00 23.85
Table 3.11: Descriptive Statistics for Individual-level Independent Variables, LMS
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Relgious Identification
Roman Catholic dummy 4512 .27 - 0 1
Southern Baptist dummy 4512 .07 - 0 1
Black Protestant dummy 4512 .09 - 0 1
Other Protestant dummy 4512 .35 - 0 1
Other Christian dummy 4512 .02 - 0 1
Non-Christian dummy 4512 .04 - 0 1
Unaffiliated dummy 4512 .16 - 0 1
Religiosity Index 2996 .00 1.0 -2.25 1.68
Political Ideology
Conservatism 4483 3.13 1.25 1 5
Sex
Female dummy 4512 .54 - 0 1
Race
Black dummy 4512 .13 - 0 1
Age in years 4496 45.34 16.55 18 89
Education 4512 4.08 1.845 1 8
Income 3806 5.46 2.69 1 9
Employed fulltime dummy 4512 .53 - 0 1
Married dummy 4512 .56 - 0 1
House dummy 4512 .72 - 0 1
Table 3.12: Descriptive Statistics for Individual-level Independent Variables, GSS
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acres and is compared to a “minitown” due to its variety of secular services (Brown, 
2002).  This results in over 12 percent of this tract given over to “religious” use, defined 
by church ownership of the land.  Questions of multiple uses present on church grounds 
permeate the legal literature on megachurches (Evans-Cowley and Pearlman, 2008; 
Galvin, 2006; Mertes, 2005).  The other tract (010306), located in Northeast Jefferson 
County, has four churches claiming twenty or more acres—although this amounts to less 
than two percent of the tract’s land.  The average lot size of the city’s seven 
megachurches is 26 acres.  The average tract has 3.5 churches per square mile, while 
several urban tracts have church densities exceeding ten per square mile.  Russell and a 
diverse, historic neighborhood of Victorian homes near the University of Louisville (Old 
Louisville, 005100) are the most-dense neighborhoods—with 28 and 35 churches per 
square mile, respectively.   
From Table 3.10, one can see that Louisville is still a very segregated city (also 
see Cummings and Price, 1997; Hudson, 2004).  Some urban census tracts are nearly 100 
percent composed of African Americans, while the average tract has 25 percent and the 
lowest tract has nearly none (just over one percent).  The average neighborhood is seven 
miles from the downtown while the farthest fringe communities are almost 20 miles out 
from the CBD.   
Comparison.  Tables 3.8 and 3.11 report means for Louisville and Tables 3.9 and 
3.12 report means for the nation from the GSS.  In terms of religious identification, 
Louisville contains more Southern Baptists (19 percent versus 7 percent) and Black 
Protestants (18 percent versus 9 percent) than the nation as a whole—evidence of its 
southern context and urban demographics.  Despite its Roman Catholic heritage, 
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Louisville contains slightly fewer Catholics than the nation (24 percent versus 27 
percent).  The same is true of the unaffiliated—13 percent of Louisville’s adult 
population claims no affiliation while 16 percent of adults across the nation do the same.  
This would seem to indicate that Louisville tends to be slightly more religious in its 
identification than the nation due to its Bible belt location.  I suggest that this difference 
is even more pronounced because I think the LMS unaffiliated category is slightly 
inflated by the inclusion of non-denominational evangelicals claiming Christianity is not 
their “religion.”  I explore Louisville’s religious landscape further in the following 
chapter.   
Politically, Louisville is slightly less conservative and less supportive of President 
Bush than the nation.  While Kentucky is a “red state,” Jefferson County is a “blue city.”  
This is again demonstrated by slightly less opposition to homosexuality and sex 
education in public schools in Louisville.  Just shy of two-thirds of adult residents voted 
in the 2000 city-county consolidation referendum with seven of ten casting their ballot in 
support.   
On the control variables, the GSS is slightly more female (54 percent versus 51 
percent) and a little less African American (13 percent versus 21 percent) than the LMS.  
The average age is also slightly older in the LMS than the GSS, although both are in the 
mid-to-late 40s.  The Louisville sample is a little more educated, on average, but averages 
less income—an odd urban paradox.  More of the national respondents are married and 
employed full-time.  Finally, a full three-quarters of the LMS respondents live in a house, 
compared with 72 percent in the national sample.  This is a bit unusual for an urban area 
but reflective of Louisville’s distinctive architecture.  The city consists largely of small 
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“shotgun” houses for those with minimal income and larger Victorian homes in historic 
neighborhoods.  The suburban areas feature mid-sized ranch homes, larger, newly-built 
development homes, and original farm houses.   
 
Statistical Methods   
This study uses both descriptive and inferential statistical techniques to address 
the research questions.  I first calculate basic univariate descriptive statistics and examine 
differences of means.  I ultimately make use of multivariate modeling techniques 
including linear regression, or ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, and binary 
logistic regression, or logit regression.  Before addressing the individual research 
questions, I describe the two regression approaches.  The following sections then describe 
the models constructed to answer each respective research question.   
Linear Regression.  The purpose of linear regression is to find a linear 
relationship between a dependent variable and one or more explanatory variables.  The 
multiple linear regression (MLR) equation, in simple matrix form, is as follows:  
y = Xβ + ε, 
where y is the dependent variable, X is a vector of independent variables, and ε is the 
error term, which captures the effects of all omitted variables.   
Various procedures have been developed for parameter estimation and inference 
in linear regression.  The simplest and most common is ordinary least squares (OLS), 
which estimates β
 
by minimizing the sum of squared prediction errors, also known as 
residuals.  Despite the relative simplicity of a linear regression model estimated by OLS, 
many scholars, particularly political scientists, still rely solely on or begin their analyses 
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with OLS regression (Krueger and Lewis-Beck, 2008).  Krueger and Lewis-Beck (2008, 
4) write that OLS “remains the principal multivariate technique in use by researchers 
publishing in our best [political science] journals.”  OLS regression analysis is based on 
several assumptions that can be referenced in any statistics text (see Berry, 1993 for a 
concise discussion).   
Logistic Regression.  The Binary Logistic Regression Model (BLRM) is an 
appropriate model if the dependent variable is dichotomous, reflecting whether an event 
occurs or does not occur (Pampel, 2000).  The BLRM thus estimates the probability of an 
event occurring.  The linear probability model (LPM), performing OLS with a binary 
dependent variable, has several problems (Johnson, Joslyn, and Reynolds, 2001).  For 
one, it generates nonsensical predicted y-values (i.e., probabilities) that are negative or 
greater than one at extreme values of the independent variable.  In addition the LPM is an 
inappropriate functional form because Xs may have diminishing returns as the predicted 
probability nears 0 or 1 (i.e., taking the form of an S-shaped curve).  The LPM generates 
heteroscedastic errors and thus biased standard errors and tests of significance (t)—in 
other words, the model predicts better near probabilities of 0 and 1.  Finally, the LPM 
also results in non-normally distributed errors, which can lead to biased standard errors.  
There are two assumptions for the BLRM: (1) cases must be independent and (2) the 
model must be correctly specified, without omitted variable bias.  The multivariate 
BLRM model, simplified, is written:  
Prob(event) = 1/(1 + e–Z), 
where Z is the regression equation, β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + . . . βkXk; k is the total number of 
independent variables in the model; and e (~=2.7818) is the base of the natural logarithm.  
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Prob(event) is the probability that the event will occur.  BLRM uses a Maximum 
Likelihood (ML) algorithm to arrive at a solution.   
Specific Models.  I initially examine descriptive statistics on Louisville’s religious 
past using available data from 1906 to 2000.  Using the LMS and church location data, I 
divide the city into three rings and compare: means on church attendance and religiosity; 
proportions of the four highlighted religious traditions; and the number of churches, 
churches per capita, church density, and religious land usage.  I construct a bivariate 
linear regression model to calculate a “density gradient” for churches—that is, the 
percent churches decline with each additional mile from the city center (see Clark, 1951 
for population equivalent).  I create several map figures using Arc-GIS to better illustrate 
the distribution of religion across Louisville Metro.   
I construct individual-level MLR models predicting religiosity in Louisville 
(LMS) and the nation (GSS).  I compare significant variables and coefficients across the 
two models.  I specify regression models from the LMS and GSS for each of the four 
political variables.  I use MLR to compare Louisville to the nation on political 
conservatism and attitudes on the morality of homosexuality.  I again compare significant 
variables and coefficients.  I use BLRM to compare Louisville and the nation on support 
for President Bush and sex education in public schools.  I compare significant variables 
and predicted probabilities.  The key independent variables in all of the models are 
religiosity and religious identification.  To test for religious differences on another key 
local moral issue, that has no GSS counterpart, I specify a MLR model to predict 
attitudes on adult entertainment.  I use BLRM to calculate probabilities of voting in the 
consolidation referendum and voting in favor of merger.  Furthermore, I construct MLR 
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models predicting the merger index and favorability towards Abramson.  I use MLR to 
predict attitudes towards national urban policy and political trust from the GSS.   
Since the GSS redistribution question was worded differently when asked of two 
subsections of the sample, I conduct a Chow test.  A Chow test assesses whether 
regression coefficients are equal across two subsamples (Chow, 1960).  If respondents 
can be divided into two distinct samples, one can write: 
y = Xβ1 + ε; 
y = Xβ2 + ε, 
where y is the dependent variable, X is a vector of independent variables, ε is the error 
term, and β1 and β2 are parameters to be estimated for each subsample.  The null 
hypothesis to test is: 
H0: β1 = β2 
The Chow test statistic is calculated as follows: 
F = [ESSc – (ESS1 + ESS2)]/k 
      ____________________ 
      (ESS1 + ESS2)/(n – 2k), 
where F is the test statistic, ESSc is the error sum of squares for the combined model, 
ESS1 is the error sum of squares for the first subsample, ESS2 is the error sum of squares 
for the second subsample, k is the number of estimated parameters, and n is the total 
sample size.  The resulting test statistic is distributed F(k, n–2k).   
 If I reject the null of equal coefficients, then the two samples are distinct and 
cannot be combined.  If I do not reject the null, the responses are similar enough to 
combine the sample into one and perform MLR predicting the combined variable.   
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Conclusion 
 This chapter covered in detail the data and methodology of this study.  The 
remaining chapters present the findings, organized into three chapters on “congregants, 
culture, and consolidation,” respectively; and finally the implications for research, 
religion, and politics/policy.   
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CHAPTER IV 
LOUISVILLE’S RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 
Introduction: Religious Congregations in Louisville 
Louisville’s present and future lie in its past.  This is true of Louisville’s 
demographics, politics, economics, and social relations.  It is also true of its religious 
ecology.  For over two hundred years, the people of Louisville—whites, free blacks and 
enslaved blacks—have flocked to their chosen houses of worship, whether Protestant, 
Catholic or Jewish.  This rich religious heritage still exists today and is as important to 
Louisville’s society as ever.  This short review emphasizes Louisville’s three largest 
religious traditions—Roman Catholics, Baptists (and their Stone-Campbell breakaway 
group), and Black Protestants—which together have historically (and presently) 
dominated the religious scene.   
Louisville’s first church, under the supervision of the Episcopalians, was built in 
1803, twenty-five years after the area’s first settlement at the Falls of the Ohio 
(Wickendon, 1921).  The second church constructed in 1811 was the first Catholic church 
in Louisville (Ibid).  A French Priest was active in Louisville as early as 1794, while the 
first sermon in the area may have been preached by Baptist Squire Boone, brother to the 
famous frontiersman and folk hero Daniel Boone (Ibid).  Early on, Baptist, Catholic, and 
black congregations succeeded at demonstrating their presence in Louisville, alongside 
several other Protestant denominations (Episcopalian, Methodist, Presbyterian).   
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The Catholic Church established the Diocese of Kentucky in 1808 (Wickendon, 
1921).  The first Catholic church in Louisville was built on Main St. in 1811 (Ibid).  
Originally, the Diocese was centered south of Louisville in nearby Bardstown but moved 
to Louisville in 1841 because the local Bishop “found that Bardstown was not gaining in 
importance” (Ibid, 12).  Early Catholic congregations founded in Louisville catered to 
particular ethnicities such as Germans (St. Boniface, 1836) and the French (Notre Dame 
de Port, or the Church of Our Lady in Portland, 1841).  Wickendon (1921) documents a 
variety of Catholic contributions to education and social services in Louisville, including 
the creation of hospitals and orphanages.  Catholic schools still have a particularly strong 
presence in modern-day Louisville.   
Baptists, and the splinter movement including Christian Churches and the 
Disciples of Christ, also made an early impression on Louisville.  The first Baptist 
congregation in Jefferson County was the Baptist Church of Beargrass founded in 1784 
near the Shelbyville Pike (Wickendon, 1921).  In 1803, Kentucky’s Baptists founded the 
Long Run Baptist Association covering Jefferson as well as neighboring Shelby, Spencer, 
Bullitt, and part of Hardin counties (Ibid).  Wickendon (1921, 16) cautions that, in 
traditional Baptist fashion, “This association was merely a gathering for consultation and 
advice.”  Hudson (1998, 45) labels Long Run “a rather loose association of Baptist 
churches in the [Louisville] region.”  The First Baptist Church of Louisville was 
established in 1815, which later split into other white Baptist, black Baptist, and Christian 
Church congregations (Wickendon, 1921).   
Wickendon (1921, 21) writes that while “The Baptists of Louisville [are] now 
very powerful in the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), [they] had no part in its 
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organization, which occurred in 1845 in Augusta, Georgia.”  The conventions’ creation 
was a protest against the American Baptist Home Mission Society’s refusal to allow a 
slave-holder’s participation in missions (Ibid).  Foreshadowing events to come, the 
Charleston Mercury newspaper wrote, “When we are forced out of the church by the 
Northern fanatics we shall next be forced out of the Union by the same nefarious arts” 
(quoted in Wickendon, 1921).  A month after its creation, Kentucky’s Baptist churches 
renounced the northern Baptists and pledged their allegiance to the SBC.  Louisville 
gained its prominence in the convention when the Southern Baptist Theological 
Seminary, founded in 1859 under the pro-slavery leadership of James P. Boyce, moved 
from Greenville, South Carolina to Louisville in 1877 (Ibid).  In 1921, the President of 
the seminary, Dr. E. Y. Mullins, ascended to the presidency of the SBC, forever 
cementing Louisville’s prominence in the convention (Ibid).   
The Disciples of Christ were founded in 1810 by Alexander Campbell and his 
father Thomas in Pennsylvania, breaking ties with the Baptist church according to 
Wickendon (1921).  The Campbell’s later merged with former Presbyterian minister 
Barton Stone, a Kentuckian who began the Christian Church, in 1832 (Davis, 1915).  
Together, these churches are known as the Stone-Campbell or Restoration movement—
united around common ideals of restoring the early church’s emphasis on regular 
communion and the necessity of baptism of believing adults by immersion, apart from 
denominational division and creeds (Ibid).  Alexander Campbell visited Louisville in 
1824, delivering a passionate speech, and by 1825 various Louisville Baptists followed 
his lead by “break[ing] the loaf every Lord’s Day and…attend[ing] regularly to the 
contribution for the poor” (Wickendon, 1921, 52-53).   
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Today, the Christian Church and Southern Baptists have much in common—
religiously, socially, and politically—particularly in Louisville.  Alexander Campbell 
(1970, xv) penned a work titled The Christian System, which refers to Christianity as a 
“system” likened to the human body or universe, for the purpose of “communicating a 
correct knowledge of the Christian Institution.”  Campbell (Ibid, vii) praises Luther’s 
“effort to dethrone the Man of Sin,” in reference to the Roman Catholic Pope, but equally 
condemns the various “Protestant Popes, who gradually assimilated the new church to the 
old.”  According to White (1972, 102), the Disciples of Christ denomination sprung from 
this tradition has “retained sufficient emphasis on local autonomy to prevent them from 
developing a genuine formal structure.”  Today, the Christian Church is undoubtedly the 
second largest mostly white Protestant presence in Louisville—with over 80 
congregations and tens of thousands of adherents, largely due to Louisville’s largest 
congregation, Southeast Christian Church.  With the conservative turn in the SBC, the 
two groups share many mutual interests, such as emphasis on congregational polity, 
baptism by immersion following a confession of faith, and Biblical primacy/inerrancy.   
Southeast Christian Church began in 1962 with 77 charter members, originally 
meeting in a basement and then elementary school (Southeast Christian Church, 2007).  
The church outgrew two other buildings, officially growing to megachurch size in 1985 
and first achieving “Gigachurch” attendance, exceeding 10,000 average weekly 
attendees, in 1990 (Ibid; Southeast Outlook, 2008).  In 2007, Southeast ranked sixth 
nationally in size and seventeenth in reputation (Outreach Magazine, 2007; Church 
Report, 2007).  The church calls an over one-hundred acre campus home, complete with 
several structures, a 9,000 seat sanctuary, a full-service café, Christian bookstore, and a 
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50,000 square-foot exercise facility, among countless other congregational amenities 
(Brown, 2002).  The church even produces an Easter Pageant that rivals Broadway and 
Hollywood (Smith, 2008).  One of the other four majority white megachurches is a 
Christian Church, two are Southern Baptist, and one is Pentecostal (Assembly of God). 
The two remaining megachurches are associated with the black Baptist tradition.  
Black Protestantism has always been strong in Louisville, even in the days of slavery.  In 
the early and mid-1800s, blacks were forced to choose between “either their master’s 
church, a separate African American branch of their master’s church (i.e., separate but 
not independent), the ‘invisible institution’ of slave religion, or little or no religion at all” 
(Hudson, 1998, 44).  Early denominations seeking to evangelize the black population of 
America included the Baptists and Methodists (Kolchin, 1993; Lincoln and Mamiya, 
1990; Raboteau, 1978).  Eventually, black Baptists and black Methodists successfully 
founded their own independent denominations—such as the African Methodist Episcopal 
church, founded in 1816 by Richard Allen (Lincoln and Mamiya, 1990).  Today, black 
Protestantism is the third largest tradition in Louisville following Roman Catholicism and 
the Southern Baptist Convention (Jones, et al., 2002; Department of Sociology, 2006).   
During the early 1920s, University of Louisville graduate student Homer E. 
Wickendon (1921) wrote that there were 269 churches in the city, including 38 Catholic 
(two of which were black), 72 Baptist (including 40 black), 14 Episcopal (one black), and 
16 Christian Churches (three black).  Wickendon tracked the number of congregations in 
Louisville from 1800 to 1920, providing a count for every ten years.  There existed only a 
handful of churches prior to the 1830s with the population of congregations at 
approximately 60 by the Civil War.  In 1860, there were eight independent African 
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American churches in Louisville (Hudson, 1998).  In the two decades following the war, 
the number of Louisville churches more than doubled to over 120.  This count again 
doubled between 1880 and 1920.  While this rate of increase slowed during the twentieth 
century, the total exceeded 500 congregations by 1980 (Jones, et al., 2002).   
Figure 4.1 features the approximate locations of the over 500 Christian 
congregations in Louisville today.  Churches are distributed randomly within the census 
tracts that house them.  Each dot represents a single church.  One can see that the census 
tracts located immediately adjacent to the downtown, particularly in the African 
American dominated west end, feature the highest density of church buildings.  As one 
moves farther out to the more sparsely populated fringe, churches thin out.   
 
Religious Identification in Louisville 
 Table 4.1 reports Census data on religious adherents in the City of Louisville from 
1906 to 1936.  Approximately two-thirds of the population was religiously affiliated over 
this thirty-year period.  Catholics composed forty percent of the population around the 
turn of the century but dropped to just under one-quarter from 1916 to 1936.  This large 
presence of Catholics distinguishes Kentucky from other parts of the South—and is due 
to northern Kentucky’s location at the base of the “German Triangle,” with points in 
nearby Cincinnati, Ohio; St. Louis, Missouri; and Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Ownby, 2005).  
A geographic analysis of the dominant religious traditions in U.S. counties finds that 
Louisville is the boundary between Southern Baptist territory, stretching north from the 
Gulf of Mexico, and German Catholic territory coming down from the central Midwest 
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(Jones, et al., 2002).  Around one-third of the early-1900s population held a non-Catholic, 
primarily Protestant, affiliation.   
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Year 1906 1916 1926 1936
Religiously affiliated 68.7 56.5 62.4 59.3
Religiously unaffiliated 31.3 43.5 37.6 40.7
Roman Catholic affiliation 39.7 23.3 23.9 24.1
Non-Catholic affiliation 29.0 33.2 38.6 35.3
Population Estimate 214,330 229,410 271,318 313,411
Source: Stark and Bainbridge (1996)
Table 4.1: Louisville Religious Adherents, 1906-1936 (Percent of Population)
 
Table 4.2 features data on religious adherence in Jefferson County, Kentucky—
now consolidated Louisville Metro—covering the latter half of the twentieth century.  
Catholics have remained at around one-quarter of the population from the 1950s to the 
present.  Southern Baptists are consistently about one-sixth (16-17 percent) of Jefferson 
County’s population.  Southern Baptists compose about one-third of religious adherents 
in the Kentucky-Tennessee region, more so than even other parts of the South (Ownby, 
2005).  Other Protestants appear to grow from the 1970s to 1990 and then decline sharply 
prior to 2000.  The RCMS data is reliable when one compares within a tradition—so long 
as a denomination does not alter the way it counts members—but amorphous categories 
like “Protestants” may shift over time due to the inclusion of different denominations 
with each iteration of the RCMS.  Furthermore, the population not counted in 1990 
amounted to one-third while nearly half are uncounted in 2000.  While this may be seen 
as a decline in religious adherence, it is just as likely that several denominations ceased 
reporting membership data to the RCMS study team or it may reflect increasing  
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Year 1952 1971 1980 1990 2000
Southern Baptist 13.8 16.8 17.0 17.1 15.6
Other Protestant 15.8 14.6 19.2 26.0 14.1
Total Protestant 29.6 31.4 36.2 43.1 29.7
Roman Catholic 25.8 22.5 24.0 23.5 22.6
Population Not Counted 42.8 45.9 39.1 32.1 45.4
Source: Jones, et al., 2002
Table 4.2: Louisville-Jefferson County Religious Adherents, 1952-2000 (Percent of Population)
 
identification with non-denominational congregations, which the RCMS does not reliably 
count.   
To establish the reliability of the 2006 LMS data on religious identification, I 
compare the proportions responding with each religious denomination to the 2000 RCMS 
and the 2000 LMS, which also asked a simplified religious preference question.  The 
comparison is contained in Table 4.3.  The numbers for the major traditions—Catholics 
and Southern Baptists—are similar across the data sources, again reflecting 
approximately one-quarter and one-sixth, respectively, of the total population of Jefferson 
County.  A discrepancy does exist when one tallies total Protestants.  While the 2000 
RCMS reports only 30 percent Protestant, the 2000 and 2006 LMS datasets report nearly 
half and over half, respectively.  This is easily resolved because the RCMS underreports 
Protestants due to not counting most African American and independent Protestants.  The 
religious preference question asked in the 2006 LMS included more categories, including 
several ambiguous ones, which make comparison with the 2000 LMS difficult.  While 
certainly an improvement over the simplistic 2000 response categories, the 2006 LMS 
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added open-ended categories which capture disparate denominations and neglected to 
include specific non-Christian religious categories like Judaism.   
 
Dataset RCMS LMS LMS
Year 2000 2000 (Unweighted) 2006 (Weighted)
Southern Baptist 15.6 - 18.5
Black Protestant - - 18.0
Other Protestant 14.1 - 13.0
Other Christian - - 10.4
Total Protestant 29.7 44.6 59.9
Roman Catholic 22.6 26.1 23.6
Other Non-Christian 2.0 - 3.3
Jewish - 0.7 -
Other - 21.8 -
Population Not Counted 45.4 - -
Unaffiliated/None - 6.9 13.2
Evangelical Protestant 21.6 - -
Mainline Protestant 8.5 - -
Table 4.3: Comparison of 2000 RCMS and 2000/2006 LMS Estimates of Religious Adherence
 
Table 4.4 compares the presence of religious traditions in Louisville with the 
nation using 2006 LMS and GSS data.  Louisville has comparable proportions of Roman 
Catholics, non-Christian religious traditions, and the religiously unaffiliated.  The non-
Catholic Christian population is slightly higher in Louisville due to elevated evangelical 
Protestant proportions.  Since the LMS does not ask an evangelical identification 
question, I compare Southern Baptists and other Protestants/Christians.  Louisville has 
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over twice the proportion of Southern Baptists as the nation.  The percentage of other 
Protestants and Christians in Louisville is only about two-thirds as much as their 
representation in the nation as a whole.  In addition, Louisville has twice as many Black 
Protestants when compared with their proportion in the national population.   
 
Louisville Nation
Roman Catholic 24% 27%
Southern Baptist 19% 7%
Black Protestant 18% 9%
Other Protestant/Christian 23% 37%
Total Non-Catholic Christian 60% 53%
Non-Christian 3% 4%
Unaffiliated 13% 16%
Source: LMS and GSS (both 2006)
Table 4.4: Comparison of Louisville's Major Traditions with the Nation (% of pop)
 
 
Louisville’s Religious Urban Ecology 
 Table 4.5 captures the religious ecology across the three rings of Louisville 
Metro—urban, within the inner beltway; inner suburban, between the inner and outer 
beltways; and outer suburban, beyond the outer beltway.  While neighborhoods in urban 
Louisville average over one church per 1,000 residents, this number falls to 0.6 in the 
older suburbs and rebounds slightly to nearly 0.8 in the newer fringe suburbs.  Church 
density—churches per square mile—declines tenfold with distance from the center, 
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dropping from an average of 6.2 in the urban core to 0.62 at the county’s edge.  Figure 
4.2 illustrates this decline in church density by mapping churches per square mile for 
each census tract.  The densest neighborhoods are located within the inner beltway, while 
the communities outside the outer beltway are all within the lowest category.  While there 
may be less church structures per square mile, church campus size grows with distance 
from the central city.  Urban churches average just over one acre while inner and outer 
suburban churches tend to each cover about five acres.  Churches are less frequent sights 
at the fringe but, when seen, are likely to cover more ground or hold more land.   
 
Ring Urban Inner Suburban Outer Suburban
Number of churches 3.51 2.58 3.35
Churches per 1,000 persons 1.10 0.61 0.76
Churches per sq. mi. 6.22 1.88 0.62
Percent of religious land use (% of acreage) 0.73 1.00 0.50
Average church campus size (acres) 1.27 4.88 5.14
Religiosity -0.10 0.10 -0.02
Church attendance 3.19 3.24 3.23
Southern Baptist (% of pop) 14.9 21.7 18.4
Roman Catholic (% of pop) 18.1 27.7 24.6
Black Protestant (% of pop) 31.0 14.8 5.3
Other Protestant (% of pop) 9.3 13.5 17.4
Other Christian (% of pop) 6.0 9.4 17.9
Other Non-Christian (% of pop) 5.0 1.3 4.3
Unaffiliated (% of pop) 15.7 11.6 12.1
Table 4.5: Comparison of Congregational and Individual Religious Variables' Means by Urban Ring 
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Table 4.5 also presents individual level data on affiliation and religiosity in 
Louisville from the 2006 LMS.  Both Catholics and Southern Baptists are most-highly 
represented in the inner-suburbs, claiming respective 22 and 28 percents of the 
population here.  As a percentage of total population, they both claim higher proportions 
in the outer suburbs than the urban core.  Interestingly, if one calculates the share of each 
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tradition residing within each ring (not shown in Table 4.5), the distributions are nearly 
identical.  Forty-six percent of both traditions live in the inner suburbs while the 
remainder of each is divided between the urban area and the outer suburbs, each claiming 
between 26-28 percent of each tradition.  Figure 4.3 highlights the residential 
distributions of both Southern Baptists and Catholics.  This visual representation 
confirms that while both traditions are concentrated in the inner suburbs, they each spread 
proportionally over most of the county’s land area.   
Black Protestants are concentrated in the inner-city while other Protestants and 
other Christians make up higher proportions of the two suburban rings.  Non-Christians 
make up nearly five percent each in the urban and outer suburban rings, while only 
accounting for one percent in the inner suburbs.  While highest in the central city, the 
religiously unaffiliated account for a steady 10-15 percent of the population per ring.   
Average religiosity, based on the factor score index, peaks in the inner suburbs 
and is lowest in the urban core—perhaps supporting a “backward bending” relationship 
like that found by Azzi and Ehrenberg’s (1975) analysis of religiosity and income.  
Average church attendance, one component of the religiosity index, is statistically 
identical across all three rings—with all three average scores corresponding to attendance 
just over once per month.   
Figure 4.4 maps the mean religiosity score for each ZIP code.  The urban core 
boasts some of the highest scores in the African American west end, while the more 
affluent east end drags the urban average down with the lowest religiosity in the entire 
county.  Other African American and inner suburban ZIP codes are also highly religious.   
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The bulk of the eastern and southern portions of the county are mildly religious, with the 
eastern portion demonstrating greater religiosity levels than the bulk of the southern 
county.   
Table 4.6 reports the results of four bivariate linear regression models calculating 
density gradients for population and churches, each by census tract and ZIP code.  The 
coefficients on distance from the CBD are the rates at which population or churches 
decline with each additional mile from the city center (Clark, 1951).  The results show 
that the population is more sprawled than the houses of worship.  More specifically, 
churches per square mile decline more sharply with distance from the city center than the 
population per square mile.  Results are consistent whether one employs census tracts or 
ZIP codes, although the ZIP code models each boast a higher adjusted R-Square statistic.   
 
Coefficient on
Dependent Variable Constant Distance from CBD Adj. R-Square
LN(persons per sq. mi., tract) 9.008 -0.142 0.437
LN(persons per sq. mi., zip) 8.983 -0.134 0.500
LN(churches per sq. mi., tract) 2.209 -0.208 0.518
LN(churches per sq. mi., zip) 2.146 -0.167 0.674
NOTES: Constants and coefficients are all significant at .001 level; Constants are predicted values of
LN(density) at the CBD; Coefficients are the rates at which density declines with distance from CBD
Table 4.6: Population and Congregation Density Gradients by Tract and Zip
 
 
Religiosity in Louisville and the Nation 
 Tables 4.7/8 and 4.9/10 present the findings of OLS regression models predicting 
the individual religiosity index using 2006 data for Louisville (LMS) and the nation 
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(GSS), respectively.  Model 1 in Table 4.7 is equivalent to the lone model in Table 4.9.  
The findings on almost all independent variables’ effects are nearly identical.  Age, 
political conservatism, and the female, black, married, and house dummy variables are all 
statistically significant and positive with similar magnitudes.  Income and the fulltime 
employment dummy are not significant in either model.  One difference between the two 
models is the effect of education.  While not significant in the LMS model, education is 
significant and positive in the GSS model.  Both models explain near one-fifth of the 
variation in religiosity.   
Model 2 in Table 4.7 includes an additional variable unique to the local dataset—
miles from the CBD—which is not present in the GSS.  While distance from the CBD is 
significant and positive, signifying an increase in religiosity with distance from the city 
center, it does little to alter the model—all other variables’ effects maintain significance 
and remain similar in magnitude and the adjusted R-Square increases by a mere 0.005.   
Tables 4.8 and 4.10 compare local and national models including religious 
tradition dummy variables and excluding the black dummy variable due to excessive 
multicollinearity with black Protestant.  The most significant finding from these tables is 
that while Southern Baptists are more religious than Catholics in the nation, there is no 
significant difference in religiosity between them in Louisville.  The inclusion of 
religious tradition dummies in the models predicting religiosity raises the adjusted R-
Squares above 0.4 in both the local and national models.   
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) -1.744*** .189 - -1.863*** .195 -
Female .502*** .072 .244 .492*** .072 .240
Black .632*** .091 .249 .677*** .093 .266
Age .013*** .002 .218 .013*** .002 .214
Education -.001 .023 -.002 .004 .023 .007
Income .000 .018 -.001 -.007 .018 -.019
Fulltime -.046 .080 -.022 -.051 .080 -.025
Married .319*** .080 .155 .313*** .080 .152
House .164‡ .087 .070 .151‡ .087 .064
Conservatism .161*** .030 .183 .150*** .030 .171
Distance to CBD - - - .018* .008 .086
F 22.677*** 21.102***
Adj. R-Square .223 .228
N 681 681
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. ***p<0.001. 
Model 1 Model 2
Table 4.7: Predicting Individual Religiosity in Louisville (LMS)
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) -1.081*** .181 - -.940*** .175 -
Female .354*** .063 .173 .354*** .063 .173
Age .010*** .002 .166 .010*** .002 .166
Education .008 .020 .014 .008 .020 .014
Income -.014 .015 -.038 -.014 .015 -.038
Fulltime .077 .071 .038 .077 .071 .038
Married .259*** .070 .126 .259*** .070 .126
House -.014 .076 -.006 -.014 .076 -.006
Conservatism .109*** .026 .125 .109*** .026 .125
So. Baptist .142 .094 .054 - - -
Black Prot. .506*** .099 .188 .365*** .103 .135
Catholic - - - -.142 .094 -.059
Other Prot. .106 .106 .034 -.036 .114 -.012
Other Christ. .240* .114 .070 .099 .120 .029
Non-Christ. -.424* .170 -.078 -.565** .174 -.104
Unaffiliated -1.282*** .109 -.420 -1.424*** .113 -.466
F 34.538*** 34.538***
Adj. R-Square .406 .406
N 689 689
NOTE: *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001.  Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic.  Model 4 reference
category is Southern Baptist.  Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.
Table 4.8: Predicting Individual Religiosity in Louisville (LMS), Contd.
Model 3 Model 4
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) -1.390*** .090 -
Female .370*** .037 .187
Black .656*** .057 .213
Age .005*** .001 .086
Education .023* .011 .044
Income -.007 .008 -.018
Fulltime -.059 .039 -.030
Married .224*** .040 .113
House .147** .043 .067
Conservatism .196*** .014 .254
F 59.845***
Adj. R-Square .173
N 2525
NOTE: *p<0.05. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001. 
Table 4.9: Predicting Individual Religiosity in the Nation (GSS)
Model 1
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) -.703*** .079 - -.322** .095 -
Female .248*** .031 .125 .248*** .031 .125
Age .002‡ .001 .028 .002‡ .001 .028
Education .041*** .009 .076 .041*** .009 .076
Income -.017* .007 -.046 -.017* .007 -.046
Fulltime -.063‡ .033 -.032 -.063‡ .033 -.032
Married .147*** .033 .074 .147*** .033 .074
House .081* .035 .037 .081* .035 .037
Conservatism .114*** .012 .147 .114*** .012 .147
So. Baptist .381*** .064 .096 - - -
Black Prot. .682*** .061 .185 .301*** .079 .082
Catholic - - - -.381*** .064 -.172
Other Prot. .192*** .038 .094 -.189** .063 -.092
Other Christ. .146 .105 .021 -.235* .116 -.035
Non-Christ. -.056 .077 -.012 -.437*** .093 -.090
Unaffiliated -1.287*** .048 -.476 -1.668*** .070 -.617
F 139.722*** 139.722***
Adj. R-Square .435 .435
N 2525 2525
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001.  Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic.  Model 4 
reference category is Southern Baptist.  Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.
Table 4.10: Predicting Individual Religiosity in the Nation (GSS), Contd.
Model 2 Model 3
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Summary and Discussion 
Louisville’s religious ecology is largely composed of Roman Catholics, 
representing a quarter of total persons, and Southern Baptists, composing one-sixth of the 
population.  These proportions have remained remarkably consistent throughout the 
twentieth century.  While the Catholic figure is similar to the percentage in the nation, 
Louisville contains over twice the Southern Baptists as the national norm.  This is a 
product of the evangelical religious subculture of the South, which contrasts with larger 
numbers of mainline Protestants in other regions of the country.  This is the major 
difference between Louisville and the nation.  To establish the exact differences, better 
data must be collected that captures the full range of Protestant traditions in Louisville—
including mainline, evangelical, Pentecostal, black, and independent/nondenominational.  
Current data sources either exclude certain denominations/traditions or fail to 
differentiate among the major traditions within Protestant Christianity. 
Turning to the examination of religious geography in Louisville, I find that 
religiosity generally increases with distance from the city center—although the inner 
suburbs exhibit greater religiosity than the outer suburbs.  This is confirmed by the 
finding that both Catholics and Southern Baptists appear to dominate this middle zone of 
the city-county more so than the center or fringe.  Church attendance is generally low 
across all three regions—corresponding to an average attendance at just over once per 
month.  This is, though, higher than the national average, which is less than once per 
month and thus consistent with the Bible belt image and evangelical emphasis on 
religious participation.  Church facilities, while more centralized than the population as a 
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whole, are larger in the outer suburbs due to the availability of land.  This is consistent 
with the conventional wisdom on megachurch locational decisions.   
Predictive models of religiosity in Louisville and the nation are largely 
comparable—with similar directions and magnitudes of variables’ effects and analogous 
R-Squares, which describe the amount of variation in religiosity explained by the models.  
The adjusted R-Square statistics are each around one-fifth in the original models, but 
catapult to over two-fifths when religious tradition is included as a predictor.  It seems 
that despite some differences in affiliation and religious culture, Louisville’s population 
exhibits similar patterns as the nation as a whole.  One interesting finding is that while 
Southern Baptists are more religious than Catholics in the nation, in terms of the 
religiosity index, there is no difference between them in Louisville once one accounts for 
other socio-demographic factors.  This seems to suggest that Louisville’s Catholics are 
more traditional, or at least more dedicated to their faith than Catholics nationwide.  This 
is again consistent with the picture of Louisville as more faithful than the country as a 
whole, despite the influences of seemingly unconventional urban culture.   
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CHAPTER V 
CULTURE WAR IN LOUISVILLE AND THE NATION 
Introduction: Culture War in Louisville 
Culture war is a concept introduced (or at least popularized) by James Davison 
Hunter (1991) in his book by the same name.  In writing his book, Hunter (1991, 34) 
argues that “America is in the midst of a culture war that has had and will continue to 
have reverberations not only within public policy but within the lives of ordinary 
Americans everywhere.”  Religion plays a central role in this conflict—pitting “Christian 
fundamentalists, Orthodox Jews, and conservative Catholics…against their progressive 
counterparts for control of American secular culture” (Hunter, 1991, back cover).  
Religion influences public debate in the southern states more so than any other U.S. 
region, an area dominated religiously and often politically by evangelical Protestants—
referred to as the “Southern Religious Establishment” (Wilson and Silk, 2005).   
The culture wars came to a head nationally during the 2000 and 2004 presidential 
elections and the resulting two administrations of President George W. Bush.  The media 
harped on issues separating cultural conservatives from their progressive opponents.  
Religious actors, particularly evangelical Protestants and other brands of the conservative 
faithful, were ever-present in the discussion of elections, politics, and policymaking.  
While the national scene is often emphasized in media accounts, one cannot lose sight of 
the fact that many, if not most, culture war battles take place at the local level (see for 
examples, Deckman, 2004; Djupe and Olson, 2007; Sharp, 1999; 2004; 2005).  Like 
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other U.S. communities, Louisville faces numerous local political issues where religion is 
certain to influence the debate.  These include moral arguments over homosexuality and 
gay rights, sex education in public schools, and pornography and adult entertainment.  
Louisville presents a particularly interesting case study of all three issue areas.   
Gay rights are a very important issue facing Louisville.  From 2000-2006, the six 
years prior to the Louisville Metro Survey, Louisville experienced the highest percentage 
increase in unmarried same-sex households in the U.S., a recognized proxy for gay 
couples (Brown 2007; Gates 2007; see Florida, 2005, 94).  While once discrete and 
hidden, Louisville’s gay community has emerged to take an active role in the community 
since the 1970s (Williams, 2001).  The lesbian community founded a branch of the 
Metropolitan Community Church in 1972 (chartered 1985), which formerly met at the 
First Unitarian Church before purchasing its own building (Ibid).  Also in the 1970s, a 
chapter of Dignity—a support group for gay Catholics—was founded in Louisville (Ibid; 
also see Davidson, 1987).  In the 1980s, the gay community formed an advocacy 
coalition (Gays and Lesbians United for Equality, or GLUE), a gay newspaper, and a 
local television program to bolster their cause (Ibid).  While gay rights legislation faced 
difficulties, the Louisville Board of Alderman eventually passed an ordinance by a vote 
of 7-5 in January, 1999 banning workplace discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation (Ibid).  These legislative efforts faced steady opposition from religious 
conservatives (Ibid).  Savitch and Vogel (2004) report that gays organized against 
Louisville’s merger with Jefferson County based on fears that the consolidated entity 
would reflect a power shift to the suburbs, which are generally seen as less sympathetic to 
the fight for gay rights and anti-discrimination legislation.   
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I must note in this discussion that there is a vibrant debate amongst American 
Christians, and Christians worldwide, on whether Christianity should condemn (if at all) 
homosexuality as an orientation in general or homosexual activity on its own.  This 
sometimes takes the form of the classic distinction “love the sinner, hate the sin,” 
language which has crept into the academic lexicon (Mak and Tsang, 2008).  Thus, many 
Christians now accept homosexual orientation but, even so, do not permit homosexual 
activity among committed believers, including clergy members.  Other Christian 
denominations have openly welcomed the gay and lesbian communities (Summers, 
2007).   
Sex education in Louisville and Kentucky’s public schools is another 
controversial issue.  Because Kentucky received abstinence-only funding from federal 
Title V grants from 1997 to 2008, the Jefferson County School District’s (JCSD) sex 
education instructors “can mention STDs, but not how to use a condom or how to access 
birth control” (Ungar, 2008; also see LEO, 2008).  JCSD’s abstinence funding, $79,000 
(10 percent) of the state’s total $817,000, goes to the Teen Youth Program of 
Encouragement (TYPE) where instructors discuss “self-esteem and healthy relationships” 
with sex-segregated middle-schoolers (Ungar, 2008).  Instructors sometimes ask students 
to sign “virginity pledges,” a practice allegedly causing teens to practice unsafe sex when 
they do become sexually active because they “believe using a condom means sex is pre-
meditated, enhancing feelings of guilt” (LEO, 2008).  The teachers can discuss safe-sex 
only if a teenager asks a question, and typically the response is given after the session’s 
conclusion.  More-comprehensive education is only available for students who are 
already pregnant or parenting (Ungar, 2008).  Local health department officials, nonprofit 
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and progressive activists, and professors of medicine at the University of Louisville are 
among the opponents of Kentucky’s abstinence-only sex education (Ungar, 2008; LEO, 
2008).  The recently-elected Democratic Governor Steve Beshear has not announced any 
intention to forego receiving federal abstinence-only funding, which requires a match of 
$3 for every $4 received (LEO, 2008).  Recent evidence does suggest, however, that 
abstinence-only sex education initiatives may persuade a significant portion of 
participating teenagers to delay sexual activity and, as such, constitute worthy 
investments of education dollars (Jemmott, Jemmott, and Fong, 2010; Stein, 2010).   
Sex-oriented business regulation has also been a hot-button concern—even one of 
the “most contested decisions” facing the post-consolidation Louisville Metro Council 
(Savitch, Tsukamoto, and Vogel, 2008, 447).  The adult entertainment issue has rallied 
religious congregations into political action, including the Southeast Christian 
megachurch.  Savitch, et al. (2008, 446-447) note that Southeast Christian “has 
substantial voting power and the capability to influence public opinion, especially on 
issues of vice and morality.”  They further write that, “Large evangelical Christian 
organizations have come to the political fore by demonstrating their clout in both local 
elections and state referenda; they have also successfully campaigned against vice in 
downtown strip clubs” (Savitch, et al., 2008, 448).  The ROCK organization, which 
stands for Reclaim Our Culture Kentuckiana, was formed in March 2004 to “defend and 
sustain the Judeo-Christian principles upon which our country was founded” (Birke, 
2007).  ROCK formed as a result of a series of stories in Southeast Christian’s weekly 
newspaper, the Southeast Outlook, which “described how sexually oriented businesses 
had spread from downtown like poison ivy, and reported that 60 such businesses were 
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operating inside Jefferson County” (Ibid).  ROCK, led by director Bryan Wickens, an 
attorney with the conservative Alliance Defense Fund, seeks support from Louisville-area 
churches to fight adult entertainment venues, including strip clubs and pornographic 
retailers (Ibid).  They do this by lobbying and educating local governments in Kentucky 
and Indiana, reaching out to addicts and “women caught up in the pornography industry,” 
and otherwise promoting Christian values (Ibid).   
While the South is considered a highly-conservative area, with portions 
simultaneously holding membership in the oft-mentioned Bible belt, it does seem that the 
South contains urban areas that are considerably less conservative as a whole or that 
express a form of repressed hedonism.  In one unscientific investigation of Google search 
terms, Louisville ranks among the top-five U.S. cities for searches of: “wife swapping,” 
“girls gone wild,” “anal sex,” and “masturbation” (Classically Liberal, 2008).  
Interestingly, Louisville’s residents are number one in searches for “homosexuality” 
(Ibid).  This may signify a large homosexual presence or, more likely, a general interest 
in the topic, positive or negative.  Birke (2007) quotes ROCK director Wickens as stating 
that, “We’ve had more than one expert tell us that [the Louisville] area is one of the most 
saturated with sexually oriented businesses in the country.”   
This chapter constructs regression models comparing the determinants of public 
opinion on these prominent culture war issues in Louisville with the nation.  I explore 
political conservatism, support for former President George W. Bush, and perspectives on 
homosexuality, sex education, and one local-only issue—adult entertainment.   
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Data Analysis and Comparison 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 compare MLR models predicting individual political 
conservatism in Louisville and the nation, respectively.  Table 5.1 contains a second, 
non-comparable model with the addition of distance to the CBD.  The national model 
explains more variation in conservatism than the local model (12.4 versus 5.2 percent) 
and includes many more statistically significant predictors.  Findings are similar on three 
independent variables: religiosity (strong positive), house dummy (positive), and fulltime 
employment dummy (not significant).  The remaining six predictors are not significant in 
the LMS model but significant with varying effects in the GSS model.  Education and the 
female and black dummy variables are negative while age, income, and the married 
dummy are positive.  The signs on the LMS predictors are the same except age and 
income, which are both negative.  The inclusion of the distance to the CBD variable in 
Table 5.1, Model 2 enhances the model’s predictive power—the change in adjusted R-
Square is .015, raising the explained variation to 6.7 percent.  This variable, which 
measures suburbanization, has a significant, positive effect on conservatism.   
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 look at BLRMs predicting support for President George W. 
Bush in Louisville and the nation, respectively.  The dichotomous LMS variable is based 
on those responding in support for Bush in an “approval rating” type question.  The 
dichotomous GSS variable is based on those who voted for Bush in 2004 added to those 
who would have voted for Bush had they voted or been eligible to vote.  In the Louisville 
model, the female and black dummy variables are significant and negative, while 
conservatism, religiosity, and the fulltime employment dummy are all significant and  
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) 3.091*** .222 - 2.800*** .236 -
Female -.030 .093 -.013 -.039 .093 -.017
Black -.032 .119 -.011 .058 .121 .020
Age -.002 .003 -.029 -.002 .003 -.032
Education -.007 .029 -.010 .003 .028 .004
Income -.000 .022 .000 -.013 .022 -.029
Fulltime -.125 .100 -.053 -.132 .099 -.056
Married .116 .102 .050 .107 .101 .046
House .190‡ .109 .071 .166 .109 .062
Religiosity .254*** .048 .223 .235*** .047 .206
Distance to CBD - - - .032** .010 .136
F 5.170*** 5.875***
Adj. R-Square .052 .067
N 681 681
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001. 
Model 1 Model 2
Table 5.1: Predicting Individual Conservatism in Louisville (LMS)
 
147 
 
Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) 3.217*** .108 -
Female -.261*** .050 -.102
Black -.554*** .077 -.139
Age .004* .002 .050
Education -.085*** .014 -.123
Income .021‡ .011 .044
Fulltime -.020 .053 -.008
Married .238*** .053 .093
House .102‡ .057 .036
Religiosity .349*** .026 .269
F 40.677***
Adj. R-Square .124
N 2525
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. ***p<0.001. 
Table 5.2: Predicting Individual Conservatism in the Nation (GSS)
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Standard Standard
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
(Constant) -3.590*** .780 -3.546*** .804
Female -.784** .281 -.788** .282
Black -1.603*** .415 -1.622*** .425
Age .013 .009 .014 .009
Education .011 .090 .010 .090
Income -.033 .070 -.032 .070
Fulltime .685* .317 .693* .319
Married .091 .303 .097 .304
House .206 .342 .210 .343
Conservatism .672*** .123 .674*** .123
Religiosity .833*** .178 .839*** .181
Distance to CBD - - -.006 .030
-2 Log likelihood 357.727 357.681
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square .342 .342
N 369 369
NOTE: *p<0.05. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001. 
Table 5.3: Predicting Individual Support for Bush in Louisville (LMS)
Model 1 Model 2
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Standard
Independent Variable Coefficient Error
(Constant) -2.671*** .255
Female -.166‡ .099
Black -2.124*** .208
Age -.003 .003
Education -.019 .028
Income .080*** .021
Fulltime -.103 .103
Married .061 .103
House .188‡ .113
Conservatism .748*** .043
Religiosity .311*** .052
-2 Log likelihood 2731.596
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square .340
N 2567
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. ***p<0.001. 
Table 5.4: Predicting Individual Support for Bush in the Nation (GSS)
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positive.  The remaining variables are not significant, including distance from the CBD 
which is added in Model 2 and has no net impact on the model.  The model for the nation 
is similar—with a nearly identical Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square at 0.34.  Most significant 
variables and their effects are the same except for the following differences: income is 
significant and positive, the fulltime dummy is not significant, and the house dummy is 
significant and positive.  The positive effect of conservatism is strengthened in the 
national model, while the positive religiosity effect is cut by more than half. 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 examine MLR models predicting beliefs about the morality of 
homosexuality in Louisville and the nation, respectively.  Again, Model 2 in Table 5.5 
includes the distance to the CBD variable.  The LMS and GSS models are very similar, 
both predicting 27 percent of the variation in beliefs about homosexuality’s morality.  
Most independent variables’ effects are comparable.  Education, income, and the female 
dummy are significant and negative—meaning that women and individuals with higher 
socio-economic status are less likely to commit to the view that homosexuality is wrong.  
On the other hand, conservatism, religiosity, and the married dummy are significant and 
positive—meaning that married, more-conservative, and more-religious persons are more 
likely to claim homosexuality is wrong.  Fulltime employment status is not significant in 
either model.  Age and the house dummy are only significant in the national model but 
have similar positive effects, though not statistically significant, in the Louisville model.  
The glaring difference is the black dummy variable, which is significant and positive in 
the GSS model but does not approach significance in the LMS model.  Consistent with 
the findings on religiosity and conservatism, the distance to the CBD variable is  
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) 3.031*** .266 - 2.783*** .274 -
Female -.683*** .099 -.242 -.693*** .098 -.246
Black .089 .125 .025 .182 .128 .052
Age .004 .003 .045 .003 .003 .042
Education -.113*** .030 -.142 -.103** .030 -.130
Income -.043‡ .023 -.082 -.056* .023 -.107
Fulltime .025 .106 .009 .015 .105 .005
Married .222* .108 .079 .215* .107 .076
House .135 .116 .042 .113 .115 .035
Conservatism .248*** .041 .205 .230*** .041 .191
Religiosity .506*** .051 .368 .491*** .051 .357
Distance to CBD - - - .034** .010 .117
F 26.987*** 25.894***
Adj. R-Square .276 .287
N 681 681
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001. 
Table 5.5: Predicting Individual Beliefs that Homosexuality is Wrong in Louisville (LMS)
Model 1 Model 2
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) 3.108*** .200 -
Female -.461*** .080 -.126
Black .583*** .127 .102
Age .007** .002 .064
Education -.185*** .023 -.185
Income -.069*** .017 -.102
Fulltime .082 .084 .022
Married .263** .085 .072
House .156‡ .091 .038
Conservatism .326*** .032 .228
Religiosity .533*** .042 .291
F 64.219***
Adj. R-Square .274
N 1673
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001. 
Table 5.6: Predicting Individual Beliefs that Homosexuality is Wrong in the Nation (GSS)
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significant and positive in Table 5.5, Model 2 with an increase of .011 in the adjusted R-
Square.   
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 contrast BLRMs predicting opposition to public school sex 
education in Louisville and the nation, respectively.  Both models find a significant 
negative effect of income and a significant positive effect of conservatism but agree on 
little else, despite similar Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square statistics just below 0.2.  In 
Louisville, status as a female exerts a significant negative effect on opposition to sex 
education.  In the nation as a whole, female status has no significant effect while age, 
religiosity, and living in a house all exert significant positive influences on personal 
opposition to sex education.  Thus, religiosity is a significant factor in national opinion 
but apparently has no influence on public opinion about the sex-ed issue in Louisville.  In 
Model 2 from Table 5.7, the addition of the distance from the CBD variable has no major 
impact on the model’s fit or findings.   
Table 5.9 presents an MLR regression model predicting opposition to adult 
entertainment in Louisville.  Because this is another culture war issue, it is expected that 
the investigation of a possible religious effect is pertinent.  Consistent with this 
assumption, the inclusion of the religiosity index as a predictor in Model 2 increases the 
adjusted R-Square by .079 over Model 1.  Age, conservatism, and the female and married 
dummies are statistically significant and positive while the black dummy variable is 
negative.  The remaining variables—education, income, distance from the CBD, and the 
fulltime employment and house dummy variables are not significant.  The inclusion of 
the religiosity index in Model 2 removes the significant effect of conservatism while 
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strengthening the negative effect of the black dummy variable.  Religiosity is the most 
powerful predictor of opposition to adult entertainment in one’s neighborhood.   
 
Standard Standard
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
(Constant) -2.965* 1.257 -3.022* 1.286
Female -1.015* .480 -1.011* .480
Black -.601 .607 -.567 .627
Age .017 .014 .017 .014
Education -.032 .139 -.031 .139
Income -.357** .127 -.361** .129
Fulltime .485 .560 .486 .559
Married .508 .488 .506 .488
House -.331 .527 -.340 .528
Conservatism .496* .195 .490* .197
Religiosity .265 .256 .265 .256
Distance to CBD - - .010 .048
-2 Log likelihood 163.747 163.702
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square .195 .195
N 330 330
NOTE: *p<0.05. **p<0.01.
Table 5.7: Predicting Individual Opposition to Sex Education in Louisville (LMS)
Model 1 Model 2
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Standard
Independent Variable Coefficient Error
(Constant) -4.829*** .527
Female .023 .181
Black .368 .255
Age .010‡ .006
Education -.058 .054
Income -.072‡ .040
Fulltime .158 .193
Married .241 .202
House .627* .243
Conservatism .536*** .080
Religiosity .549*** .107
-2 Log likelihood 952.149
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square .179
N 1696
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. ***p<0.001.
Table 5.8: Predicting Individual Opposition to Sex Education in the Nation (GSS)
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) -1.384*** .200 - -.789*** .203 -
Female .453*** .074 .222 .296*** .073 .145
Black -.176‡ .096 -.070 -.392*** .095 -.155
Age .015*** .002 .256 .011*** .002 .187
Education .003 .023 .005 .002 .022 .003
Income .019 .018 .051 .022 .017 .058
Fulltime -.081 .082 -.040 -.065 .078 -.032
Married .284** .082 .139 .184* .079 .090
House -.079 .089 -.034 -.127 .085 -.054
Conservatism .072* .031 .083 .025 .030 .028
Distance to CBD .009 .008 .043 .003 .008 .016
Religiosity - - - .319*** .038 .321
F 14.961*** 21.495***
Adj. R-Square .170 .249
R-Square Change - .079
N 681 681
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. 
Table 5.9: Predicting Individual Opposition to Adult Entertainment in Louisville
Model 1 Model 2
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Summary and Discussion 
The models included in this chapter have uncovered some interesting findings on 
the culture war in Louisville and the nation.  Louisville does not exhibit many of the 
socio-demographic differences that characterize the national culture war.  On political 
ideology, differences in race, gender, age, and SES do not predict conservatism in 
Louisville like they do in the nation.  Nonetheless, most variables’ signs confirm 
conventional knowledge of the U.S. political landscape.  While there are distinct 
differences in the Bush support variables between the datasets, the local and national 
models are remarkably similar.  It does seem that conservative ideology is more 
important in shaping national support for President Bush while religiosity is more 
important in the Louisville context, a finding again consistent with Louisville’s more-
religious nature.   
On the moral issues, Louisvillians and Americans are similar on their views of the 
morality of homosexuality.  The main difference lies in the views held by blacks.  
Holding other variables equal, blacks in the nation are significantly more likely to hold 
that homosexuality is immoral—a finding consistent with recent political events, 
including blacks’ overwhelming support of Proposition 8’s ban on same-sex marriage in 
California’s November 2008 election (although actual levels of support are debated; see 
Wildermuth, 2009).  However, in Louisville, black opinions are statistically indistinct 
from the population as a whole, ceteris paribus.  This is a surprising finding considering 
Louisville’s religious nature.  Interestingly, a comparison of means shows that urban 
blacks in Louisville are slightly more conservative, less religious, and less against 
homosexuality when compared with blacks nationwide.  While these differences are not 
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pronounced, they do conflict with conventional thinking—which would predict that 
Louisville’s blacks are less conservative but more religious given their urban and 
southern contexts, respectively.  This finding on homosexuality may mean that support 
for same-sex marriage may also be higher among Louisville’s black community than 
elsewhere, a theory that could be tested by analyzing survey data on the 2004 referendum 
in which Kentucky voted to add a same-sex marriage ban to the state’s constitution (USA 
Today, 2004).   
On opposition to sex-education, the Louisville and national models are very 
different despite similar proportions of variation explained.  One glaring difference is the 
non-significance of religiosity in the local model.  On opposition to adult entertainment, 
religiosity is the most powerful predictor.  Its inclusion in the model raises the explained 
variation by nearly one-third of its former value.   It would be interesting to compare this 
local model to a national counterpart, although similar questions are unavailable in the 
2006 GSS.   
Religiosity, the key variable in this chapter’s set of tables, is positively correlated 
with conservative culture war positions in all regression models included in this chapter, 
except the local model predicting sex-education support.  It is, though, positive in 
direction in the local sex education model.  In all other models, including the national sex 
education model, the variable is significant at the .001 level.  Thus, religiosity has proved 
to be the primary driver of the culture war even when controlling for demographics, SES, 
and political ideology.  While many variables retain their significance, when religion is 
included in the models it often dampers conservatism’s effect.  For example, in Table 5.9 
predicting adult entertainment opposition, conservatism exerts a weak but statistically 
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significant positive effect.  When religion is included in the model, it removes 
significance from conservatism, has a stronger effect, and contributes to better model fit.  
Thus, religiosity is demonstrated to be a very important predictor of public opinion on 
several prominent moral and political issues in both Louisville and the nation.   
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CHAPTER VI 
RELIGION AND CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION IN LOUISVILLE 
Introduction: Recent Political History and Consolidation Debate in Louisville 
In the latter part of the twentieth century, Louisville and Jefferson County went 
through the various intra-metropolitan rescaling stages from: (a) interjurisdictional 
competition and annexation wars; to (b) regional revenue sharing under a city-county 
compact to; (c) full-blown merger of the city with the surrounding suburban/rural county 
(Savitch and Vogel, 2000; 2004).  This chapter explores the recent debates over 
regionalism culminating in the 2000 consolidation referendum and the city-county 
merger in 2003; and analyzes data predicting participation and vote in the referendum 
and attitudes on the merged government.   
Political and business elites have attempted to amalgamate the City of Louisville 
and surrounding Jefferson County through city-county consolidation or annexation of 
large unincorporated portions of the county since the 1950s (Savitch and Vogel, 2000).  
Their plans have repeatedly failed—consolidation was rejected in both 1982 and 1983 
referenda.  An earlier effort to annex significant portions of the county in the 1950s called 
the Plan for Improvement, or Mallon Plan, also failed due to rejection by suburban voters 
by a 2-1 margin (Ibid).   
Attempts at consolidation in the 1980s were motivated by the city’s declining 
share of the county’s population, down from three-quarters to one-third over the latter 
half of the twentieth century, and tax base and revenues (Savitch and Vogel, 2000).  As a 
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result of deindustrialization and suburbanization, Louisville also housed a 
disproportionate number of the county’s poor and minority residents.  Project 2000, an 
organization of business elites in cooperation with the mayor and county judge-executive, 
pushed the state legislature in the early 1980s to establish a charter commission that 
would study and propose city-county merger.  With an exemption in place for the 90-
some legally-classified “lower-class” cities in the county, the legislature created the 
commission (Ibid; Schulman, 1987).  The resulting plan was defeated at the polls by less 
than 1,500 votes.  Despite a seemingly more “palatable” plan successfully placed on the 
ballot the following year, consolidation was again defeated, by a margin of over 5,000 
votes.   
The major opponents of merger each year were a coalition of African Americans 
from Louisville’s west end and the white working class in the south end of the city and 
the unincorporated area of southwest Jefferson County (Savitch and Vogel, 2000).  
Despite recent battles over busing, these strange bedfellows were brought together by the 
possibility of merger (Ibid; Schulman, 1987).  Savitch and Vogel (2000, 200), two local 
academics, partially attribute consolidation’s defeat to fears of a “conspiracy among the 
‘downtown’ and [affluent] ‘east end’ establishment,” with consolidation serving as the 
backbone of the “community power structure’s agenda” (also see Schulman, 1987).  
According to Schulman (1987, Lo3), this unlikely marriage was the result of the fact that, 
…two generations of Southwest county whites felt they had been treated 
by the city establishment and by East Enders as second-class, hillbilly 
bumpkins, perennially on the short end for roads, sewers, and 
representation on city-county boards and commissions.  And for many 
blacks, still only in transition to educational, economic, and participatory 
equality, nothing short of commanding evidence would retrieve a nagging 
worry that government consolidation might mean some loss of newly won, 
black political power.   
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Other coalition supporters included the NAACP, local police lodges, 18 state 
representatives, and five city aldermen.   
In 1985, Louisville made an effort to annex all of the remaining unincorporated 
parts of Jefferson County.  As a result, the county agreed to a “compact” with the city 
that enabled tax sharing, better division of agencies/functions, and a moratorium on 
further annexations and incorporations (Savitch and Vogel, 2000).  The compact 
reorganized metropolitan governance, allowing the city and county to reduce their 
rivalry, cooperatively plan for economic development, and provide public services in a 
more-efficient manner (Ibid).   
Despite the seemingly successful compact, local elites bolstered by the Louisville 
area’s daily newspaper, the Courier Journal, again placed city-county merger on the 
agenda in the 1990s (Savitch and Vogel, 2004).  The Jefferson County Governance 
Project, including a citizens’ task force, was created in 1994 to study local governance 
and make recommendations for future restructuring.  In 1996, the task force rejected 
consolidation as a strategy in favor of a “transfer of many services and revenues from the 
city to the county and reorganization of county government” (Savitch and Vogel, 2000).  
The state legislature did not enact the task force recommendations.  In 1998, the compact 
was renewed for another ten years beyond its original 12-year term with few changes—
including the same tax-sharing formulas and moratorium on new annexations and 
incorporations (Ibid).  The renewal eliminated a joint city-county office of economic 
development, shifting its functions into the hands of a public-private partnership, Greater 
Louisville, Inc. (GLI), which doubles as the Chamber of Commerce (Ibid).   
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The area’s state legislative delegation subsequently created a new Task Force on 
Local Government (TFLG), which in addition to the delegation included the city’s mayor 
and board of alderman, the county judge-executive, the fiscal court, and representatives 
from the small suburban cities.  In late 1999, the mayor and judge-executive jointly 
proposed the merger of city and county governments.  The TFLG voted in favor of the 
proposal in early 2000 and the Kentucky General Assembly passed a bill authorizing 
consolidation during the Spring 2000 session.  According to Savitch and Vogel (2004), 
consolidation’s supporters closely mirrored Molotch’s (1976) growth machine players—
including corporations, developers and realtors, lawyers, other professionals, the 
newspaper, and state, city, and county politicians (both Democrat and Republican).   
A merger referendum was placed on the ballot for the November 2000 general 
election.  At the time of the referendum, there were 116 governments in Louisville—the 
City plus 85 small cities and 29 special districts.  As a political concession, these other 
governments were again exempted from merger (Savitch and Vogel, 2004).  While 
opponents and casual observers believed consolidation would again fail, Savitch and 
Vogel (2004) identify three key changes that altered the environment and debate since 
merger was last considered in the 1980s.  Middle and upper-class suburbs had emerged, 
stocked with voting professionals sympathetic to the “government as business,” 
corporate-style rhetoric.  Louisville’s governing coalition, which pushed for 
consolidation, is categorized as a developmental or corporate-centered regime (Stone, 
1989; Savitch, Tsukamoto, and Vogel, 2008).  Secondly, voters believed allegations that 
Louisville was and would be falling behind its consolidated big-city neighbors: 
Indianapolis, Indiana and Nashville, Tennessee.  Furthermore, “failure to merge” may 
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have resulted in also-consolidated Lexington-Fayette County, the home of the University 
of Kentucky, surpassing Louisville as the largest city in Kentucky following the 2000 
Census (Savitch and Vogel, 2000).  This time 54 percent of Jefferson County voters 
approved city-county consolidation.  The vote was countywide, despite some calls to 
allow the city its own, separate vote (Savitch and Vogel, 2004).  Religious actors may 
have played a significant role in supporting or opposing consolidation in Louisville, but 
there is no known, direct evidence.   
 The remainder of this chapter is devoted to analyzing consolidation turnout and 
support using both MLR and BLRMs and discussing the findings.   
 
Data Analysis 
Table 6.1 predicts turnout in the 2000 Louisville city-county consolidation 
referendum, employing a BLRM.  This and subsequent consolidation models are 
presented in two base forms—Model 1 without the religiosity index and Model 2 with it.  
This strategy allows one to gauge the impact of religiosity’s inclusion on other variables’ 
effects and the model’s predictive power.  I will primarily discuss the findings of the 
specification containing the religiosity index except when highlighting any major changes 
wrought by its inclusion.  I then run further specifications with religious tradition added.  
The inclusion of religiosity in Table 6.1, Model 2 has minuscule impact on model fit—
raising the Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square from 0.31 by a mere 0.003 to 0.313.  Religiosity 
is positive in direction but not statistically significant.  Several major socio-economic 
variables are significant and positive in both specifications: education, income, and the 
house dummy.  Furthermore, two demographic variables are significant in both as well: 
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age is positive while female is negative on turnout.  The remaining variables did not 
significantly affect one’s initiative to vote in the referendum: conservatism, 
suburbanization (distance from the CBD), fulltime employment, marital status, and the 
black dummy.   
 Table 6.2 adds dummy variables for religious traditions to Model 2 from Table 
6.1.  The black dummy variable is excluded from the models in Table 6.2 due to high 
multicollinearity with the black Protestant dummy because such a large proportion of 
Louisville’s black population identify as Protestants.  Interestingly, these variables’ 
inclusion has little impact on the model.  No religious traditions are significantly different 
from Southern Baptists or Catholics, nor are Southern Baptists or Catholics significantly 
different from one another in terms of turnout.  The Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square 
exhibits minuscule improvement.  The only change in independent variable significance 
is conservatism, which becomes significant at the 0.1 level and retains its negative sign.   
Table 6.3 reports results of a BLRM predicting electoral support for city-county 
consolidation in the same referendum.  This model explains less of the variation (0.129) 
than the turnout model.  Again, religiosity does not exert a significant impact.  The 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square remains identical in Model 1 and 2.  The only significant 
predictor of consolidation vote is education, which is positive.  However, a model with 
education only (not shown) explains just half the variation explained by the full model 
(0.065).   
 Table 6.4 adds dummy variables for religious traditions to Model 2 from Table 
6.3.  The inclusion of religious tradition increases the explained variation by 6.1 points to 
nearly one-fifth.  The black dummy variable is again excluded due to multicollinearity.  
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With the inclusion of religious tradition, the house dummy joins education as a 
significant predictor but is negative.  Education remains positive with a somewhat 
weakened effect.  When including the religious tradition dummy variables, this and 
subsequent tables present two models—one excluding Catholics and one excluding 
Southern Baptists.  This allows one to compare the two traditions to one another and all 
others.  The coefficient on Catholic in Model 4 is naturally the mirror image (i.e., 
opposite sign but same magnitude) of the coefficient on Southern Baptist in Model 3.  
The key finding from Table 6.4 is that Southern Baptists lent significantly less electoral 
support to consolidation than Roman Catholics—they were indeed less likely to report 
voting in favor of consolidating city and county in Louisville.  The predicted probability, 
holding other independent variables constant at their means, of a Catholic voting in favor 
of consolidation is 0.740; whereas the predicted Pr[vote=1] for a Southern Baptist is 
0.541.  In comparison to Catholics in Model 3, other Protestants were significantly more 
likely to support consolidation and non-Christian faiths were significantly less likely.  
When compared with Southern Baptists in Model 4, black and other Protestants and the 
unaffiliated were significantly more likely to vote in favor of consolidation than Southern  
Baptists.  A full ordering of religious traditions is unnecessary because several categories 
include potentially unrelated traditions due to ambiguity in the LMS question wording.   
Figure 6.1 explores the distribution of consolidation referendum voters throughout 
the metropolitan region.  This map again uses the dot density function to approximate 
actual residential locations.  “Yes” voters outnumber “no” voters by about 2-1.  Many of 
the supportive voters came, as they have historically, from the eastern urban and 
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suburban areas.  Supporters reside in all areas of the county, although the west and south 
ends appear much more balanced by opposing voters.   
 
Standard Standard
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
(Constant) -4.215*** .600 -3.954*** .627
Female -.363‡ .199 -.438* .206
Black .057 .250 -.036 .260
Age .046*** .006 .044*** .007
Education .391*** .071 .391*** .071
Income .136** .050 .137** .050
Fulltime .307 .219 .314 .220
Married .178 .218 .131 .221
House .546* .238 .529* .239
Conservatism -.098 .083 -.120 .085
Distance to CBD .001 .022 -.001 .022
Religiosity - - .151 .110
-2 Log likelihood 649.080 647.188
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square .310 .313
N 602 602
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. 
Table 6.1: Predicting Individual Consolidation Referendum Participation in Louisville
Model 1 Model 2
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Standard Standard
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
(Constant) -3.884*** .660 -4.015*** .644
Female -.412* .207 -.412* .207
Age .044*** .007 .044*** .007
Education .387*** .071 .387*** .071
Income .147** .051 .147** .051
Fulltime .322 .224 .322 .224
Married .085 .221 .085 .221
House .580* .239 .580* .239
Conservatism -.140‡ .085 -.140‡ .085
Distance to CBD .005 .022 .005 .022
Religiosity .155 .122 .155 .122
So. Baptist -.131 .298 - -
Black Prot. -.158 .319 -.028 .332
Catholic - - .131 .298
Other Prot. -.325 .340 -.194 .357
Other Christ. -.353 .354 -.222 .368
Non-Christ. .258 .572 .389 .580
Unaffiliated -.182 .389 -.051 .405
-2 Log likelihood 650.834 650.834
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square .317 .317
N 609 609
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001.  Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic.  Model 4
reference category is Southern Baptist.  Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.
Table 6.2: Predicting Individual Consolidation Referendum Participation in Louisville, Contd.
Model 3 Model 4
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Standard Standard
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
(Constant) .886 .824 .812 .857
Female -.012 .253 .011 .263
Black .102 .353 .135 .368
Age -.004 .009 -.004 .010
Education .338*** .084 .334*** .085
Income .025 .069 .026 .069
Fulltime -.086 .295 -.089 .295
Married .171 .304 .182 .306
House -.607 .376 -.604 .377
Conservatism -.152 .102 -.145 .104
Distance to CBD -.045 .028 -.043 .029
Religiosity - - -.050 .156
-2 Log likelihood 389.915 389.813
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square .129 .129
N 403 403
NOTE: ***p<0.001. 
Table 6.3: Predicting Individual Electoral Support for Consolidation in Louisville
Model 1 Model 2
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Standard Standard
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
(Constant) 1.648‡ .913 .768 .891
Female -.029 .269 -.029 .269
Age -.009 .010 -.009 .010
Education .267** .085 .267** .085
Income .060 .071 .060 .071
Fulltime -.134 .304 -.134 .304
Married .133 .315 .133 .315
House -.718‡ .394 -.718‡ .394
Conservatism -.172 .109 -.172 .109
Distance to CBD -.050 .029 -.050 .029
Religiosity -.010 .178 -.010 .178
So. Baptist -.880* .352 - -
Black Prot. .253 .437 1.133* .445
Catholic - - .880* .352
Other Prot. .806‡ .473 1.686*** .484
Other Christ. -.163 .439 .717 .453
Non-Christ. -1.166‡ .692 -.286 .697
Unaffiliated .203 .578 1.084‡ .581
-2 Log likelihood 381.001 381.001
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square .190 .190
N 410 410
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001.  Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic.  Model 4
reference category is Southern Baptist.  Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.
Table 6.4: Predicting Individual Electoral Support for Consolidation in Louisville, Contd.
Model 3 Model 4
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Tables 6.5 and 6.6 contain four MLR models predicting individual approval of the 
consolidated government in the years since merger was completed in 2003.  The 
dependent variable is the consolidation index derived from PCA.  The base model, Model 
1, accounts for just over 12 percent of the variation in attitudes toward the consolidated 
government.  In Table 6.5, the four economic variables wield the largest impacts on 
consolidation approval—but two are positive (education and income) and two are 
negative (fulltime and house).  Alone, these four variables account for ten percent of the 
explained variation (model not shown).  In addition, age is positive while conservatism, 
distance from the CBD, and the black dummy are negative.  Gender and marital status are 
not significant.  Religiosity is significant and positive in Model 2.  Its inclusion in the 
model amounts to less than one percentage point in adjusted R-Square change.   
 Table 6.6 adds in the religious tradition dummy variables and increases the 
amount of explained variation to just below 14 percent.  The black dummy is once more 
eliminated due to multicollinearity with black Protestant.  Catholic is the reference 
category in Model 3 while Southern Baptist is the reference in Model 4.  Again, Southern 
Baptists express less approval of consolidation than Catholics.  Furthermore, black 
Protestants are lower still.  In Model 4, other Protestants and Christians and non-
Christians express even greater (positive) differences with Southern Baptists.  If one 
restricts the model to only respondents identifying as Catholics and Southern Baptists, 
with all independent variables from Model 2 plus a Southern Baptist dummy (model not 
shown), the coefficient on Southern Baptist is -0.256*—nearly identical to the coefficient 
when the full sample is analyzed.  The adjusted R-Square for the model limited to 
Catholics and Southern Baptists is 0.160, greater than for the full sample.   
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) -.224 .217 - -.070 .228 -
Female .014 .078 .007 -.029 .081 -.014
Black -.185‡ .103 -.075 -.244* .106 -.099
Age .006* .002 .106 .005* .002 .089
Education .109*** .025 .196 .110*** .025 .197
Income .064** .020 .174 .066** .020 .179
Fulltime -.229** .087 -.115 -.221* .087 -.111
Married .049 .089 .025 .016 .090 .008
House -.481*** .098 -.206 -.502*** .098 -.215
Conservatism -.063‡ .033 -.074 -.077* .033 -.091
Distance to CBD -.017‡ .009 -.081 -.018* .009 -.088
Religiosity - - - .092* .042 .094
F 9.553*** 9.166***
Adj. R-Square .123 .129
R-Square Change - .006
N 609 609
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. 
Table 6.5: Predicting Individual Approval of Consolidated "Louisville Metro" Government
Model 1 Model 2
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) .075 .240 - -.193 .228 -
Female -.057 .080 -.029 -.057 .080 -.029
Age .004‡ .002 .073 .004‡ .002 .073
Education .104*** .025 .187 .104*** .025 .187
Income .056** .020 .153 .056** .020 .153
Fulltime -.215* .087 -.108 -.215* .087 -.108
Married .024 .090 .012 .024 .090 .012
House -.451*** .097 -.192 -.451*** .097 -.192
Conservatism -.075* .033 -.089 -.075* .033 -.089
Distance to CBD -.019* .008 -.095 -.019* .008 -.095
Religiosity .095‡ .049 .097 .095‡ .049 .097
So. Baptist -.268* .115 -.108 - - -
Black Prot. -.343** .127 -.131 -.075 .129 -.029
Catholic - - - .268* .115 .116
Other Prot. .034 .131 .011 .302* .139 .100
Other Christ. .073 .142 .022 .341* .150 .102
Non-Christ. .123 .216 .023 .391‡ .221 .072
Unaffiliated -.051 .154 -.017 .217 .159 .072
F 7.067*** 7.067***
Adj. R-Square .136 .136
N 616 616
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001.  Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic.  Model 4 
reference category is Southern Baptist.  Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.
Table 6.6: Predicting Individual Approval of Consolidated "Louisville Metro" Government, Contd.
Model 3 Model 4
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Figure 6.2 maps the consolidation index means by ZIP code.  Approval is lowest 
in the African American urban west end, south end, and rural parts of the southeastern 
county.  The working class, inner suburbs exhibit medium levels of support while the 
affluent urban and suburban east ends express the highest consolidation approval ratings.   
 Because the LMS lacks a measure of partisan identification, I do run vote choice 
and approval models with a control variable capturing Republican Party affinity (models 
not shown).  This variable is a factor score of support for Bush and Republican Governor 
Fletcher.  The sample size is reduced significantly, to below 200 in one case, enough to 
make these models questionable.  In the vote choice model, this Republican variable is 
not significant.  In the approval model, the variable is a strong positive predictor (.703**) 
and does increase the explained variation to beyond one-fifth.  Its inclusion removes 
significance from the religiosity and affiliation variables and greatly strengthens the 
negative impact of conservative ideology.   
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Further Analysis 
To test if consolidation vote or the index serve as proxies for other variables, 
Tables 6.7 through 6.12 employ MLR models with the same independent variables to 
predict three different dependent variables: individual attitudes about redistribution to 
central cities (ordinal), political trust (PCA score), and views of a prominent personality, 
Mayor Abramson (ordinal).   
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 use the GSS to predict support for expanding redistribution to 
“big cities.”  The Chow test statistic (F=28.491) is statistically significant at the 0.001 
level, thus I reject the null hypothesis of equal regression coefficients and conclude that 
coefficients indeed differ when performing regressions with “expanding assistance” 
versus “expanding spending to solve the problems” of large central cities.  Thus, one 
cannot combine the respondents to the two GSS variables into a single measure and 
sample for regression analysis.  I choose to present regression findings for one of the two 
variables, “expanding assistance,” because the effect of religiosity is strongest in this 
model.  However, the effect of religiosity still fails to reach statistical significance, nor 
does its inclusion vastly alter Model 2 (over Model 1) in Table 6.7.  Religiosity’s addition 
to the model does somewhat weaken the significant negative effect of conservatism and 
strengthen the significant positive effects of female and black.  All other variables are not 
significant in either model, except marital status which is negative and significant at the 
0.1 level in Model 1.  Both models’ adjusted R-Square statistics are low, approximately 
0.04.   
Table 6.8 features two models nearly identical to Table 6.7, Model 2 but without 
the black dummy and with the religious tradition dummy variables.  Again, Model 3  
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) 2.137*** .106 - 2.098*** .110 -
Female .135** .045 .090 .146** .046 .097
Black .180** .069 .076 .199** .071 .084
Age -.002 .001 -.035 -.001 .001 -.032
Education -.013 .013 -.031 -.012 .013 -.029
Income .013 .010 .047 .013 .010 .047
Fulltime .001 .047 .001 -.001 .047 -.001
Married -.080‡ .048 -.053 -.074 .048 -.049
House -.027 .052 -.016 -.024 .052 -.014
Conservatism -.080*** .017 -.138 -.074*** .018 -.128
Religiosity - - - -.030 .024 -.040
F 6.282*** 5.817***
Adj. R-Square .039 .040
R-Square Change - .001
N 1169 1169
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. 
Table 6.7: Predicting Individual Support for Expanding Assistance to the "Big Cities" (GSS)
Model 1 Model 2
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) 2.202*** .112 - 2.048*** .137 -
Female .136** .045 .091 .136** .045 .091
Age -.001 .001 -.020 -.001 .001 -.020
Education -.006 .013 -.014 -.006 .013 -.014
Income .011 .010 .041 .011 .010 .041
Fulltime -.001 .047 -.001 -.001 .047 -.001
Married -.079 .048 -.052 -.079 .048 -.052
House -.023 .052 -.014 -.023 .052 -.014
Conservatism -.071*** .018 -.124 -.071*** .018 -.124
Religiosity -.018 .029 -.024 -.018 .029 -.024
So. Baptist -.155 .094 -.051 - - -
Black Prot. .023 .089 .008 .178 .115 .064
Catholic - - - .155 .094 .094
Other Prot. -.217*** .055 -.139 -.063 .092 -.040
Other Christ. -.446* .188 -.069 -.291 .202 -.045
Non-Christ. -.245* .109 -.068 -.090 .134 -.025
Unaffiliated -.120 .080 -.057 .034 .112 .016
F 4.965*** 4.965***
Adj. R-Square .048 .048
N 1169 1169
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001.  Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic.  Model 4 
reference category is Southern Baptist.  Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.
Table 6.8: Predicting Individual Support for Expanding Assistance to the "Big Cities" (GSS), Contd.
Model 3 Model 4
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) -.575*** .143 - -.492** .150 -
Female .040 .058 .020 .029 .058 .015
Black -.420*** .084 -.143 -.451*** .086 -.154
Age .000 .002 .003 .000 .002 -.005
Education .060** .017 .107 .059** .017 .106
Income .032* .014 .086 .032* .014 .086
Fulltime .027 .060 .014 .026 .060 .013
Married -.083 .064 -.041 -.088 .064 -.043
House -.081 .068 -.036 -.094 .069 -.042
Conservatism .097*** .023 .121 .087*** .024 .108
Religiosity - - - .054‡ .030 .054
F 9.206*** 8.613***
Adj. R-Square .058 .060
R-Square Change - .002
N 1197 1197
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. * p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Religiosity index is limited to two items (worship attendance and
strength of religious preference) because other items were not asked of those respondents asked the political
trust questions.
Table 6.9: Predicting Individual Political Trust (GSS)
Model 1 Model 2
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) -.440** .155 - -.639*** .181 -
Female .018 .058 .009 .018 .058 .009
Age .000 .002 .002 .000 .002 .002
Education .062*** .018 .112 .062*** .018 .112
Income .029* .014 .078 .029* .014 .078
Fulltime .008 .061 .004 .008 .061 .004
Married -.078 .064 -.038 -.078 .064 -.038
House -.078 .069 -.035 -.078 .069 -.035
Conservatism .085*** .024 .106 .085*** .024 .106
Religiosity .053 .041 .053 .053 .041 .053
So. Baptist -.199‡ .116 -.054 - - -
Black Prot. -.554*** .110 -.165 -.355* .137 -.105
Catholic - - - .199‡ .116 .085
Other Prot. -.068 .076 -.032 .131 .111 .062
Other Christ. -.021 .184 -.003 .178 .201 .028
Non-Christ. -.562** .172 -.097 -.362‡ .192 -.063
Unaffiliated -.088 .113 -.033 .111 .146 .042
F 6.272*** 6.272***
Adj. R-Square .062 .062
N 1197 1197
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. * p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Religiosity index is limited to two items (worship attendance and
strength of religious preference) because other items were not asked of those respondents asked the political
Table 6.10: Predicting Individual Political Trust (GSS), Contd.
Model 3 Model 4
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) 3.131*** .288 - 3.125*** .306 -
Female .007 .108 .003 .008 .111 .004
Black -.092 .141 -.035 -.090 .148 -.034
Age .013*** .003 .211 .013*** .003 .212
Education .046 .037 .073 .046 .037 .073
Income .038 .027 .097 .038 .027 .097
Fulltime -.087 .120 -.041 -.087 .120 -.041
Married -.180 .122 -.085 -.179 .125 -.084
House -.106 .130 -.044 -.106 .130 -.044
Conservatism -.138** .047 -.150 -.137** .048 -.150
Distance to CBD .008 .011 .036 .008 .012 .036
Religiosity - - - -.003 .059 -.003
F 3.453*** 3.131***
Adj. R-Square .061 .058
R-Square Change - -.003
N 380 380
NOTE: **p<.01. ***p<0.001. 
Table 6.11: Predicting Individual Approval of Louisville's Mayor Abramson
Model 1 Model 2
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Unstandardized Standard Standardized Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Coefficient Error Coefficient
(Constant) 3.518*** .320 - 3.012*** .307 -
Female -.053 .111 -.025 -.053 .111 -.025
Age .011** .003 .189 .011** .003 .189
Education .027 .036 .043 .027 .036 .043
Income .025 .027 .064 .025 .027 .064
Fulltime -.019 .119 -.009 -.019 .119 -.009
Married -.181 .121 -.086 -.181 .121 -.086
House -.053 .128 -.022 -.053 .128 -.022
Conservatism -.141** .047 -.154 -.141** .047 -.154
Distance to CBD .003 .011 .016 .003 .011 .016
Religiosity -.057 .065 -.055 -.057 .065 -.055
So. Baptist -.506** .164 -.189 - - -
Black Prot. -.217 .177 -.078 .290 .181 .104
Catholic - - - .506** .164 .204
Other Prot. .067 .179 .022 .573** .190 .186
Other Christ. .111 .195 .032 .618** .205 .178
Non-Christ. -.192 .349 -.028 .314 .359 .046
Unaffiliated -.494* .197 -.163 .013 .206 .004
F 385 385
Adj. R-Square .090 .090
N 3.373*** 3.373***
NOTE: **p<.01. ***p<0.001.  Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic.  Model 4 reference category is 
Southern Baptist.  Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.
Table 6.12: Predicting Individual Approval of Louisville's Mayor Abramson, Contd.
Model 3 Model 4
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omits Catholic while Model 4 excludes the Southern Baptist dummy.  The percent of 
explained variation rises slightly to 4.8 percent with the inclusion of religious 
identification.  Southern Baptists and Catholics do not differ in their support for 
expanding assistance to central cities.  In fact, Model 4 shows that Southern Baptists do 
not differ from any other religious traditions.  In Model 3, other Protestants and 
Christians and Non-Christians are demonstrated to have significantly less support than 
Catholics for expanding assistance.  Conservatism and female status retain their 
significant, respective negative and positive effects while all other variables are 
nonsignificant.   
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 present MLR models predicting political trust from the GSS.  
The variables included in Table 6.8 together predict about 6 percent of the variation in the 
index of public trust in political leaders.  In Model 1, income, education, and 
conservatism are statistically significant and positive, while the black dummy is 
significant and negative.  These patterns hold in Model 2 with the addition of religiosity 
to the model.  Religiosity is positive, though the effect is weak and only significant at the 
0.1 level.  Religiosity improves model fit by 0.002 or 0.2 percentage points.  The 
religiosity index used in these models is a PCA score limited to two items: frequency of 
worship attendance and strength of religious preference.  Other religious items were not 
asked of those GSS respondents asked the political trust questions which compose the 
dependent variable index.    
Table 6.10 again removes the black dummy and adds the religious tradition 
dummy variables to the model.  The adjusted R-Square is again improved by just 0.002.  
Southern Baptists possess less political trust than Catholics, although the coefficient is 
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weak and only significant at the 0.1 level.  Not surprisingly, black Protestants and non-
Christians are significantly lower in trust than both Catholics and Southern Baptists.  The 
remaining traditions do not differ from either denomination.   
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 use the LMS data to construct models predicting support for 
Louisville’s Mayor Abramson, consolidation entrepreneur and first post-consolidation 
mayor.  In Table 6.10, only two variables significantly alter support for the mayor—age, 
which is positive, and conservatism, which is negative.  The inclusion of religiosity does 
not alter these effects and, with its complete insignificance, actually harms model fit, 
lowering the adjusted R-Square from 0.061 to 0.058.   
Table 6.12 presents models predicting Abramson support without the black 
dummy but with religious tradition dummies.  The inclusion of religious identification 
improves the percentage of explained variation by three points to nine percent.  Southern 
Baptists and the unaffiliated lend significantly less support to Abramson than Catholics 
(Model 3).  In Model 4, Catholics, other Protestants, and other Christians have 
significantly higher levels of support than Southern Baptists.   
If indeed a polity replication effect is present, I would expect that those 
parishioners with more exposure to church activities and cues would exhibit greater 
(Catholic) or lesser (Southern Baptist) levels of support for consolidation than those 
minimally involved with the tradition.  Regression models restricted to either the Catholic 
or Southern Baptist traditions’ members do not find a significant effect on the religiosity 
index as an independent variable (models not shown).  However, Figures 6.3 and 6.4 
present data on the general relationship between consolidation support and religious 
participation and salience, respectively, for both Catholics and Southern Baptists.   
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Figure 6.3 shows that Catholics that attend church more frequently tend to offer 
higher levels of support for the merged government than those who nominally attend.  
The Southern Baptist relationship is unclear.  Those attending every other week offer the 
highest support, while those attending once a month and every week are about equally 
lower.  Those who attend nominally—every few months—offer the lowest support for 
the regime, which is also true of Catholics.  A church attendance variable is significant 
and positive (0.118*; Std. Err. 0.056; Beta 0.184) in a regression model restricted to 
Catholics but is not significant in a model restricted to Southern Baptists.   
 
Figure 6.3: Merger Index Means by Church Attendance for Southern Baptists and Catholics
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Figure 6.4 displays merger support and its relationship to religious salience for 
each tradition.  Here, Catholics again demonstrate a positive relationship between 
religiosity (salience) and support for consolidated government.  The relationship for 
Southern Baptists is again unclear.  Consolidation support declines as one moves from 
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“slightly important” to “important” but then rebounds slightly for those in the “very 
important” category.  Importance of religion is not significant in Catholic or Southern 
Baptist-only regression models (not shown).   
 
Figure 6.4: Merger Index Means by Religious Importance for Southern Baptists and Catholics
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Summary and Discussion 
This chapter presents the results of my investigation into whether religiosity 
affects individual political behavior and public opinions on issues of local institutional 
design as it does moral political issues.  Furthermore, does religious affiliation affect 
behavior and opinions about consolidation in Louisville?  Religiosity and religious 
identification both failed to attain statistical significance in the model predicting 
consolidation referendum turnout.  However, theoretically key predictors like political 
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ideology and African American status were also not significant in the base model.  SES is 
the most important set of predictors in the turnout model.   
Religiosity also does not affect one’s vote in the consolidation referendum.  
Education is the only significant predictor, although the other variables double the 
model’s predictive power when included.  Religious tradition does, however, greatly 
improve model fit and demonstrates significant differences between traditions.  The key 
finding is that Catholics are 37 percent more likely to vote for consolidation than 
Southern Baptists, holding other factors equal.  This difference exists despite nearly 
identical residential patterns and no significant difference in ideological means.  The 
other traditions are ambiguous because the composition of each category is unknown.   
The traditions significantly enhance the model predicting consolidation support 
using an index composed of six items.  Southern Baptists again demonstrate lower levels 
of support for the consolidated government, controlling for other influences.  Once again 
the findings on the other traditions are unclear.  For the lone tradition for which the real 
composition is known—black Protestants—the findings are equally unclear.  In the 
consolidation vote model, black Protestants were more likely to vote for consolidation 
than Southern Baptists; but in the approval model, black Protestants are significantly 
lower than Southern Baptists when compared to Catholics.  This finding suggests that 
black Protestants picked up on the traditional black opposition to consolidated 
government, for fear of power dilution and distrust of power reasons, but nonetheless 
supported consolidation at greater levels than white Southern Baptists.   
To weed out possible “noise” wrought by the inclusion of these other ambiguous 
religious categories, I ran a model restricted to Louisville’s Southern Baptists and 
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Catholics.  The differences between them hold, and are remarkably equivalent in size.  
Furthermore, this restricted model explains a greater amount of variation in consolidation 
support.   
Religiosity is also a significant, positive predictor of one’s views of the 
consolidated government.  It is a more powerful predictor than political ideology, 
residence, and select demographic characteristics (marital status, age, and sex) and on par 
with race.  It nonetheless fails to compare with the predictive power of the four indicators 
of SES—including education, income, fulltime employment, and single-family home.  It 
is unclear why these variables split their effects—education and income are positive, 
which is expected, but fulltime and house are negative.  It must be noted that, while 
correlated, these variables do capture disparate aspects of SES.  For examples, some LMS 
respondents with higher levels of education and income may not work full-time (such as 
stay-at-home parents/spouses) nor live in a house (like high-end apartment or condo-
dwellers).  The consolidation approval model seems superior to the vote model because it 
is based on an interval dependent variable and captures a wider range of opinion than the 
dichotomous vote model.  This MLR model brings out significance in several variables 
hypothesized to play a role in the consolidation referendum that are not significant in the 
vote model.  It is also important to recall that individuals do not always report their 
electoral support accurately.  This is likely a factor in the LMS since support for 
consolidation is reportedly higher than the actual electoral support.  Consolidation is 
popular enough locally that respondents may feel pressure to say they supported it 
electorally, but then are more free to express their opinions honestly when asked to pick 
among a range of values when gauging individual facets of consolidation.    
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This chapter also includes models testing whether consolidation vote/support 
serve as proxies for other variables—stances on redistribution to central cities, political 
trust, and views of Louisville’s Mayor Abramson.  I conclude that consolidation is not a 
proxy for redistribution.  This model, based on the national GSS sample, finds no 
statistically significant difference between Catholics and Southern Baptists.  One may 
argue that this model should be restricted to the South or Midwest, or even these regions’ 
metropolitan areas, so the respondents are more similar to Louisville’s population.  I 
believe that this comparison is adequate because the bulk of the nation’s Southern 
Baptists reside in the southern states.  One would think that, when restricted to the South, 
it would make sense if Catholics and Baptists thought similarly due to the region’s 
distinctive subculture.  At the national level, with the inclusion of northern, Midwestern, 
and western Catholics, it seems that distinctions would boil to the surface more easily.  
The finding that Catholics and Southern Baptists do not differ significantly on 
redistribution, I believe, is conclusive evidence that the public does not view 
consolidation as a proxy for redistribution of suburban resources.   
The findings on public trust and Mayor Abramson require greater examination.  
When examining trust of political and governmental leaders at the national level, 
Southern Baptists are less trusting than Catholics—however the differences are at the 0.1 
level of significance and would be ignored as not significant by many other social 
scientists.  This suggests that differences in political trust may partially be driving views 
on consolidation among the two traditions.  I would argue, however, that differences in 
public trust are the result of the same forces shaping denominational polity, and thus 
preferences for similar forms of governance in other institutions.  It is clear that early 
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Protestants were less trusting of Catholic leadership and thus created forms of church 
government that relied on higher bodies only consultatively, if at all.  Today’s 
congregational churches likely retain the distrust that motivated their forebears to 
establish local, autonomous control of their religious houses.   
The model predicting support for Mayor Abramson finds sharp differences 
between Catholics and Southern Baptists.  In fact, the direction mirrors the findings on 
consolidation vote and approval but is strengthened.  The difference between the two 
traditions rivals the effects of age and political ideology as the most important variables 
in the model.  This effect perhaps captures the same dynamics motivating differences on 
consolidation in general because Mayor Abramson is seen as the driver of consolidation 
and, as the head of consolidated government, it is only natural that the same effects 
would arise in this model as the consolidation models.  Of course, others may argue that 
differences on consolidation merely capture differences in opinions about Abramson—
due to his personality, religious preference, partisan affiliation, or political ideology.  I 
favor the former explanation because it is consistent with a theory of polity replication.  I 
do not think these findings contradict my theory but instead bolster its applicability.  The 
Abramson model is, I believe, capturing preferences for consolidation in addition to 
general personality preferences.  It does seem odd that Abramson’s support does not 
mirror consolidation support—the Abramson model doubles the effects of age (positive) 
and conservatism (negative) but fails to find significance on the key SES variables that 
indeed motivated consolidation support.  This may be due to consolidation receiving 
support outside Abramson’s loyal supporters—urban Democrats—in the Republican and 
corporate-minded suburbs, for example.   
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When examining the effects of religious participation, I conclude that greater 
exposure to church activities and greater levels of religious salience are more important 
in shaping consolidation views in Catholics than Southern Baptists.  Catholics may care 
more about the issue of consolidation, perhaps due to the strong Catholic educational 
institutions in Louisville promoting the Catholic worldview and polity replication.  
Participation in a church’s institutional structure is more-important in hierarchical polities 
like the Catholic Church (McMullen, 1994).  McMullen (1994, 724) argues that “a 
congregational polity cannot mobilize individual behavior or attitudes to the same extent 
as an episcopal polity can…because of its particular myth of ecclesiastical authority 
embedded in its institutional structure.”  He admits that this argument may seem 
counterintuitive—because one “might expect the more ‘democratic’ congregational 
polity…to allow for the free flow of information, facilitating members’ knowledge about 
organizational policy” (Ibid).  McMullen adds: 
It is precisely the lack of legitimated hierarchical authority promoted by a 
congregational polity (i.e., a loosely structured institution) that severs the 
connections between the local church and national leadership.  The 
institutional myth of local church autonomy prevents mechanisms from 
being socially constructed to facilitate the movement of information 
between institutional levels, as well as the interest and motivation for even 
listening to what is being said “from on high” (Ibid). 
 
Concerning the Catholic Church, one of the two denominations under study here, 
McMullen (1994, 724) writes: 
…one might expect that the greater bureaucratic maze maintained by the 
institutional myth of ecclesiastical authority would clog communication 
channels; but instead, those myths have socially constructed the 
motivation for parishioners to be aware of church policy, exactly because 
they acknowledge as legitimate the authority of the episcopal authority. 
 
My findings further support McMullen’s assertions.   
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CHAPTER VII 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
This dissertation’s theory and findings hold implications for social science, 
church structures, and policymaking.  I discuss each in turn and then offer concluding 
remarks and recommendations for future work.   
 
Implications for Academic Research 
This research has several implications for the social scientific study of urban and 
metropolitan governance, societal and governmental institutions, and religious 
organizational structures.  I will first discuss the renewed importance of religion to the 
study of urban politics.  Secondly, I will review institutional implications.   
I began this dissertation recalling the past importance of religious phenomena, its 
banishment from academic discourse, and its recent resurgence in the social sciences.  I 
have personally lamented religion’s continued absence in urban studies here and 
elsewhere (Ambrosius 2008a; 2009a).  In one exception, Sharp (2007) theorized that 
religious and other cultural forces likely impact urban elections indirectly, rather than 
directly and substantively, by shaping the prospective electorate and turnout.  However, 
this research argues that religion does affect urban political outcomes beyond partisan 
allegiance and electoral participation.  In fact, neither religiosity nor religious affiliation 
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significantly altered participation in Louisville’s consolidation referendum.  Instead, 
religion’s effect was indeed substantive.  Religiosity, an important variable affecting 
national elections, is the key driver of the culture war in Louisville and other American 
communities.  In addition, religiosity—although failing to rival SES—indeed influences 
views of city-county consolidation on par or greater than most socio-demographic 
characteristics, including race.  Controlling for political ideology, which also serves as a 
proxy for partisan identification, does not damper religiosity’s influence.   
Furthermore, religious affiliation continues to play a role in communities’ debates 
over local governance.  This is validation that the Catholic-Protestant division dominating 
ethno-religious theory in the early to mid-twentieth century still is relevant when one 
examines issues of institutional design, issues that do not really appear in national 
elections but feature prominently in local referenda (see Freeman, 1958 for a historical 
example).  Differences between traditions must receive further examination using better-
specified data sources and multiple methods.   
This dissertation extends the understanding of religious polities as institutions 
pioneered by McMullen (1994) and others.  It further shows how New Institutionalism 
can enhance the urban politics field.  Other scholars have called for investigation of New 
Institutionalism’s implications for urban politics (Lowndes, 2001; 2009).  While 
somewhat unorthodox due to its emphasis on religious institutions’ roles in urban 
politics, this study fulfills these goals.  It also suggests psychological political effects of 
voluntary institutional association/membership.  McMullen’s (1994) work was partially 
motivated by a desire to understand religious institutions as differentiated from other 
institutions because of their voluntary nature.  My suggestive findings beg for further 
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exploration of the links between religious denominations’ structures and individual 
preferences for institutional design in all realms of politics and society—beyond 
metropolitan governance to federalism and states’ rights, the United Nations and 
international law, and a host of other policy/issue areas.     
 
Implications for Religious Organizations 
Despite their historical (and profound) differences, Roman Catholics and Baptists 
have engaged in a series of recent talks meant to identify common elements of their faiths 
and areas for future dialogue (Radano, 2007).  It is clear to observers that any efforts at 
reconciliation will face difficulty in moving past the inflammatory rhetoric of the past 
and the vast doctrinal and cultural divide (Freeman, 2009).  As Monsignor John Radano 
(2007) notes, “Baptists will hesitate to join in a call for structural unity or doctrinal 
unity”—the two legs of the church, polity and conceptions of the Ultimate (emphasis 
added; see earlier citations in Chapter II).   
These differences tend to mask a contemporary tendency towards balance in the 
practice of church polity.  Some scholars find that the Southern Baptist Convention 
(SBC) is no longer as decentralized as many other Protestant denominations.  In fact, 
Sullins (2004) labels the SBC “moderately centralized,” or less decentralized than over 
100 other Protestant denominations—a list which includes many fellow Baptists.  
Following the liberalizing reforms of Vatican II, the Catholic Church is less centralized 
than ever, and is feeling pressure for further reforms.  While churches with presbyterian 
polities were once thought of as occupying a middle-ground, this model is largely defunct 
and these denominations are becoming more and more congregational (see Takayama, 
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1974).  This leaves the poles of polity—each of which is adopting elements of its 
opposite.   
White (1972, 107) wrote a proposition for future review in the 1970s: “Resolution 
of problems centering around social acceptance by the dominant society will tend to force 
the churches in the direction of conformity with constituting norms calling for more 
decentralized decision-making and greater centralization” (emphasis added).  Thus, even 
over thirty years ago, the middle-ground was becoming some combination of centralized 
authority and decentralized decision-making.  While the poles of polity remain the same, 
they are each, to borrow the Hegelian/Marxian triad, navigating toward a synthesis of 
thesis (centralized) and antithesis (decentralized).  This parallels a similar move in other 
realms of society: from how we live (Old Urbanism versus Suburbanism to New 
Urbanism; see Bohl, 2000) and how we organize metropolitan governance (Old 
Regionalism versus Polycentrism to New Regionalism; see Savitch and Vogel, 2009) to 
how we manage our public sector organizations (Traditional Public Management versus 
New Public Management/Privatization to a synthesis currently under development; see 
Norman, 2009).  It would seem that somewhat centralized organizations that 
simultaneously adopt some decentralized elements are best suited to govern our 
congregations and communities.  Churches of all stripes and sizes are moving in the 
direction of this middle-ground—a balanced polity, or polity synthesis—that gleans best 
practices from both types.  Whether centralization or decentralization will predominate is 
yet to be determined.   
This study finds that pronounced differences do exist today between followers of 
different religious traditions on seemingly non-spiritual issues.  Leaders of religious 
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denominations and congregations should carefully consider the cues, intentional and 
unintentional, they are displaying for congregants to absorb.  In light of organizational 
change, do congregations still wish to encourage parishioners to pattern their political 
opinions after churches’ wavering commitments to organizational structures that arose in 
the past?  This is a question that individual traditions must grapple with as we usher in a 
new political and economic synthesis in light of the 2008 economic crash.   
It is clear that political and religious pluralism have been positive for America’s 
development as a liberal democracy.  America typifies the so-called “denominational 
principle;” which “rests on the assumption that all churches are good, and it does not 
matter to which church one belongs, just so he [or she] belongs” (White, 1972, 104).  
This ideal is distinctly American—the result of the “institutionalization of the norm of 
religious pluralism” (Ibid).  I believe that despite recent attacks on religion by the “new 
atheists,” religious organizations should continue to take on the role of political 
participants in the public square—including local elections and referenda on issues like 
consolidation.  I agree with Putnam (2000) that their participation is not only healthy but 
necessary for vibrant democracy.  If Louisville contained a different mix of religious 
traditions but the same socio-demographic composition, it is possible (maybe even likely) 
that consolidation would not have been enacted.  Religious bodies, no matter the 
tradition, wield power and must use this power peacefully to craft the better worlds 
envisioned by each tradition.   
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Implications for Politics and Policy 
My findings allow political entrepreneurs to look beyond class and racial lines to 
rally support or opposition better, depending on where one sits, for reforms of 
metropolitan government or governance.  For example, class groupings, lower, middle, 
and upper, particularly among whites, are all divided along religious lines.  While lower 
strata may be more fundamentalist and upper strata more mainline, it is clear that each 
level of society has elements of many religious traditions.  Emphasizing a particular 
economic sub-group—the poor, the middle class, or the wealthy—in a political or policy 
campaign is naïve if one does not differentiate potential supporters among each grouping.  
Because of beliefs about religious and societal authority, it may be wise to target 
grassroots efforts at particular religious traditions that are predisposed to support one’s 
cause.  In addition, any political effort to mobilize the African American community 
must understand the central role of the black church, especially in inner-city 
communities.   
Republicans have rallied religious publics very well in recent elections; and 
Democrats are getting better at speaking the language of faith, as demonstrated by their 
successful 2008 bid for the White House (Pew Forum, 2008).  Most would agree that 
partisan affiliation is not as significant in local elections as it is in national elections.  
This does not mean that political differences in party or ideology do not matter locally—
far from it.  But locally, voters may reach across the aisle to support a friend or family 
member’s bid for office or a “common sense” policy strategy originating with the other 
party.  After all, local politics are often more mundane politics (or “sewage without tears” 
to use one metaphor) that elicit less passionate responses and lower electoral turnout 
199 
 
(John, 2009, 19).  But if religious differences exist over non-morality, seemingly 
mundane issues like whether two independent governments should consolidate, maybe 
religion matters for a whole host of local issues.  Perhaps even sewage.   
 
Recommendations and Conclusion 
 Recommendations.  This dissertation has filled an important gap in the religion 
and politics and urban politics literatures.  I pioneer a link between both religiosity and 
religious affiliation and local institutional design—namely, city-county consolidation.  
While providing compelling evidence, I believe this dissertation should be understood as 
exploratory: as inspiring future research.  The results are suggestive of a polity replication 
effect and discount consolidation as a proxy for redistribution.  Future research must 
better specify all religious traditions for more precise analysis so one can compare across 
the full gamut of church polities.  This includes the churches that still represent the polity 
extremes, the blended churches, and the regional or presbyterian denominations.  This 
effort requires more-detailed primary survey datasets that use the collection strategy of 
the General Social Survey (which asks for the specific denomination with which one 
affiliates) and ask questions about one’s organizational preferences.  This will establish: 
(1) if denominational participants do prefer their churches’ organizational structure; and 
(2) if differences exist across a range of institutional design issues.  Scholars should also 
conduct qualitative research, including interviews, participant observation, and content 
analysis of denominational and congregational documents and communications to bolster 
the findings of quantitative analyses.   
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Furthermore, scholars may wish to expand my reasoning beyond religious 
organizations.  This requires asking, are religious organizations unique?  While my 
theory of polity replication is perhaps strongest in religious organizations, due to their 
very nature and accompanying transcendent experiences, it is likely applicable to other, 
secular organizations—private, public, or voluntary.  Experience with a “successful” 
(self-identified) organization tends to alter one’s thoughts about how institutions or 
organizations should be structured.   
McMullen (1994, 724) closes his article on church polity’s effect on individual 
knowledge of church policy with the following passage:  
Although there is the danger in neoinstitutional theory of reifying and 
anthropomorphizing the “actions” of institutions on individual behaviors, I 
hope this article has shown how these scripts and rules, myths and rituals 
become part of an individual’s thinking and acting.  Continuing research 
could further delineate the characteristics of tightly structured and loosely 
structured institutional forms.  Evidence suggests that those authority 
structures operate in similar ways across organizational fields—even in 
religious organizations with voluntary membership. 
 
I echo McMullen’s sentiments.   
I also encourage further spatial research on religion’s role in the city.  While 
religious ecology is a staple research topic in the sociology of religion, collaboration with 
urban planning is needed and seems to be building.  Interest in New Urbanism, which 
prizes centrally-located religious houses, spreading knowledge and use of Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) software like ArcGIS, and churches’ desires to understand 
their environments and congregants’ communities all will drive further interest in 
religious ecology.  This study only explored religious ecology, including the locations of 
religious followers and places of worship, to understand better the community of 
Louisville.  Because the LMS lacked respondents’ addresses, I was unable to assign 
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geographic coordinates or census tract locations and was instead forced to locate them by 
ZIP code only.  This inhibited detailed statistical analysis beyond the density gradient 
because the sample size was low (N=32).  Future survey research should seek to establish 
accurate locations, minimally at the census tract or block group levels and preferably at 
the street or address levels, to better test research questions relating to religious ecology.   
Conclusion.  It is my hope that this dissertation spawns further work on religion 
by scholars of urban politics and more work on local politics by scholars of religion.  But 
just as with religious conviction and conversion, altering actions must begin with a 
change of heart.  If readers take away a renewed appreciation of religious forces in 
American society, particularly urban communities, I consider this dissertation a 
successful and useful contribution to the literature.   
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APPENDIX A 
2006 LOUISVILLE METROPOLITAN SURVEY (LMS) QUESTIONS 
 
Government and Politics Questions 
 
GOV01: At the time of the vote for or against the City-County merger in November of 
2000, were you living in the City of Louisville, outside of Louisville but within Jefferson 
County, or somewhere else?   
|__| 1. CITY OF LOUISVILLE 
|__| 2. JEFFERSON COUNTY BUT OUTSIDE OF LOUISVILLE 
|__| 3. SOMEWHERE ELSE 
|__| 4. DOES NOT REMEMBER 
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
GOV02: Did you vote for the merger, against the merger, or did you not vote at all?   
|__| 1. VOTED FOR MERGER 
|__| 2. VOTED AGAINST MERGER 
|__| 3. DID NOT VOTE 
|__| 4. DOES NOT REMEMBER 
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
GOV03: Regardless of whether you voted or how you voted, would you say that, overall, 
the merger has made you better off or worse off, or are you about the same as you would 
have been without the merger?   
|__| 1. BETTER OFF 
|__| 2. WORSE OFF 
|__| 3. ABOUT THE SAME 
|__| 4. DON’T KNOW 
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
GOV04: How much of the time do you think you can trust the Louisville Metro 
government to do what is right?  Do you think...   
|__| 1. Just about always 
|__| 2. Most of the time 
|__| 3. Only some of the time 
|__| 4. Never 
|__| 5. DOES NOT KNOW 
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
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GOV05: Would you say the Louisville Metro government is pretty much run by a few 
big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?   
|__| 1. RUN BY A FEW BIG INTERESTS 
|__| 2. RUN FOR BENEFIT OF ALL 
|__| 3. DON’T KNOW 
|__| 4. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
GOV06: Do you think people in the Louisville Metro government waste a lot of money 
that we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?   
|__| 1. WASTE A LOT 
|__| 2. WASTE SOME OF IT 
|__| 3. DON’T WASTE VERY MUCH 
|__| 4. DON’T KNOW 
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
GOV07: Do you think that quite a few of the people running the Louisville Metro 
government are dishonest, not very many are dishonest, or do you think hardly any of 
them are dishonest?   
|__| 1. QUITE A FEW 
|__| 2. NOT VERY MANY 
|__| 3. HARDLY ANY 
|__| 4. DON’T KNOW 
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
GOV08: Compared to five years ago, do you think race relations in Louisville are...   
|__| 1. Much better 
|__| 2. A little better 
|__| 3. A little worse 
|__| 4. Much worse 
|__| 5. No change 
|__| 6. DOES NOT KNOW 
|__| 7. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
NAM01: Now I'm going to read a list of names; please tell me how you feel about each 
of them.  Do you feel very favorable, favorable, neutral, negative, or very negative?   
George W. Bush   
|__| 1. Very favorable 
|__| 2. Favorable 
|__| 3. Neutral 
|__| 4. Negative 
|__| 5. Very negative 
|__| 6. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE 
|__| 7. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
NAM05: Jerry Abramson   
|__| 1. Very favorable 
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|__| 2. Favorable 
|__| 3. Neutral 
|__| 4. Negative 
|__| 5. Very negative 
|__| 6. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE 
|__| 7. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
LCM01: This next question refers to your political liberalness or conservativeness.  We 
hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives.  Do you think of yourself as 
a Liberal, a Conservative, or as middle-of-the-road?   
|__| 1. LIBERAL 
|__| 2. CONSERVATIVE 
|__| 3. MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD 
|__| 4. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE 
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSE 
 
LCM02: Do you consider yourself a strong or not very strong [liberal or conservative]?   
|__| 1. STRONG 
|__| 2. NOT VERY STRONG 
|__| 3. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE 
|__| 4. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
Religion and Morality Questions 
 
COM01: Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements 
about various community issues.  Adult bookstores and strip clubs tend to create an 
unsafe neighborhood.  Do you…   
|__| 1. Very much agree 
|__| 2. Somewhat agree 
|__| 3. Somewhat disagree 
|__| 4. Very much disagree 
|__| 5. No opinion 
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
COM02: Communities that have adult bookstores and strip clubs are more likely to have 
robberies.  Do you…   
|__| 1. Very much agree 
|__| 2. Somewhat agree 
|__| 3. Somewhat disagree 
|__| 4. Very much disagree 
|__| 5. No opinion 
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
COM03: Adult bookstores and strip clubs hurt other businesses in the area.  Do you…   
|__| 1. Very much agree 
|__| 2. Somewhat agree 
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|__| 3. Somewhat disagree 
|__| 4. Very much disagree 
|__| 5. No opinion 
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
COM04: The next set of questions asks about your views and behaviors regarding 
religion.  We hear a lot of talk these days about religion.  How important is religion in 
your life?  Is it...  
|__| 1. Not at all important 
|__| 2. Slightly important 
|__| 3. Important 
|__| 4. Very important 
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
COM05: Over the past 12 months, how often did you attend a religious gathering such as 
a worship service, Sunday school, or Bible study?  Did you attend...   
|__| 1. Nearly every week 
|__| 2. Every other week 
|__| 3. About once a month 
|__| 4. Every few months 
|__| 5. Never 
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
COM07: Do you believe in an afterlife?   
|__| 1. YES 
|__| 2. NO 
|__| 3. NOT SURE 
|__| 4. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
COM08: How often do you currently read a religious text such as the Bible, the Torah, or 
the Koran?  Would you say...   
|__| 1. Daily 
|__| 2. Several times per week 
|__| 3. Several times per month 
|__| 4. Every few months 
|__| 5. Never 
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
COM09: How close do you feel to God most of the time?  Would you say...  
|__| 1. Extremely close 
|__| 2. Somewhat close 
|__| 3. Not sure 
|__| 4. Not very close 
|__| 5. Not close at all 
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
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COM12: Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements.  I would 
like to be a more religious person. Do you...   
|__| 1. Strongly agree 
|__| 2. Agree 
|__| 3. Not Sure 
|__| 4. Disagree 
|__| 5. Strongly disagree 
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
COM15: Homosexuality is wrong.  Do you…   
|__| 1. Strongly agree 
|__| 2. Agree 
|__| 3. Not Sure 
|__| 4. Disagree 
|__| 5. Strongly disagree 
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
COM16: What is your religious preference?   
|__| 1. Baptist 
|__| 2. Other Protestant denomination 
|__| 3. Roman Catholic 
|__| 4. A Christian religion not yet mentioned 
|__| 5. A non-Christian religion 
|__| 6. No religious preference 
|__| 7. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
SXED01: Now I'd like to ask you some questions about sex education, a topic that is 
often debated among communities and in schools.  The Centers for Disease Control 
reports that in 2003, just over 52% of teens surveyed in Kentucky claimed to have had 
sexual intercourse at least once.  How supportive are you of some form of sex education 
being taught in public schools?  Are you...   
|__| 1. Very Supportive 
|__| 2. Supportive 
|__| 3. Not very supportive 
|__| 4. Not at all supportive 
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
SXED02: The term comprehensive sex education includes discussion on the following: 
abstinence, prevention of sexually transmitted infections, pregnancy, contraception, and 
reproductive anatomy and physiology.  How supportive are you of comprehensive sex 
education being taught in public schools?   
|__| 1. Very Supportive 
|__| 2. Supportive 
|__| 3. Not very supportive 
|__| 4. Not at all supportive 
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
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Socio-demographic Questions 
 
DEM01: Which of the following best describes your marital status . . .   
|__| 1. Married 
|__| 2. Not currently married but living with a partner 
|__| 3. Widow or Widower 
|__| 4. Divorced 
|__| 5. Separated, or 
|__| 6. Never married 
|__| 7. OTHER 
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE 
|__| 9. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
DEM02: Do you live in a house, an apartment, a condominium, a mobile home or some 
other type of dwelling?   
|__| 1. HOUSE 
|__| 2. APARTMENT 
|__| 3. CONDOMINIUM 
|__| 4. MOBILE HOME 
|__| 5. OTHER 
|__| 6. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE 
|__| 7. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
DEM04: What is your current age? 
|__|__| Years 
 
DEM05: Which of these categories best describes how much education you've 
completed?   
|__| 1. Eighth grade or less 
|__| 2. Some high school, but no diploma (INCLUDES 9TH GRADE) 
|__| 3. High school graduate/GED 
|__| 4. Some college or technical school 
|__| 5. Associate's degree 
|__| 6. Bachelor's degree 
|__| 7. Some graduate course(s) but no advanced degree 
|__| 8. Advanced degree 
|__| 9. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE 
|__| 10. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
DEM06: Please tell me which of the following best describes your job situation last 
week... 
|__| 1. Working full-time 
|__| 2. Working part-time 
|__| 3. Not at work because of temporary illness, vacation, or strike 
|__| 4. Unemployed or laid off 
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|__| 5. Student 
|__| 6. Disabled 
|__| 7. Retired 
|__| 8. Homemaker 
|__| 9. Other 
|__| 10. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
DEM07: What race do you consider yourself?   
|__| 1. White 
|__| 2. African American 
|__| 3. Hispanic/Latino 
|__| 4. Asian/Pacific Islander 
|__| 5. Mixed race 
|__| 6. OTHER 
|__| 7. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE 
|__| 8. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
DEM08: INTERVIEWER: RECORD SEX OF RESPONDENT   
|__| 1. MALE 
|__| 2. FEMALE 
 
DEM09: I'm going to read some broad income categories.  Please stop me when I get to 
the one that includes your total household income for last year before taxes.  Would you 
say. . .   
|__| 1. Less than $10,000 
|__| 2. $10,000 to $19,999 
|__| 3. $20,000 to $29,999 
|__| 4. $30,000 to $39,999 
|__| 5. $40,000 to $49,999 
|__| 6. $50,000 to $59,999 
|__| 7. $60,000 to $69,999 
|__| 8. $70,000 to $79,999 
|__| 9. $80,000 and above 
|__| 10. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE 
|__| 11. NO ANSWER/REFUSED 
 
DEM10: What is your zip code?  (ENTER 99999 IF UNKNOWN) 
|__|__|__|__|__| 
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APPENDIX B 
2006 GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY (GSS) QUESTIONS 
 
Government and Politics Questions 
 
VOTE04: In 2004, you remember that Kerry ran for President on the Democratic ticket 
against Bush for the Republicans. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in 
that election?   
|__| 1. VOTED 
|__| 2. DID NOT VT 
|__| 3. INELIGIBLE 
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW 
|__| 9. NA 
 
PRES04: IF VOTED: Did you vote for Kerry or Bush?   
|__| 1. KERRY 
|__| 2. BUSH 
|__| 3. NADER 
|__| 6. DIDN'T VOTE 
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW 
|__| 9. NA 
 
IF04WHO: IF DID NOT VOTE OR INELIGIBLE: Who would you have voted for, for 
President, if you had voted?   
|__| 1. KERRY 
|__| 2. BUSH 
|__| 3. NADER 
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW 
|__| 9. NA 
 
POLVIEWS: I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that 
people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where 
would you place yourself on this scale?   
|__| 1. EXT. LIB. 
|__| 2. LIBERAL 
|__| 3. LEAN LIB. 
|__| 4. MODERATE 
|__| 5. LEAN CON. 
|__| 6. CONSERV. 
|__| 7. EXT. CON. 
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW 
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|__| 9. NO ANSWER 
 
NATCITY: Spending on solving the problems of the big cities   
|__| 1. TOO LITTLE 
|__| 2. RIGHT 
|__| 3. TOO MUCH 
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW 
 
NATCITYY: Spending on assistance to big cities 
|__| 1. TOO LITTLE 
|__| 2. RIGHT 
|__| 3. TOO MUCH 
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW 
 
POLSFAIR: In your opinion, how often do public officials deal fairly with people like 
you?  
|__| 1. ALMOST ALWAYS 
|__| 2. OFTEN 
|__| 3. OCCASIONAL 
|__| 4. SELDOM 
|__| 5. ALMOST NEVER 
|__| 8. CAN'T CHOOSE 
|__| 9. NA 
 
KNOWPOLS: Do you think that the treatment people get from public officials in 
America depends on who they know?  
|__| 1. DEFINITELY DOES 
|__| 2. PROBABLY DOES 
|__| 3. PROBABLY DOES NOT 
|__| 4. DEFINITELY DOES NOT 
|__| 8. CAN'T CHOOSE 
|__| 9. NA 
 
CORRUPT1: In your opinion, about how many politicians in America are involved in 
corruption? Would you say: 
|__| 1. ALMOST NONE 
|__| 2. A FEW 
|__| 3. SOME 
|__| 4. QUITE A LOT 
|__| 5. ALMOST ALL 
|__| 8. CAN'T CHOOSE 
|__| 9. NA 
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CORRUPT2: And in your opinion, about how many government administrators in 
America are involved in corruption? 
|__| 1. ALMOST NONE 
|__| 2. A FEW 
|__| 3. SOME 
|__| 4. QUITE A LOT 
|__| 5. ALMOST ALL 
|__| 8. CAN'T CHOOSE 
|__| 9. NA 
 
BRIBE: In the last five years, how often have you or a member of your immediate family 
come across a public official who hinted they wanted, or asked for, a bribe or favor in 
return for a service? 
|__| 1. NEVER 
|__| 2. SELDOM 
|__| 3. OCCASIONAL 
|__| 4. QUITE OFTEN 
|__| 5. VERY OFTEN 
|__| 8. CAN'T CHOOSE 
|__| 9. NA 
 
Religion and Morality Questions 
 
RELIG: What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other 
religion, or no religion?   
|__| 1. PROTESTANT 
|__| 2. CATHOLIC 
|__| 3. JEWISH 
|__| 4. NONE 
|__| 5. OTHER 
|__| 6. BUDDHISM 
|__| 7. HINDUISM 
|__| 8. OTH.EASTRN  
|__| 9. ISLAM 
|__| 10. ORTH-CHRST 
|__| 11. CHRISTIAN 
|__| 12. NAT.AMER. 
|__| 13. NONDENOM 
|__| 18. DON'T KNOW 
|__| 19. NO ANSWER 
 
DENOM: IF PROTESTANT: What specific denomination is that, if any?  
(other responses deleted) 
|__| 14. SO.BAPTIST 
|__| 70. NO/NON DEN 
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW 
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|__| 99. NO ANSWER 
 
ATTEND: How often do you attend religious services? 
|__| 0. NEVER 
|__| 1. < 1 A YEAR 
|__| 2. 1 OR 2 YR. 
|__| 3. SEV.A YEAR 
|__| 4. 1 A MONTH 
|__| 5. 2-3 MONTH 
|__| 6. ABOUT WKLY 
|__| 7. WEEKLY 
|__| 8. SEV. A WK. 
|__| 9. DK, NO ANS 
 
RELITEN: Would you call yourself a strong (STATED RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE) or 
a not very strong (STATED RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE)? 
|__| 1. STRONG 
|__| 2. NOT VERY 
|__| 3. SOMEWHAT 
|__| 4. NO RELIG 
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW 
|__| 9. NO ANSWER 
 
POSTLIFE: Do you believe there is a life after death?   
|__| 1. YES 
|__| 2. NO 
|__| 8. UNDECIDED 
|__| 9. NO ANSWER 
 
PRAY: About how often do you pray?   
|__| 1. DAILY + 
|__| 2. DAILY  
|__| 3. SEV.A WK. 
|__| 4. WEEKLY 
|__| 5. - WEEKLY 
|__| 6. NEVER 
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW 
|__| 9. NO ANSWER 
 
RELACTIV: How often do you take part in the activities and organizations of a church or 
place of worship other than attending services?    
|__| 1. NEVER 
|__| 2. <1 A YEAR 
|__| 3. 1 OR 2 YR. 
|__| 4. SEV.A YEAR 
|__| 5. 1 A MONTH 
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|__| 6. 2-3 MONTH 
|__| 7. ABOUT WKLY 
|__| 8. WEEKLY 
|__| 9. SEV.A WEEK 
|__| 10. 1 A DAY 
|__| 11. SEV. A DAY 
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW 
|__| 99. NO ANSWER 
 
RELPERSN: To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person?  Are you...  
|__| 1. VERY RELIG 
|__| 2. MODERATE 
|__| 3. SLIGHTLY 
|__| 4. NOT AT ALL 
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW 
|__| 9. NO ANSWER 
 
SPRTPRSN: To what extent do you consider yourself a spiritual person?  Are you...  
|__| 1. VERY SPIRT 
|__| 2. MODERATE 
|__| 3. SLIGHTLY 
|__| 4. NOT AT ALL 
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW 
|__| 9. NO ANSWER 
 
HOMOSEX: What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex -- do you 
think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at 
all? 
|__| 1. ALWAYS WRG 
|__| 2. ALMOST AL. 
|__| 3. SOMETIMES 
|__| 4. NOT AT ALL 
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW 
|__| 9. NO ANSWER 
 
SEXEDUC: Would you be for or against sex education in the public schools?   
|__| 1. FOR 
|__| 2. AGAINST 
|__| 3. DEPENDS 
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW 
|__| 9. NO ANSWER 
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Socio-demographic Questions 
 
MARITAL: Are you currently -- married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you 
never been married?   
|__| 1. MARRIED 
|__| 2. WIDOWED 
|__| 3. DIVORCED 
|__| 4. SEPARATED 
|__| 5. NEV.MARR. 
|__| 9. NO ANSWER 
 
DWELLING: Dwelling type 
|__| 1. TRAILER 
|__| 2. SING.FAM. 
|__| 3. SIDE 2 
|__| 4. UP 2 
|__| 5. 3-4 UNIT 
|__| 6. ROW HOUSE 
|__| 7. 5+/3 STOR. 
|__| 8. 5+/4 STOR+ 
|__| 9. COMMERCIAL 
|__| 10. OTHER 
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW 
|__| 99. NO ANSWER 
 
AGE: RESPONDENT'S AGE (AGE) 
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW 
|__| 99. NO ANSWER 
 
EDUC: RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION: What is the highest grade in elementary school 
or high school that you finished and got credit for?   
|__| 0. NO SCHOOL. 
|__| 1. 1ST GRADE 
|__| 2. 2ND GRADE 
|__| 3. 3RD GRADE 
|__| 4. 4TH GRADE 
|__| 5. 5TH GRADE 
|__| 6. 6TH GRADE 
|__| 7. 7TH GRADE 
|__| 8. 8TH GRADE 
|__| 9. 9TH GRADE 
|__| 10. 10TH GRADE 
|__| 11. 11TH GRADE 
|__| 12. 12TH GRADE 
|__| 13. COLL:1 YR 
|__| 14. COLL:2 YR 
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|__| 15. COLL:3 YR 
|__| 16. COLL:4 YR 
|__| 17. COLL:5 YR 
|__| 18. COLL:6 YR 
|__| 19. COLL:7 YR 
|__| 20. COLL:8 YR 
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW 
|__| 99. NO ANSWER 
 
DEGREE: Highest educational degree earned by respondent   
|__| 0. NOT H.S. 
|__| 1. HIGH SCH. 
|__| 2. JR. COL. 
|__| 3. B.A. 
|__| 4. GRAD. DEG. 
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW 
|__| 9. NO ANSWER 
 
WORKING: Last week were you working full time, part time, going to school, keeping 
house, or what? 
|__| 1. FULL TIME 
|__| 2. PART TIME 
|__| 3. ON LEAVE 
|__| 4. UNEMPLOYED 
|__| 5. RETIRED 
|__| 6. IN SCHOOL 
|__| 7. KEEP.HOUSE 
|__| 8. OTHER 
|__| 9. NO ANSWER 
 
RACE: Respondent's race   
|__| 1. WHITE  
|__| 2. BLACK 
|__| 3. OTHER 
 
SEX: Respondent's sex   
|__| 1. MALE 
|__| 2. FEMALE 
 
INCOME06: In which of these groups did your total family income, from all sources, fall 
last year before taxes, that is?   
|__| 1. < $1000 
|__| 2. $1K -2999 
|__| 3. $3K -3999 
|__| 4. $4K -4999 
|__| 5. $5K -5999 
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|__| 6. $6K -6999 
|__| 7. $7K -7999 
|__| 8. $8K -9999 
|__| 9. $10K-12.4K 
|__| 10. 12.5K-14.9K 
|__| 11. $15K-17.4K 
|__| 12. 17.5K-19.9K 
|__| 13. 20K -22.4K 
|__| 14. 22.5K-24.9K 
|__| 15. 25K-29.9K 
|__| 16. 30K -34.9K 
|__| 17. 35K -39.9K 
|__| 18. 40K -49.9K 
|__| 19. 50K -59.9K 
|__| 20. 60K-74.9K 
|__| 21. 75K -89.9K 
|__| 22. 90K-109.9K 
|__| 23. 110K-129.9K 
|__| 24. 130K-149.9K 
|__| 25. 150K + 
|__| 26. REFUSED 
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW 
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